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Abstract 
 
 
In this dissertation the feasibility of Experientialism about the sense of bodily 
ownership (SBO) is explored and defended. An original experientialist proposal 
on the SBO is presented. On this view, for a subject to have a SBO is for her to 
be aware of (A) the experience-dependency of the properties involved in the 
content of somatosensory experiences; and (B) the relevant experiences as being 
her own. Clause (B) of the view requires acknowledging the existence of a sense 
of experience ownership (SEO). In the first half of the dissertation (Chapter 1 
and Chapter 2) I argue for the plausibility of this sort of approach by motivating 
the idea that there are explanatory relations between the SBO and the SEO, and 
criticising some rival views on the SBO. In the second half of the thesis (Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4) I substantiate and defend my proposal. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
We consciously perceive a myriad of things. The façades of buildings around 
us; the clatter of the subway in motion; the taste of coffee in the morning; a 
tickly throat when the plane trees spread their seeds in spring. Among all the 
things we perceive, there is only one of which philosophers agree to say that 
we perceive it from the inside: our own body. 
Indeed, for each of us, and for all the objects we have conscious 
experiences of, there is one body that is significant to us in a way in which no 
other object is. Descartes said that he called this one body “mine” by some special 
right.1 It has been a major philosophical issue across the centuries to figure out 
what this special right exactly is. Plausibly, it breaks into several elements. For 
instance, the body is the origin of our viewpoint on the world. It is also the 
organ of the will:2 the object we can directly move and control, and with which 
we can perform actions and manipulate the environment. It is the object that 
matters the most for our survival – at least, the object whose corruption affects 
us most directly. And it is, as well, an object we seem to have a special 
perceptual relationship with – one intendedly captured by the expression from 
the inside. But what is it exactly to feel the body from the inside? And most 
importantly: in what sense and to what extent feeling the body in this way 
legitimises our calling it “mine”? 
This dissertation is an inquiry into these questions. Note that, if walking 
down the street I randomly entered one of the blocks around me, there would 
be a sense in which I would then get to visually perceive the building from the 
inside. But nothing in this perceptual experience of the building would grant 
me a right of any sort to call the building mine, just as contemplating its façade 
from the outside doesn’t by itself grant me this right either. This contrast 
suggests the following: what we intend to capture when we describe our 
awareness of the body as an awareness of it from the inside differs from 
anything we tend to say about worldly objects and space, and about our 
relationship with them. The expression captures a peculiar type of experience, 
reserved to experiences of the body, that links this one object to ourselves in a 
singularly intimate way. 
                                                 
1  In his Metaphysical Meditations (Med. 6, AT 7:76). All the quotes from the Metaphysical 
Meditations in English are taken from Descartes (1996). 
2 As Husserl (1989, §38) eloquently called it. 
 2 
Part of what we intend to capture with this expression was actually 
pointed at by Descartes himself in a very celebrated passage: 
 
Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that 
I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am 
very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body 
form a unit. If this were not so, I … would not feel pain when the body was hurt, 
but would perceive the damage … just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in 
the ship is broken. (Med. 6, AT 7:81) 
 
It is in virtue of his sensations of pain, hunger, or thirst, that Descartes learns 
that he is intermingled with his body. This is not something he could have learned 
on any grounds whatsoever, he points out: for instance, perceiving the damage 
in the body “as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in the ship is broken” 
would make for a remarkably different sort of experience of the body. In fact, 
when out into the open sea, Descartes’ sailor will surely perceive the ship from 
the inside in some sense. In particular, in a sense similar to that in which I will 
see the building from the inside if I cross the threshold. But bodily sensations3 
are somewhat different. They have a phenomenology that conveys the 
properties of an object, namely the body, in a way that allows Descartes to 
claim that “I and the body form a unity”. 
This peculiar perceptual relationship with our body is arguably part of 
what shapes philosophical discussions on the metaphysics of selves, as well as 
on personal identity. Does this relationship constitute a reason to think that we 
are our bodies? Or are we simply in our bodies, even if not exactly as a sailor is 
in a ship? And so, is it in virtue of our body’s persistence that we endure in 
time? This thesis does not touch upon metaphysical questions of this sort, 
however. Rather, my concern is restricted to the phenomenology: is there really 
anything about my experience of the body in bodily sensations that reveals me 
the body as mine? And if so, what about it? 
In the last few years, there has been a very lively debate around the latter 
questions in the philosophical literature. Philosophers working in the 
intersection between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of cognitive 
sciences have quite consistently adopted the expression sense of bodily ownership 
to name the subject matter of this debate. Other expressions such as 
                                                 
3  Throughout this dissertation I will use “bodily experiences” and “bodily sensations” 
interchangeably. I will also use the term “somatosensation” and its derivatives to refer to 
bodily sensations in general. 
 3 
phenomenology of ownership, sense of mineness, or for-me-ness are also used in this 
context, as well as in other discussions in the vicinity. In this dissertation I will 
stick to the first idiom. My aim is to contribute to the debate on the sense of 
bodily ownership, and to do so in various ways. 
As often happens with philosophical discussions that, in their own terms, 
are relatively new, it is not entirely straightforward to see what is at stake in the 
debate about the sense of bodily ownership. There is thus some work to be 
done to clarify the terms of the discussion, and to elucidate what the 
disagreements in it actually are about. Chapter 1 in this dissertation is partly 
devoted to this. In Chapter 1, I propose a non question-begging definition of 
the sense of bodily ownership that allows to situate the different views on it as 
answers to a clear question. I distinguish the sense of bodily ownership from 
another phenomenon, which I call sense of experience ownership, to carefully see 
the differences, and most importantly the similarities, between the two of 
them. By doing this I highlight the fact that both notions are key pieces within 
the major philosophical matter of self-consciousness. I thereby motivate the 
idea that there might be deep explanatory relations between them. 
Chapter 2 is a critical chapter. I address some views on the sense of bodily 
ownership available in the literature, and argue that they do not offer 
satisfactory accounts of the phenomenon at stake. 
Finally, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I present an original, positive proposal 
on the sense of bodily ownership. My view exploits the resources that the 
views addressed in Chapter 2 put forward in their respective analyses of bodily 
sensations. However, my proposal goes beyond the views criticised, by 
claiming that the sense of experience ownership is part of the explanation of 
the sense of bodily ownership. Hence, on my view it becomes clear what we 
gain by endorsing the independently motivated idea of there being explanatory 
relations between these two phenomena. The motivation and main substance 
of the view are presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I address some 
objections to it and underpin it by showing how it meets all our explanatory 
demands. 
 
After this brief introduction, in the rest of this dissertation I will not resort to 
the expression from the inside anymore: from the point of view of the 
phenomenology, this expression is as evocative as it is limited. The class of 
bodily sensations includes very rich and varied types of phenomenologies: 
what it is like to have a headache is remarkably different from what it is like to 
 4 
be hungry. And yet, as Descartes tells us, there is something that all bodily 
sensations seem to have in common. Saying that they all convey the body from 
the inside gives us a flavour of this phenomenal commonality. From this point 
of view, the expression is thus an effective placeholder for whatever this 
commonality might be, but it just leaves us at the door of a deeper 
phenomenological discussion. After giving an extensional definition of the 
class of bodily sensations in the first chapter, part of the point of this 
dissertation is to engage in this discussion. I will proceed on the conviction 
that spelling out how we actually experience our bodies when we have bodily 
sensations helps settle our worry: why knowing our bodies in this way is such 
an important part of our special right to call them ours.  
 5 
Chapter 1  
 
Senses of Ownership 
 
 
The first chapter of this dissertation has both an introductory and a positive 
character. On the one hand, in this chapter I present the central topic of the 
thesis, establishing the basic terminology to be put into play in the rest of the 
dissertation as well as offering an outline of the state of the art relative to it. I 
thereby define the scope and goals of the present work. On the other hand, the 
main points contained in the pages to follow are, I think, philosophically 
significant by themselves, besides being argumentatively relevant in the context 
of the whole dissertation. 
The positive claims I put forward in this chapter are summarised in the six 
points below. Some of the claims are central, because they concern the core 
topic of the dissertation; some others are supplementary, because they do not 
directly concern the core topic of the dissertation, but other issues that are 
relevant to it in ways to be defined. Some of the points I will make mainly have 
a programmatic character, namely they concern the structure and guidelines of a 
given debate in the literature; whereas others are substantive, in the sense that 
they are about the specific objects of study of the relevant debates. One of the 
points is descriptive, in that it is just the statement of a fact relevant to the overall 
project of this dissertation. Finally, this chapter makes a general motivating 
point, since it puts forward some of the reasons why the kind of view that I 
will defend in this dissertation seems prima facie plausible. 
Briefly put, here are the main claims and objectives of this chapter: 
 
(i) Central Substantive Point: I propose that there exists what I will call a 
sense of bodily ownership involved in bodily experiences. The sense of 
bodily ownership is the core topic of this dissertation. I will argue 
that there are three defining features to the sense of bodily 
ownership: the involvement of the first-person in it, the seeming 
compellingness of this involvement, and its empirical relevance. My 
ultimate goal in this dissertation is to present and defend an original 
view on the sense of bodily ownership (chapters 3 and 4). 
 6 
(ii) Central Programmatic Point: I stress that the views that intend to 
account for the sense of bodily ownership aim at putting forward an 
answer to what I will call the Constitutive Question. Besides, I point out 
how the defining features of the phenomenon, mentioned in (i), 
dictate three desiderata that any such theory has to meet. I label 
these desiderata Judgment Formation Goal, Intuitive Goal, and Empirical 
Goal. This observation is central because these goals give the 
yardstick to the validity of views on the sense of bodily ownership. 
Views can be criticised on the grounds of not meeting the goals (as 
will be done in Chapter 2), and conversely, can be validated on the 
grounds of meeting them all. Notice that my own proposed view 
will therefore have to meet them if it is to succeed. 
(iii) Supplementary Substantive Point: I claim that there exists what I will call 
a sense of experience ownership, typically involved in all conscious 
experiences. I will point out that the sense of experience ownership 
has the following core, philosophically significant features, which 
parallel mutatis mutandis those of the sense of bodily ownership: 
the first-person involvement in it, the seeming compellingness of 
this involvement, and its empirical relevance. This point is 
supplementary because I will not try to offer an account of the sense 
of experience ownership in this dissertation. However, the notion is 
relevant because it will play a role in my positive account of the 
sense of bodily ownership. 
(iv) Supplementary Programmatic Point: I claim that the views aimed at 
accounting for the sense of experience ownership aim at answering 
what I will call the Constitutive Question – E. Besides, the defining 
features of the sense of experience ownership mentioned in (iii) 
dictate three goals for these views, which I will call Judgment 
Formation Goal – E, Intuitive Goal – E, and Empirical Goal – E. I 
therefore suggest that the inquiries into the sense of bodily 
ownership and the sense of experience ownership pursued in the 
literature are relevantly similar. This point is supplementary because 
it is formulated in the context of assessing a phenomenon that is 
itself supplementary in the dissertation. 
(v)  Descriptive Point:  I will underline what I take to be a fact relevant to 
the notions of a sense of bodily ownership and a sense of 
experience ownership, and more generally to the project of offering 
 7 
an account of the former. The fact is that the sense of bodily 
ownership and the sense of experience ownership co-occur in 
bodily experiences. Besides, and importantly, I will motivate the idea 
that the co-occurrence of these two phenomena in bodily 
experiences is not a mere co-occurrence. 
(vi) Motivating Point: I will point out that the previous claims, jointly 
considered – specially (i), (iii), and (v) –, constitute part of the 
motivation for the kind of view that I will defend in this 
dissertation.4 In particular, I take these points to make plausible the 
idea that there are explanatory relations between the sense of bodily 
ownership and the sense of experience ownership.5 
 
1. 1. The Sense of Bodily Ownership (SBO) 
 
If I now close my eyes and pay attention to my body, I would say my legs are 
crossed and my hands are resting on the keyboard in front of me. I would also 
report, if asked to, some mild, intermittent twinges in the right side of my 
lower back. I would thus be reporting some of my current bodily experiences. 
Upon scrutiny, it is clear that by entertaining judgments such as “I can feel 
that my legs are crossed” I am taking myself to be the subject of a mental state 
– just as I do when I say, for instance, “I am thinking of you” –, but also the 
subject of the body to which I am ascribing certain properties. Evidence of this 
are the two first-person pronouns in the relevant statement just mentioned. 
Indeed, eyes closed, not only do I realise that it is me who feels some legs 
being crossed or an aching back, but also that these crossed legs and aching 
back are mine. 
This dissertation focuses on bodily sensations, namely the class of 
phenomenally conscious mental states that includes the following experiences: 
proprioception (experiences of bodily posture through the detection of muscle 
length and tension, and joint pressure and angle), kinaesthesia (experiences of 
limb movement), sensations related to balance, 6  touch, feelings of bodily 
                                                 
4 The rest of the motivation for the view will be the failure of alternative accounts. 
5 With a different terminology, Billon (2017b) also suggests that there are such explanatory 
relations. Bermúdez (2018a, 2018b) follows up on this suggestion by defending that there is an 
interdependence between the two phenomena. As I will make clear in chapters 3 and 4, and will 
start to motivate already in the present chapter, my specific suggestion will be that the sense of 
bodily ownership depends on the sense of experience ownership. I am thus not committed to 
the claim that the sense of experience ownership depends on the sense of bodily ownership. 
6 The vestibular system, the complex of balance organs in the inner ear, performs highly 
 8 
temperature, pain, and interoception (sensations relative to general 
homeostasis, such as hunger or thirst, and sensations of internal organs). In 
particular, this dissertation revolves around the following fact: bodily 
experiences are mental states typically suitable to be reported in judgments that 
are de se in that subjects endowed with a conceptual system or language 
express them by qualifying the felt body with a first-person indexical. For 
instance, eyes closed, I do not simply report feeling a back in pain. I report 
feeling that the painful back is mine. 
Let us call judgments in which bodily experiences are reported, such as “I 
can feel that my legs are crossed” or “I have a pain on the right side of my 
lower back”, judgments of somatosensation. 7  And let us grant that, when one 
sincerely asserts8 judgments of somatosensation that are first-personal in that 
they involve a first-person pronoun qualifying the felt body – or could involve 
it and still count as accurate reports of the relevant experiences –, one 
expresses awareness of the body one feels as being one’s own. The notion of a 
sense of bodily ownership (SBO) captures this fact. To put it straightforwardly: 
 
[SBO]: for one to have a sense of bodily ownership is for one to be aware 
of the body one feels in bodily experience as being one’s own. 
 
Two notes about the notion of awareness in [SBO] are required. Firstly, it is non-
factive. The phenomenon described in [SBO] is different, and presumably 
independent, from whether the body one feels in a given situation is actually 
one’s own according to the relevant metaphysical considerations regarding 
which body counts as each subject’s. In particular, consider a body B and a 
subject S, and suppose that S feels B somatosensorily at t, and judges B to be 
her own body at t. [SBO] is compatible with the claim that B is actually not S’s 
body at t, metaphysically speaking. For instance, the SBO is conceivably 
involved in crossed wire cases, namely thought experiments in which a subject 
is wired up to what, by other criteria, we would take to be someone else’s 
                                                                                                                            
convergent and multimodal processing. It is sometimes assumed that it is phenomenologically 
“silent”, since most conditions that activate it also activate other sensors such as 
proprioceptors and tactile receptors (e.g. Day & Fitzpatrick, 2005, R583; but see Wong, 2017). 
Remaining non-committal on the discussion about the specificity of a phenomenology of 
balance, here I mean to include all those sensations connected with being in and out of 
balance, such as vertigo, dizziness, or the sensation of spinning around. 
7  I will sometimes use “judgments of ownership” instead, for reasons that will become 
immediately clear. 
8 The notion of asserting here is to be understood broadly, encompassing both avowals and 
introspective judgments. 
 9 
body, and has experiences caused by it – experiences that are subjectively 
indistinguishable from ordinary episodes of somatosensation caused by what 
would typically count as her own body. Furthermore, the SBO is also present 
in cases in which subjects feel as their own an inexistent body (part), as it is 
usually the case in phantom limb experiences. 
Secondly, the notion of awareness at stake in [SBO] is the most neutral 
possible, namely one we can assume is involved in any sincere judgment, and 
thus in particular in judgments intended as reports of bodily experiences. In 
this sense, a speaker manifests awareness of the body she feels as being her own to 
the extent that she reports that she takes this body to be her own by tokening 
the first-person pronoun in the content position when reporting her bodily 
sensations. Correspondingly, a subject is aware of the body she feels as being her 
own to the extent that she would report her bodily experience via statements of 
the mentioned sort. I will henceforth assume that there is such a thing as being 
aware of the body one feels as being one’s own, that is, that there is such a 
thing as a SBO. Given the notion of awareness at stake in [SBO], this 
assumption should be found uncontroversial. 
Having laid out [SBO] and the relevant caveats, a question emerges that 
provides the backbone of the debate in which this dissertation takes part: what 
is the nature of the awareness involved in being aware of the body one feels in 
bodily experience as being one’s own? Let us call this question the Constitutive 
Question. Several authors in the philosophical literature have attempted to offer 
accounts of the SBO. Offering an account of the SBO means offering an 
answer to the Constitutive Question. The final aim of this dissertation is to put 
forward an original view on the SBO, and hence to answer this question. 
In the next section I draw the map of the several views on this 
phenomenon already available in the literature. Afterwards, in section 1.3, I put 
forward a set of desiderata that, I shall argue, any satisfactory view on the SBO 
should meet. These desiderata emerge from taking into account the defining 
features of the phenomenon under consideration. 
 
1. 2. Landscape of Views on the SBO 
 
There are two broad lines of reply to the Constitutive Question in the 
literature. On the one hand, one could claim that subjects are aware of the 
body they feel in bodily experiences as being their own only if they judge that 
that body is their own (Alsmith, 2015; Wu, forthcoming). This seems to 
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assume that the SBO consists, maybe only partly but crucially, of judgments 
involving a relative of the I-concept – or of the exercise of capacities related to 
judgment formation, and in particular to the formation of judgments of 
somatosensation –, hence going beyond anything in the content of bodily 
experiences themselves. This view is thus compatible with the idea that bodily 
experiences involve no specific component that stands for the first-person 
figuring in judgment – being, so to speak, selfless (Chadha, 2018). 
Let us label the accounts along these lines Judgmentalist Accounts. Notice 
that Judgmentalist Accounts are also compatible with there being some 
phenomenology specifically attached to the SBO – that is, one derived from 
making the relevant judgment, and so maybe one of a cognitive kind (Alsmith, 
2015, 884). While such phenomenology could then be said to be part of what 
the SBO consists of, it would not be part of the epistemic basis for judgments 
of ownership, but rather just some byproduct of them. A consequence of 
Judgmentalist Accounts is that creatures that do not have the relevant 
judgment related capacities do not enjoy a SBO – even if they have experiences 
otherwise identical to those that would yield judgments of ownership, and 
hence a SBO, in creatures with the relevant conceptual capacities. 
However, the Constitutive Question could plausibly be answered in the 
opposite sense. One can defend that there are experiences of bodily ownership 
that are independent of cognitive acts of bodily self-attribution (ibid., 883). Let 
us call the accounts within this trend Experientialist Accounts. These views 
assume that there is some component of bodily experiences themselves that 
stands for the first-person that eventually figures in judgment. On these views, 
the SBO consists of a certain aspect of what it is like to undergo bodily 
experiences, and therefore the epistemic basis for judgments of 
somatosensation that are de se in the way now relevant will involve a first-
person element.9 
Given the phenomenal richness of bodily experiences, this element could 
be specified in several ways. As the discussion has been set, it is natural to say 
that bodily experiences are mental states that convey something to the 
                                                 
9 Although the twofold divide of views sketched here is partly based on Alsmith’s (2015), I 
have opted for a change in the terminology. Alsmith calls his own account “Cognitive”, and 
labels the accounts in the opposite strand of the debate “Phenomenal”. In this dissertation I 
use “Experientialist” instead of “Phenomenal” – thereby avoiding the suggestion that, on the 
views under this label, the SBO is related to the strictly phenomenal properties of somatosensory 
experiences as opposed to their representational content. In turn, I use “Judgmentalist” instead of 
“Cognitive” – avoiding the opposition cognitive/experiential, and thereby remaining neutral on 
whether cognitive states qualify as experiences. 
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experiencing subject: eyes closed, I report that my legs are in this or that 
position, or that there is painfulness in my lower back. More specifically, by 
undergoing bodily experiences, subjects are typically aware of the state and 
condition of a body. In this sense, bodily experiences are mental states with 
content. This content can be spelled out minimally in terms of properties or 
qualities (Position, Movement, and the like) that seemingly qualify the body or 
some of its parts. On these grounds, this content is generally said to have both 
a qualitative and a spatial dimension.10 In this dissertation I take for granted 
from the outset this general assumption about the content of bodily 
experiences, which will be unpacked as the dissertation unfolds.11 
Experientialist Accounts divide according to the role they assign to these 
dimensions of bodily experiences in accounting for the SBO. For one thing, a 
distinction has been traced between deflationary and inflationary views 
(Bermúdez, 2011; Bermúdez, 2015). Deflationism defends that the component 
of bodily sensations that constitutes the SBO is not “a positive quality over 
and above the felt quality of sensation and the location” (Martin, 1995: 270). 
The sense that the felt body is one’s own is then spelled out in terms of how 
space is represented in bodily experiences (Martin, 1995; de Vignemont, 2007; 
Bermúdez, 2017); or of the kind of sensory qualities, which in principle track 
the relevant bodily events, that one feels when undergoing them (Dokic, 2003). 
I call these views Spatial Deflationism and Property Deflationism respectively. 
This trend crucially distances itself from Inflationism – and in particular 
from what we could call Pure Inflationism. Bodily sensations, Pure Inflationism 
would maintain, do involve a dedicated mineness quale, irreducible to any of 
their other aspects (de Vignemont, 2013; Billon, 2017b). From this perspective, 
the awareness involved in bodily experiences that the felt body is one’s own 
consists of this specific quale. On this view, then, the first-person has the 
status of a primitive. Somewhere between Deflationism and Pure Inflationism, 
some authors enrich the phenomenology of bodily experiences and specify the 
SBO in terms of their affective character (de Vignemont, 2017, 2018; 
forthcoming); their agentive dimension (Peacocke, 2017); or an intrinsic, pre-
                                                 
10 Ordinarily, we might say of sensations, rather than of the properties they convey, that they are 
felt as localised somewhere in the body. This arguably reveals something about the nature of 
these properties (see e.g. Brewer, 1995). But I must leave this discussion for Chapter 3. On 
occasion, I will talk interchangeably of bodily sensations and bodily properties as localised, not 
meaning to entail that the former qua mental states are physically located, nor experienced as 
such. 
11 If the assumption that all sensations are localised is found controversial, see the discussion in 
Chapter 4, section 4.1.2 (“On Non-Localised Sensations”). 
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reflective self-consciousness involved in all such components (Gallagher, 
201712).13 
Notice that it is in principle compatible with Experientialist Accounts that 
creatures that do not entertain conceptually articulated judgments of 
ownership, or do not have the capacity to do so, have a SBO. If we spell out 
the SBO in terms of aspects of experiences, then in principle the only 
requirement for creatures to enjoy a SBO is that they have experiences of the 
relevant sort. This is of course dialectically relevant at this point to the extent 
that one assumes and operates with a notion of experience on which 
experiential contents are judgment or concept independent.14 
Throughout the several chapters of this dissertation, the feasibility of a 
fully Experientialist Account on the SBO is explored and defended. In 
particular, I examine the prospects of accounting for the SBO by exploiting the 
minimal set of elements postulated as part of the contents of somatosensory 
experiences: that is, the properties felt as instantiated in a location. The aim of this 
dissertation is to defend this possibility. However, I will make the case for the 
claim that, in order to do so, we need to appeal to a further element of our 
phenomenal lives, beyond those appealed to by the deflationist positions 
available in the literature. This element is the sense of experience ownership. I 
introduce the sense of experience ownership, and motivate the suitability of 
appealing to it in an inquiry into bodily self-awareness, after defining the basic 
goals for views on the SBO in the next section. 
 
 
                                                 
12 In his account of the SBO, Gallagher follows the classical phenomenological tradition in 
using the notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness. To avoid possible misunderstandings at 
this point, notice that in this tradition the very same notion is resorted to when accounting for 
what I will call “sense of experience ownership”. 
13 Billon (2017b) describes these views as versions of Inflationism, although different from 
what I have called “Pure Inflationism”. This is because these views are still somehow 
“mineness friendly”, since what they do still is substantiating the nature of the first-person 
quale in independent terms. Another way of making the same point is by saying that these 
authors reduce the first-person component to other phenomenally salient aspects of bodily 
experiences. 
14 Experientialists rarely make explicit, in their writings about the SBO, the assumption that the 
content of bodily experiences is nonconceptual (an exception being Peacocke, 2017). 
However, it does not seem far-fetched to attribute them this assumption. On the one hand, 
because some argue for these kind of contents of bodily experiences in other parts of their 
work (see e.g. Bermúdez, 1998, Chapter 6; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008, 161). On the other 
hand, because endorsing conceptualism about bodily experiences collapses, in the context of 
our debate, into Judgmentalist Accounts on the SBO. In this dissertation I will be assuming 
that the contents of somatosensory experiences are nonconceptual, but I will not arguing for it. 
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1.3. SBO: Basic Features and Goals for Views 
 
Surely, the outline of views just presented is to be framed within the context of 
acknowledging that there is such a thing as being aware of the body one feels 
as being one’s own. On this assumption, we wonder about the nature of this 
awareness. Any proper answer to the Constitutive Question will arguably imply 
a picture of bodily sensations, namely a specification of what their content is 
and what it is like to undergo them. [SBO], together with the foregoing 
considerations on the notion of awareness at stake, already suggest a basic 
desideratum that we should impose on this picture: it must offer, or allow for, 
an explanation of the first-personal character of all judgments aimed at 
reporting bodily sensations that are de se in the sense indicated. Our inquiry 
thus pursues the following goal: 
 
[Judgment Formation Goal]: any account of the SBO must explain the fact 
that we self-attribute the felt body for all judgments of somatosensation in 
which we do so. 
 
A preliminary aspect to notice about the formulation of this goal is the 
following: the specification of the type of judgments we are concerned with, 
namely judgments of somatosensation, is required, because there are 
judgments of bodily self-attribution that are not judgments of 
somatosensation. For instance, one might look at one’s anaesthetised hand and 
claim “My hand is lying on the stretcher” solely on the grounds of her visual 
perception of the hand. Judgments like this one do not fall under the scope of 
the present discussion – they do not involve a SBO.15 
The Judgment Formation Goal articulates the assumption that judgments 
of somatosensation in which the first-person features in the content position 
constitute our initial datum – something the existence of which all 
philosophers engaged in the debate on the SBO can agree on, and which 
deserves the status of an explanandum. It is precisely in the minimal sense of 
there being judgments of bodily self-attribution that we find the claim about 
the existence of the SBO straightforwardly uncontroversial. Also, it is from 
this standpoint that we can set the Constitutive Question without begging the 
question. Notice that, as it is formulated, the Judgment Formation Goal should 
be acceptable by so-called de se sceptics, for whom strictly speaking bodily 
                                                 
15 The reason for this will become evident immediately, in the motivation of the second goal.  
 14 
self-attributions are not grounded on anything first-personal intrinsic to the 
content of bodily experiences (Cappelen and Dever, 2013; Magidor, 2015). 
Likewise, judgmentalists in the abovementioned divide also can, and should, be 
committed to it. 
With this in mind, note also that this goal now allows for a refinement of 
the twofold divide of views mentioned above: the difference between 
Experientialist and Judgmentalist Accounts mainly lies in that the former pick 
out a specific aspect of the phenomenology of bodily experiences to carry the 
explanatory and constitutive burdens with respect to the SBO, thus not 
focusing just on facts about the relevant cognitive acts. However, we now see 
that Judgmentalist Accounts should also ultimately be able to specify what the 
proper grounds for the relevant judgments are, that is, what the experiences 
that underlie judgments of ownership are like.16 
With this first aim in view, the second desideratum that, I contend, all 
accounts of the SBO must meet is dictated by a central feature of the relation 
between bodily sensations and judgments of somatosensation. This feature 
illuminates a contrast between bodily sensations and external perception, when 
it comes to the types of judgments we ordinarily conceive of them as possibly 
yielding. To illustrate this, recall that Ernst Mach (1914) once got on an 
omnibus and had a visual perception of what seemed to him a shabby 
pedagogue at the other end. He then realised that he was actually looking in a 
mirror, subsequently thinking “I am a shabby pedagogue!”. After the 
revelation, but not before, he was aware that the body he visually perceived 
was his own. 
Surprising as revelations of this kind are in ordinary life, they seem in 
order. More generally put, several of our experiences beyond bodily sensations 
involve bodies as part of their content – for instance, visual experiences. Yet, 
this being the case, it does not seem specially problematic for a visual 
                                                 
16 José Luis Bermúdez, who defines himself as a deflationist on the SBO (see e.g. Bermúdez, 
2015, 38), describes Deflationism as accepting that there is a phenomenology of ownership, 
but also that the SBO consists “first, in certain facts about the phenomenology of bodily 
sensations and, second, in certain fairly obvious judgments about the body (which we can term 
judgments of ownership)” (2011, 162. My emphasis). Even if, in some versions, Experientialist 
Accounts assume that judgments of ownership are part of what it means to have a SBO, it is 
crucial to them that they do not eliminate, even if they deflate, the experiential awareness a 
subject has of her body as her own. In other words, it is crucial that they spell out the first-
person that figures in judgments of somatosensation (i) in terms that describe bodily experiences, 
(ii) which may or may not be independent of the very notion of ownership (notice that Pure 
Inflationism assumes (i), while not spelling out the first-person in terms independent of the 
notion of ownership). In contrast, Judgmentalist Accounts are compatible with eliminativism 
with respect to the first-person in somatosensation. 
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experience to occur in which a body is represented but is not taken by the 
perceiver to be her own. 17  This happens ordinarily when we perceive the 
bodies of others, and situations in which the relevant experience does indeed 
represent our own body, such as Mach’s, are also relatively common. 
The case seems remarkably different for bodily sensations. In fact, in the 
philosophical literature on bodily awareness it has classically been contended 
that, whenever bodily experiences occur, they necessarily come with their 
subject’s awareness that the body experienced is her own (e.g. O’Shaughnessy, 
1989; Martin, 1995; Dokic, 2003). This points in the direction of claiming that 
something for which we now seem to have empirical evidence is impossible, or 
at least inconceivable. After lesions in their right parietal lobe, 
somatoparaphrenic patients have delusional beliefs about the contralesional 
side of their bodies according to which this side, or parts of it, do not belong 
to them (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). Some such patients, however, are able to feel 
sensations in their “disowned” limbs. These patients undergo bodily 
experiences that have a body as their content, but they do not judge this body 
to be their own. These cases argue strongly for a nuanced formulation of the 
previous observation: there is a seemingly necessary link between the occurrence 
of bodily sensations and the involvement of the first-person in the content 
position in the experiencing subject’s reports of them. In other words, at least 
our intuitions generally point in the direction of taking this link to be 
necessary. 
It might be said that even this formulation is too concessive. After all, 
once somatoparaphrenia has become common knowledge in the literature, 
there is a sense of seeming in which it is no longer true that it seems to us that 
this necessary link exists.18 I contend that there is still a sense in which this 
intuition of necessity is relevant, despite the challenge from 
somatoparaphrenia. In fact, it seems to lie at the heart of the specific 
philosophical interest that the SBO raises. Notice that another context in 
which a similar tension arises is the discussion on the relation between being 
phenomenally conscious and self-attributing the state of which one is 
conscious in this way. The apparent compellingness of this connection, 
                                                 
17 An exception to this might be the awareness of one’s bodily location based on the position 
of the apex of the visual field. This is not problematic for my point. At most it suggests, 
plausibly, that awareness of bodily location on the mentioned grounds involves complications 
similar to the ones discussed in the SBO debate. 
18 I am thankful to an anonymous referee of my paper “The Bounded Body. On the Sense of 
Bodily Ownership and the Experience of Space” (forthcoming) for pressing me on this point. 
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undoubtedly lying behind its philosophical import, also informs the work on 
the phenomenon of thought insertion, which arguably challenges it. 19  In 
parallel, bodily sensations happen to be relevant to philosophical discussions 
on self-consciousness in a sense that other mental states are not. I believe that 
this mirrors, at the theoretical level, a folk intuition: bodily sensations, unlike 
exteroceptive perception in general, seem to us to be about ourselves in a 
specially compelling way.20 I suggest, speculatively, that it might actually be part 
of our folk concept of a bodily sensation that, on the one hand, it concerns our 
own body, and on the other hand, it correspondingly involves a SBO – thus 
being somehow unconceivable that an experience of this type occurs without it 
involving awareness that the felt body is our own. 
This might well be based on the fact that, in normal circumstances, bodily 
sensations are indeed about ourselves, and correspondingly and more 
importantly in this context, that in normal circumstances we do take their 
contents to be our own bodies. In other words, the intuition might be 
grounded on the fact that bodily sensations, typically caused by the body of the 
subject who is having the experience, generally involve awareness, on the part 
of this subject, that the body she feels is indeed her own. 
All in all, on the assumption that we want a theory on the SBO to fulfil 
the Judgment Formation Goal, it is crucial to the project of explaining what 
the SBO consists of that it accounts for a central feature of the relation 
between bodily experiences and judgments of somatosensation. Let me express 
it straightforwardly in terms of a second desideratum: 
 
[Intuitive Goal]: any account of the SBO must specify the SBO in terms that 
explain the seemingly necessary link that bodily experiences, but not 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Frith (1992), Campbell (2002a), and Gallagher (2015). I will elaborate on this in 
section 1.4.3 below. 
20 Some illusions of ownership such as the rubber hand illusion (Botvinik and Cohen, 1998; 
RHI henceforth), in which the self-attribution might be found compelling in the way indicated, 
are usually described as exteroceptively induced. This is not problematic: firstly, because here I 
am appealing to a general intuition of contrast between external perception and bodily 
experiences that may have exceptions in both directions. For instance, as acknowledged above 
(fn. 17), judgments about one’s own body based on the position of the apex of the visual field 
might be such an exception – and arguably perspective plays a role in the RHI. Secondly, and 
most importantly, because the success of the RHI also depends on proprioceptive feedback. I 
will take up this issue immediately below. 
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exteroceptive experiences,21 have with the awareness of the experienced 
body as one’s own. 
 
Just to clarify, this goal points out that whatever it is about bodily experiences 
that explains the awareness that they are about me, it will need to be 
sufficiently distinctive of them vis à vis external perception. The relevant 
feature, distinctive of bodily experiences, will hold the key to explaining why 
bodily sensations involve awareness of the felt body as one’s own in normal 
circumstances. In turn, this will help make sense of the mentioned intuition of 
necessity. 
These considerations evince the very tight connection existing between 
the Judgment Formation and Intuitive goals: they actually are two sides to the 
same coin. On the one hand, meeting the former will have an immediate 
bearing on the latter: an account of the SBO that meets the Judgment 
Formation Goal will confer the explanatory burden to a trait typically involved 
in having bodily experiences – since it is part of what we are assuming that 
these experiences typically yield judgments of ownership. Hence, it will 
immediately be one capable of meeting the Intuitive Goal. On the other hand, 
what the Intuitive Goal does is actually assuming and specifying the Judgment 
Formation Goal: it calls attention to the fact that the element that serves as an 
explanation for the first-personal component of judgments of somatosensation 
should be involved in bodily experiences in a way that allows to make sense of 
the seeming compellingness with which the latter yield the former.22 
There is still one more goal for theories on the SBO, I contend. It should 
be noted that the notion of SBO concerns phenomena of an empirical nature. 
The third and last goal expresses the need for theories on the SBO to be 
extensionally adequate. Here is a straightforward formulation of the 
desideratum: 
 
[Empirical Goal]: any account of the SBO must leave room for the specific, 
sometimes abnormal relations between bodily sensations and the 
                                                 
21 Setting aside visual experiences of a body from a certain perspective, as mentioned above 
(fn. 17 and fn. 20). 
22 Notice that, hence, if a given view on the SBO specifies it in terms of an element involved in 
other experiences, and these experiences do not yield first-person judgments nor seem to do 
so, then this is a limitation of the view. Several of the critical arguments that I deploy in 
Chapter 2 against Deflationist Accounts consist in stressing this particular limitation. 
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awareness of the felt body as one’s own we seem to have evidence for in 
some pathological and experimental cases. 
 
The Empirical Goal arises from considering the vast array of empirical cases 
reported in the literature that are relevant to the discussion on the SBO. In 
particular, it indicates that a view on this phenomenon needs to take them into 
account. The relevant cases split into pathological conditions and observations 
made in experimental setups. Let me now briefly articulate a central case for 
each category in order to give a sense of the kind of difficulties that theories on 
the SBO might confront. Besides, I will also mention other important cases of 
each class.23 
I already mentioned above the central pathology for discussions on the 
SBO, that is, somatoparaphrenia. Moro et al. (2004) report the case of two 
right-brain damaged patients who suffer from tactile extinction in their 
contralesional hand – namely unawareness of being touched in it, if touched 
simultaneously on their ipsilesional limb. Concomitantly, the patients deny 
ownership of the affected hand. Relying on studies on the influences of spatial 
disposition of the affected limb on tactile detection, Moro et al. show that 
extinction phenomena are actually absent if stimuli are delivered to the left 
hand when it is placed in the right hemispace. Crucially, however, they also 
show that spatial disposition has no effects in reports of disownership: patients 
keep reporting that their left hand does not belong to them, regardless of 
where it is located. In the description of one of the cases the authors write, for 
instance, that “[s]pecifically asked about how it was possible to perceive stimuli 
delivered to another’s hand, the patient reported that ‘many strange things can 
happen in life’” (440). These patients thus undergo bodily sensations in the left 
hand – specifically, tactile sensations –, but still do not report to experience the 
touched hand as their own. If we take their reports at face value, we have 
reasons to think that their bodily experiences do not involve a SBO at all. 
These would hence be cases in which experiences of a type that typically 
involve a SBO occur, but in which this typical link is broken. 
At this point, one might legitimately wonder the following: in what 
specific sense must these theories take into account cases like 
somatoparaphrenia, characterised by not involving the first-person in reports of 
                                                 
23 I will only elaborate on the details of these cases when required by the specific arguments 
developed at other points of this dissertation, specially when assessing how my own proposal 
deals with this third desideratum (Chapter 4, section 4.2.3). 
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somatosensation, if what our first desideratum asks for – and what the very 
notion of SBO ultimately is about – is an explanation for the cases in which 
the relevant judgments are at stake? What is exactly the constraint imposed by 
the Empirical Goal, in this sense? In fact, that somatoparaphrenic patients 
express disownership for their limbs might arguably tell little about ownership 
phenomena. Even more, disownership might have to be treated as a separate 
phenomenon altogether (Bermúdez, 2011; de Vignemont, 2011, 2018; Chadha, 
2018). The reply to this fair worry is that, even if we are indeed not asking of 
theories on the SBO that they offer a positive explanation of the disownership 
expressed by somatoparaphrenic patients, these cases still are, so to speak, 
retaining walls for the theories. As the Empirical Goal states, we must leave 
room for them: an account of the SBO that precludes the possibility that the 
empirical cases reported in the literature exist is not acceptable, unless it offers 
an independent interpretation of the empirical results that rules them out as 
putative counterexamples. 
Other pathologies discussed in the literature in connection with the notion 
of ownership include depersonalisation – in which conscious experiences other 
than bodily sensations also appear distorted (Billon, 2016a); xenomelia (Berti, 
2013; Romano et al., 2015); congenital insensitivity to pain (Nagasako et al., 
2003); and deafferentation – which poses difficulties on the edge between 
ownership and the sense of agency (Cole and Paillard, 1995; Gallagher, 2004; 
Frith, 2004). 
On the side of experimental cases, the paradigmatic one for philosophers 
working on the SBO is the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI; Botvinik and Cohen, 
1998). In the original setup of the experiment, the illusion is elicited by having 
subjects seat with their left arm resting on a table and placing a screen beside 
the arm in order to hide it from their view. A rubber model of a left arm and 
hand is placed on the table in from of them. The experimenter then strokes the 
rubber hand and the subject’s hidden hand with two paintbrushes, making 
simultaneous movements, while the subjects’ eyes are fixated on the rubber 
hand. Afterwards, the subjects complete a questionnaire aimed at capturing 
their experience during the stroking. The questionnaires show that the subjects 
“agree strongly” with the following claims: “it seemed as if I were feeling the 
touch of the paintbrush in the location where I saw the rubber hand touched”; 
“it seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching 
the rubber hand”; and “I felt as if the rubber hand were my hand”. 
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The RHI is typically taken to unveil the multimodality underlying the 
SBO. It is key to eliciting the illusion that there is a spatial and temporal 
congruence of the visual, tactile, and proprioceptive inputs in arm-centred 
frames of reference: the movement of the paintbrush that subjects feel on their 
skin and that of the paintbrush they see on the rubber hand are consistent; and 
so are the somatosensorily detected position of their left upper limb and the 
visually perceived position of the rubber limb. According to Botvinik and 
Cohen, the RHI shows that intermodal matching is sufficient for self-
attribution. More specifically, it shows that somatosensation can adopt a 
secondary role with respect to vision when it comes to determining the 
location of self-attributed (body-like) objects. This is most clearly manifested in 
the first report above (“it seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the 
paintbrush in the location where I saw the rubber hand touched”) – as well as in a 
modification of the initial experimental setup in which subjects are asked to 
indicate the location of their left hand with their right hand after the stroking, 
to which they respond by locating it closer to the rubber hand than to their 
own left hand. 
Contrary to the case of somatoparaphrenic patients, who deny ownership 
of their own limbs, subjects under the RHI self-attribute a limb that is actually 
not their own. Notice that, given the notion of SBO defined above, subjects 
under the RHI can be said to have a SBO for the rubber hand, since they report 
that the rubber hand feels like their own. Furthermore, since in the RHI there 
also seems to be a shift in the location of the tactile sensation towards the 
rubber hand, or so subjects report, the intuition that occurrent bodily 
sensations must be accompanied by a SBO is not challenged: in particular, 
subjects have a SBO for the limb towards which they feel the sensation to be 
instantiated, namely for the rubber hand.24 
Besides the RHI, there are other experimental results discussed in the 
literature in connection with the notion of ownership, drawn from the 
                                                 
24  Admittedly, this requires a further qualification on [SBO]. According to the definition 
offered, one has a SBO if and only if one is aware of the body one feels in bodily experience as 
being one’s own. The rubber hand is obviously not the limb from which subjects under the 
illusion receive somatosensory feedback, and therefore, it might be observed, strictly speaking 
it is not the limb they feel in bodily experience. To solve this puzzle, the non-factive character of 
[SBO] needs to be vindicated. Bodily experience is crucially involved in the RHI: the RHI 
actually consists in an illusory bodily experience in which subjects have a tactile sensation part of 
the content of which is the rubber hand (namely the non-illusory content of their visual 
experience). The subject’s mislocation both of the hand and of the sensation are evidence of 
this. Hence, on this non-factive reading, the rubber hand is the hand that subjects (seem to) 
feel in bodily experience, of which they report they feel as if it was their own. 
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elicitation of several other bodily illusions such as the invisible hand illusion 
(Guterstam et al., 2013); the full body illusion (see e.g. Lenggenhager et al., 
2007); the out of body illusion (see e.g. Thakkar et al., 2011; Guterstam and 
Ehrsson, 2012); and the body-swap illusion (see e.g. Petkova et al., 2011). All 
these empirical cases, pathological and experimental, put on the table a range 
of actual situations in which bodily experiences occur that bare abnormal 
relationships with judgments of ownership, thereby delimiting the scope of 
phenomena that need to be taken into account in our discussion. What the 
Empirical Goal does is making this necessity explicit, and stating that theories 
on the SBO should be able to accommodate all the relevant cases. 
To recapitulate, in the sections developed up to now I have elaborated on 
(i), the Central Substantive Point, and (ii), the Central Programmatic Point. I 
have proposed that there exists a SBO involved in bodily experiences, and I 
have outlined the philosophical research project built around it as the attempt 
to give an answer to the Constitutive Question. Besides, I have put forward 
three desiderata for theories on the SBO, thereby further explicating what the 
inquiry into the SBO consists on. Crucially, these desiderata emerge from 
reflection on three features that define the phenomenon under consideration: 
philosophers working on the SBO ultimately aim at spelling out the awareness 
subjects have of their body as their own in bodily sensations in a way such that 
accounts for the bodily self-attribution yielded by the relevant states (Judgment 
Formation Goal), which occurs seemingly compellingly whenever these states 
take place (Intuitive Goal), by being able to accommodate or explain away all 
the empirical cases, pathological and experimental, relevant to the discussion 
(Empirical Goal). On the way to developing these ideas, I have put forward the 
landscape of views on the SBO available in the literature. 
 
1.4. The Sense of Experience Ownership (SEO) 
 
1.4.1. Introducing the Notion: Senses of Ownership 
 
The notion of SBO has been introduced in the previous section in what was 
intended as the most neutral way possible. This is precisely what allowed me to 
pose the Constitutive Question. The characterisation is neutral in the sense 
that it only assumes what seem to be uncontroversial facts, namely: 
 
a) we make judgments intended to report our bodily experiences; 
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b) in normal circumstances, these judgments involve a first-person 
pronoun in the content position, that is, qualifying the body we 
judge to feel – or could involve it and count as accurate reports of 
the relevant bodily experiences; 
c) for every judgment of this sort, if it is sincere, the subject that 
entertains or utters it is aware of the body she feels as her own. 
 
I also put forward a further feature related to (a) and (b), namely that the 
tokening of a first-person pronoun in the content position in judgments 
intended to report bodily sensations seems remarkably compelling. 
Notice now that, as I suggested in the opening of this chapter, bodily 
experiences typically are mental states suitable to be reported in judgments that 
are de se in yet another sense: subjects endowed with a conceptual system or 
language would express them by using a first-person indexical in the subject 
position. Judgments such as “I can feel that my legs are crossed” or “I have a 
pain on the right side of my lower back”, taken as reports of a given subject’s 
actual feelings of having crossed legs or being in pain, bear witness to this. But 
the property of bodily experiences I am now pointing to is obviously not 
exclusive of this type of mental states. It is a fact about phenomenally 
conscious experiences in general that, may the subject that undergoes them 
have the capacity to make judgments in which she reports them, 25 she will 
typically use the pronoun “I” in the subject position. In other words, mutatis 
mutandis claims a) – c) above apply to phenomenally conscious experiences in 
general: 
 
d) we make judgments intended to report our phenomenally conscious 
experiences; 
e) in normal circumstances, these judgments involve a first-person 
pronoun in the subject position – or could involve it and count as 
accurate reports of the relevant experiences; 
f) for every judgment of this sort, if it is sincere, the subject that 
entertains or utters it is aware of the experience she is undergoing as 
her own. 
 
Judgments such as “I am thinking of you” or “I hear the sea” are also instances 
of the phenomenon described in d) – f), granted that the subject that entertains 
                                                 
25 Broadly understood, encompassing avowals and introspective judgments. 
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or asserts them aims at reporting her occurrent mental states as of thinking and 
having an auditory perception respectively. I will call judgments of this sort, in 
which phenomenally conscious experiences are reported, judgments of experience. 
Incidentally, notice that judgments of somatosensation are a particular type of 
judgment of experience. Let us now grant that when one sincerely asserts 
judgments of experience that are first-personal in that they involve a first-
person pronoun in the subject position, one expresses awareness of the 
experience one undergoes as being one’s own – just as (f) states. 
This yields a new definition, aimed at capturing the phenomenon just 
described. Let me call it a sense of experience ownership (SEO):26 
 
[SEO]: for one to have a sense of experience ownership is for one to 
be aware of the phenomenally conscious experience one undergoes as 
being one’s own. 
 
I shall propose that there are defining features to the phenomenon described 
in [SEO] that yield a parallel with the SBO. This parallel might actually explain 
the habitual use of the expression “sense of ownership” in the two cases in the 
literature.27 The relevant similarities between SBO and SEO dictate parallel 
goals to the views aimed at accounting for one and the other: at the end of the 
day, the goals just encapsulate the particular features of the phenomena that 
need to be explained by the relevant theories. More generally put, I contend 
that the philosophical inquiries into the SBO and the SEO are similar, and so is 
the spirit of the various theoretical possibilities that make up the respective 
debates. All this should have become clear by the end of the present section. 
In this particular subsection, I will put forward some preliminary points in 
order to pave the way for the subsequent exposition. 
                                                 
26 Jose Luis Bermúdez (2018a, 2018b) has independently developed a distinction akin to the 
SBO/SEO distinction, which has been published in the very last stages of preparation of this 
dissertation. He defines physical ownership (φ-ownership) as “the phenomenon of taking one’s 
body parts to be parts of oneself, and (correlatively) of taking one’s body to be one’s own”, 
and psychological ownership (ψ-ownership) as “the phenomenon of taking one’s own conscious 
thoughts, feelings, emotions, and other mental states to be one’s own” (2018a, 236). These 
notions refer to the existence of judgments of ownership in the physical and psychological 
domains respectively. He describes the debate as the attempt to offer descriptive-causal and reason-
giving explanations about the sources of the judgments. De Vignemont (forthcoming) also 
starts with the sketch of a similar distinction. 
27 For an example of the dual use of this expression, and others in the vicinity such as “sense 
of mineness” or “for-me-ness”, see García-Carpintero, M. and Guillot, M. (eds.), The Sense of 
Mineness (forthcoming), which contains papers both on bodily awareness and awareness of 
phenomenally conscious experiences, focusing on the intricacies of the self-attribution thereof. 
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To start with, compare [SEO] with [SBO], repeated below: 
 
[SBO]: for one to have a sense of bodily ownership is for one to be aware 
of the body one feels in bodily experience as being one’s own. 
 
Indeed, both definitions appeal to something of which one is aware – a body 
in [SBO] and an experience in [SEO]. By the same token, both definitions 
assume that there are individuals of whom we can say that they are aware of 
something – be it a body or an experience. It seems natural to call these 
individuals subjects, as I have been doing occasionally in the previous pages. 
Besides, both [SBO] and [SEO] mention specific ways of being aware of the 
relevant element in each case: [SBO] talks about the body one feels in bodily 
experience, and [SEO] refers to experiences one is phenomenally conscious of. One 
has a sense of bodily ownership for the body one feels somatosensorily, and a 
sense of experience ownership for the experience one is phenomenally 
conscious of, when one is aware of them as being one’s own. Notice that the 
sense of ownership described in [SBO] concerns (part of) the content of a 
particular class of phenomenally conscious experiences – bodily experiences –, 
namely the body. On the other hand, the sense of ownership described in 
[SEO] concerns mental states themselves. The comparison between the two 
notions at this point is useful to evince that the awareness (of X) as being one’s own 
is a crucial bit both to [SBO] and [SEO]. 
I already clarified what this awareness involves in the particular case of 
[SBO]: one is aware of the body one feels in bodily sensation as being one’s 
own if one would sincerely report the sensation by using the first-person 
pronoun to qualify the felt body. This limited, neutral notion of awareness is 
also the one that the facts described in d) – f) allow us to assume as involved in 
[SEO]. More specifically: a speaker manifests awareness of the experience she 
undergoes as being her own to the extent that she reports that she takes this 
experience to be her own by tokening the first-person pronoun in the subject 
position when reporting it. Correspondingly, a subject is aware of the 
experience she undergoes as being her own to the extent that she would report it 
via statements of the mentioned sort. In sum, the notion of awareness at stake 
in [SEO] is the one we can assume is involved in any sincere judgment, and 
hence in particular in judgments intended as reports of experiences. 
I will henceforth assume that there is such a thing as being aware of the 
phenomenally conscious experience one undergoes as being one’s own. Stated 
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otherwise, I will assume that there exists such a thing as a SEO. This 
assumption should be found mainly uncontroversial given the notion of 
awareness at stake. In fact, it should be noted that the SEO is in principle a 
ubiquitous phenomenon across phenomenally conscious mental states. It is a 
typical feature of all conscious mental states that, if undergone by a subject 
with a capacity to make judgments in which she reports them, she will express 
them via judgments that involve the pronoun “I” in the subject position. 
It is important at this point to stress the following: as phenomenally 
conscious experiences, bodily experiences constitute a particular example to 
this generalisation. Resorting to the formulation I opened this chapter with, by 
entertaining judgments such as “I can feel that my legs are crossed” on the 
grounds of a certain episode of somatosensation, I am taking myself to be the 
owner of the body to which I ascribe certain properties and also the subject of a 
mental state. A mark of this are the two first-person pronouns involved in the 
mentioned judgment of somatosensation. Given the assumption just 
mentioned, then, I am also assuming that there is such a thing as being aware 
of the phenomenally conscious bodily experience one undergoes as being one’s 
own, or that there exists a SEO for bodily experiences. 
As said, the aim of this dissertation ultimately is to put forward an account 
of the SBO, namely an answer to the Constitutive Question. However, it is 
important to bear in mind, from this point on, that bodily sensations typically 
involve both awareness of the felt body as one’s own (SBO) and awareness of 
the very sensation as one’s own (SEO). The specific sense in which, I will 
propose, it is relevant that the SBO and the SEO typically co-occur in bodily 
sensations will only become clear in the third chapter of this dissertation, in 
which I will put forward my positive account on the SBO. Yet, let me close the 
present subsection by elaborating a bit more on the point about the co-
occurrence of these two phenomena in bodily sensations – that is, by making 
the Descriptive Point mentioned in the opening of this chapter. 
Although some of the authors participating in the debate on the SEO also 
take part in the debate about the SBO, the two discussions can be taken, and 
actually are held, mainly apart from each other. This seems in principle 
unproblematic, since the SEO and the SBO are different phenomena, captured 
by concepts that are not equivalent. Correspondingly, not all philosophers 
aiming at disentangling one intend, nor in principle have to, disentangle the 
other as well. However, here is a rather intuitive observation that seems worth 
of attention: if I claim that “I can feel that my legs are crossed”, the individual 
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of whom I intend to say, on the basis of the single token mental state of feeling 
crossed legs, both that she has a proprioceptive experience and that she has 
crossed legs, is one and the same, namely myself. The mental and bodily self-
attributions that typically can be articulated in judgments of somatosensation, 
which correspondingly involve (variants of) the first-person pronoun, finally 
are attributions to a single individual, granted that the pronoun is used 
consistently adequately. 
In this sense, the claim that the SEO and the SBO co-occur in bodily 
experiences is not a claim about mere co-occurrence. Philosophical discussions 
about the self-attribution of mental states – as part of discussions on how we 
are, in general, conscious of mental states –, and about the self-attribution of 
bodies – as part of discussions on how we are, in general, conscious of bodies 
–, belong to a cluster of discussions on self-consciousness – namely discussions 
on how we are conscious of ourselves. That these two phenomena co-occur in 
bodily experiences means that several of the senses in which we say of subjects 
that they are self-conscious converge in this type of mental states. In particular, 
it can be said that when a subject S undergoes a bodily experience there 
typically are at least two aspects of S that are interwinedly disclosed to S 
herself: her mental as well as her bodily condition. 
Why is this Descriptive Point relevant at all? As I see it, the fact described 
belongs to a set of motivations one might have to at least consider the 
possibility that the SEO be relevant to an analysis of the SBO. Broadly 
speaking, my proposal will take seriously the typical, not mere co-occurrence 
of the SEO and the SBO in bodily experiences, by postulating the existence of 
explanatory relations between the two of them. In particular, I shall propose 
that the SBO constitutes a form of self-consciousness that significantly 
depends on the SEO – the latter being a much more pervasive phenomenon 
than the former. On the face of it, this type of proposal has the advantage of 
offering a unified account of the forms of self-consciousness involved in 
bodily awareness, as arguably recommended by the plain fact that the first-
person pronouns possibly involved in judgments of somatosensation (intend 
to) refer to one and the same “self” in each case. 
This fact should be taken together with the fact that the phenomena under 
consideration, namely the SEO and the SBO, manifest structurally similar 
features, as I will immediately try to show. This is also part of the motivation 
one can find for a view along the lines of the one I will propose: this sort of 
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view seems to have good prospects as for offering an explanation to why some 
central features of the SBO parallel those of the SEO. 
 
1.4.2. The SEO: Some Clarifications 
 
I have announced that I will underline several defining aspects of SEO that 
allow for a parallel between it and the SBO. Yet, before engaging in this 
exposition, in the present subsection I want to take into consideration various 
aspects that, it might be claimed, make the awareness of phenomenally 
conscious states as one’s own, and the awareness of the somatosensorily felt 
body as one’s own, prima facie clearly distinct. I will argue that these prima 
facie clear differences are dissolved if the scope and implications of the 
commitment to [SEO] and [SBO] are properly understood. 
The first possible worry arises from considerations on the transparency of 
conscious perception. According to the thesis of transparency, all that is 
presented to a subject when she has a conscious perceptual state is the object 
of the state. In particular, if a subject tries to introspectively attend to, say, her 
visual experience as of a cup of coffee in front her, she will find nothing but 
the cup of coffee visually presented to her. In this sense, the transparency 
theorist would say, our perceptual experiences do not present us with aspects 
of our own consciousness – in particular, they do not present us with the 
experiences themselves – but rather just with the objects represented in them 
(Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995). 
From this point of view, the claim that we are aware of the bodies we feel in 
bodily sensations (as being our own) might seem relatively uncontroversial, 
since it appeals to our consciousness of the content of mental states of a given 
type. Yet, in contrast, it might be argued that the assumption about the 
existence of a SEO is indeed controversial, at least when it comes to its 
ubiquity: there is at least a type of mental state, namely perceptual states, in 
which we are not aware of the experiences we undergo as being our own 
plainly because we are not aware of the experiences we undergo. If so, then the 
claim that the SEO and the SBO co-occur in bodily experiences might be 
found unwarranted, if one takes bodily experiences to be perceptual in kind. 
My reply here is that the thesis about the existence and ubiquity of the 
SEO does not commit us to anything the transparency theorist could not 
accept. It is a fact that we often make claims involving psychological 
terminology. Indeed, after looking at my cup of coffee for a while, I might 
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engage in describing its shape and colour, since I have been considering them 
as part of the content of my visual perception. But I might very well just say, “I 
see the cup” instead. Or, while lying on my desk chair, I might point out how 
the sea must be rough on the grounds of hearing the waves slapping against 
the coastline. But I might very well just declare, “I hear the sea”. All we need to 
make sense of the idea that we are aware of our conscious experiences as it is 
expressed in [SEO] is the acknowledgment of this fact. Arguably, I am trying 
to refer to something by operationalizing the psychological notions of seeing 
and hearing in the mentioned statements – something which might not be 
phenomenally given, but which I purportedly take to be different from, say, 
smelling the coffee or tasting the sea. Only in this sense, and given the 
terminological proviso that we call the relevant psychological events experiences, 
does accepting [SEO] commit us to the idea that we are aware of experiences.28 
Incidentally, this is also the only sense in which the acceptance of [SBO] 
commits us to the claim that we are aware of our bodies in bodily sensations. 
The second worry arises from considerations on the factivity or non-
factivity of the notion of awareness at stake in each case. As said, in the case of 
the SBO, it is non-factive: the SBO is different, and presumably independent, 
from whether the body one feels as one’s own in a given situation is actually 
one’s own according to the relevant metaphysical criteria. To the extent that 
one can conceivably have a SBO for a body that is not her own, for instance in 
cross-wired scenarios in which one receives somatosensory feedback from 
another’s body, our intuitions about the criteria for the attribution of bodies to 
subjects seem to go beyond the fact that the subjects can feel the relevant body 
somatosensorily, and hence beyond the fact that they can feel it 
somatosensorily as their own. 
In contrast, in the case of [SEO] the very question whether the notion of 
awareness involved is to be understood factively might be found simply trivial. 
Consider a phenomenally conscious experience E and a subject S, and suppose 
that S undergoes E at t – and incidentally judges E to be her own at t. [SEO] is 
in principle metaphysically noncommittal: it makes no claim about what makes 
a given experience the experience of a specific subject. Hence, [SEO] is in 
principle compatible with E not being S’s experience at t. However, the 
following seems plausible: regardless of whether S judges E to be her own – 
                                                 
28 What will be problematic for transparency theorists, and actually should be given their 
theoretical commitments, are certain specific accounts of SEO aimed at answering what I will 
call the “Constitutive Question – E” (see subsections 1.4.3 and 1.4.4 below). 
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regardless of whether S is aware of E as being her own –, E is S’s own experience 
just because it is phenomenally conscious for S.29 From this point of view, the 
metaphysical neutrality of [SEO] might be read as relying on the tacit 
assumption that what makes a given phenomenally conscious experience the 
experience of a specific subject is plainly the fact that she undergoes it. If this 
is true, then S’s judgment that E is her own will by necessity track actual facts 
about experience ownership. This can be found more trivial the more plausible 
the mentioned metaphysical principle is taken to be. 
This concern focuses on the ways of being aware of that for which we 
have a sense of ownership. In particular, it points to the following contrast 
between the SEO and the SBO: in the case of experiences, if one is 
phenomenally aware of them, it follows that they are one’s own; whereas in the 
case of bodies, if one is aware of them somatosensorily, it does not 
straightforwardly follow that they are one’s own, even if in normal 
circumstances it is one’s own body that one is aware of in this way. 
My first-pass reply to this worry is that, indeed, this might be a relevant 
metaphysical difference between experiences and bodies. But this difference 
should not worry us, since it is tangential to what we are concerned with when 
addressing the SBO and the SEO. The worry focuses on the metaphysical 
significance of awareness, in particular on the degree at which S’s awareness of 
X in way W makes it the case that X is S’s own. Important as this metaphysical 
question might be, it is not the central question of this dissertation. My focus 
here is rather on the awareness of X as one’s own in the sense of it yielding 
judgments of ownership – and on the fact that it seems to be linked with being 
aware of X in particular ways and not others.30 
A possible rejoinder to this first pass reply picks up on whether the 
metaphysical question about what makes an experience, or a body, that of a 
                                                 
29 This concern could not be raised by defendants of perceptual accounts of (phenomenal) 
awareness (e.g. Locke, 1975; Armstrong, 1968). According to them, the faculty by which we 
access what turn out to be our mental states is one more perceptual ability. Hence, they cannot 
appeal to the mode of access as the criterion to determine which set of experiences makes up a 
given subject’s mental life, since there are plenty of other objects that we access perceptually, 
and we access other subjects’ experiences in the same way. On the other hand, the 
commitment to this claim – that E is S’s own experience just because it is phenomenally 
conscious for S – will be radical, even metaphysically necessary, if one endorses the view that 
experiences are events consisting in the instantiation of phenomenal properties by subjects 
(Nida-Rümelin, 2018). 
30 I elaborated this point for the bodily case when contrasting somatosensation with visual 
perception in order to motivate the Intuitive Goal (section 1.3). This very same point will be 
elaborated for the case of experiences in the next subsection (1.4.3). It constitutes one of the 
parallel common features between SBO and SEO, or so I will argue. 
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specific subject’s can be ruled out of the picture so easily. A way of expressing 
the worry is this: the suitability of the term “ownership” in the context of 
[SEO] is doubtful. Whereas it can be found acceptable, although still somewhat 
metaphorical, when applied to our bodies, the claim that we (have the sense 
that we) own experiences strikes one as unnatural. In this sense, the parallel 
intended when defining the SBO and the SEO in similar terms does not make 
full justice to the phenomena. And this, the rejoinder goes, has to do precisely 
with the metaphysics. 
Let me elaborate this rejoinder a bit more. For the sake of the argument, 
let us assume that for every subject S, what it means for there to be an 
experience of S’s own just is for there to be an experience of which S is 
phenomenally aware. If this seems plausible, it is on the grounds of what it 
means for phenomenally conscious experiences to exist at all: to be undergone 
as such by a subject, so that whenever they occur they do so qua experiences of 
the subject. The case of physical bodies is obviously different: we have criteria 
to establish the existence of bodies, and in particular of a given subject’s body, 
other than their being experienced in one way or other by the subject. Hence, 
what it means for a subject to actually “possess” a body seems to be something 
remarkably different from what it means for her to actually “possess” an 
experience. And this is so exactly for the reasons that explain the mentioned 
factivity of first-personal judgments of experience: there is nothing else to 
being an experience than belonging to a subject in the specific sense of being 
experienced by her. The inadequacy of the term “ownership” in SEO, the 
worry goes, has to do with the fact that it is not a matter of contingency that, 
for every conscious experience, there is a conscious subject who is ready to 
self-attribute it, as it might be a matter of contingency in the case of bodies. 
My reply to this rejoinder goes back to a point I insisted on before. 
Nothing of what the objector points out is incompatible with the commitment 
to [SBO] and [SEO] in the specific sense I am suggesting. “Ownership” and 
related expressions such as “awareness as being one’s own” have been chosen 
simply as placeholders for “reports in the first-person”: to “own” X is to self-
attribute X in judgment. The acceptance of the existence of a SBO and a SEO 
is therefore not incompatible with an eventual specification of the 
metaphysical relations between subjects and what they claim to own in each 
case, namely either a body or experiences, in their own specific terms. 
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1.4.3. SEO: Basic Features and Goals for Views 
 
In this subsection I will put forward the three defining aspects of the SEO that 
theories on this phenomenon need to take into consideration when addressing 
it. As will be noticed, these features parallel mutatis mutandis those mentioned 
above as central to a SBO. In the present subsection, I will address the various 
aspects of the SEO on the way to defining three desiderata for views that aim 
at accounting for it. As it will be seen, these desiderata parallel mutatis 
mutandis the ones I defined for views on the SBO. 
Notice that, at the end of the day, each of the desiderata I proposed for 
views on the SBO just captures a feature of the explanandum that, I argued, 
needs to be accounted for by the relevant theories. Just to repeat, accounting 
for the SBO is specifying the awareness subjects have of the body as their own 
in bodily sensations in a way such that: explains the bodily self-attribution that 
figures in judgments of somatosensation – as expressed by the Judgment 
Formation Goal; accounts for the seeming compellingness of this self-
attribution – as demanded by the Intuitive Goal; and does so by taking into 
account the empirical cases relevant to the discussion – as expressed by the 
Empirical Goal. 
Hence, it makes sense that, if a second explanandum displays 
characteristics that are relevantly analogous to those of the first, then a set of 
desiderata for theories on this explanandum can be proposed that is mutatis 
mutandis analogous to the first set of goals. This is what I contend happens in 
the case of the SBO and the SEO. 
This is interesting because it suggests that two inquiries pursued relatively 
independently in the literature are more similar in spirit than it might be 
assumed. A symptom of this similarity is that the views within the debate on 
the SEO can be taxonomised in a way at least partially parallel to that used to 
describe the views on the SBO, starting from the initial partition between 
experientialists and judgmentalists. As the other side to the same coin, the 
observations to follow also suggest that the philosophically relevant aspects of 
the respective objects of study of these debates – that is, our awareness of 
bodies in the specific case of somatosensation, and our awareness of 
experiences in the specific case of phenomenal consciousness –, are 
remarkably alike. This parallelism might actually explain the fact that the 
expression “sense of ownership” is used in the context of philosophical 
discussions both about our awareness of bodies and about our awareness of 
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experiences even if there are aspects in which these two objects of awareness 
differ radically. Within the broader context of this dissertation as a whole, all 
this belongs to the set of motivating reasons for the kind of view that I will 
end up defending in the last chapter, namely one that postulates explanatory 
relations between the SEO and the SBO. 
Let me start by recalling the definition of the sense of experience 
ownership: 
 
[SEO]: for one to have a sense of experience ownership is for one to be 
aware of the phenomenally conscious experience one undergoes as being 
one’s own. 
 
With [SEO] on the table, we can ask the following question: what is the nature 
of the awareness involved in being aware of the phenomenally conscious 
experience one undergoes as being one’s own? In other words, after 
acknowledging the existence of a SEO, we can formulate again the 
Constitutive Question, yet this time focusing specifically on the type of 
awareness involved in having phenomenally conscious mental states and being 
aware of them as our own. Let me call this question the Constitutive Question – 
E. Authors in the literature who aim at accounting for the SEO ultimately aim 
at putting forward an answer to the Constitutive Question – E. 
Answering the Constitutive Question – E arguably implies a 
characterisation of phenomenally conscious experiences such that allows for an 
explanation of the first-personal character of all judgments aimed at reporting 
them that are de se in the sense of including the pronoun “I” in the subject 
position. Hence, the inquiry into the nature of the SEO pursues the following: 
 
[Judgment Formation Goal – E]: any account of the SEO must explain the 
fact that we self-attribute phenomenally conscious experiences for all 
judgments of experience in which we do so. 
 
Again, judgments of experience in which the first-person features in the 
subject position, with all the caveats put forward in the previous subsections, 
constitute an initial datum: something the existence of which all philosophers 
engaged in the debate on the SEO can agree on, and which has the status of an 
explanandum. It is precisely in the sense of there being judgments of mental 
self-attribution that we find the claim about the existence of the SEO 
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uncontroversial. It is also from this perspective that we can set the Constitutive 
Question – E without begging the question. What the Judgment Formation 
Goal – E does simply is stating the need for an explanation of the undisputable 
facts described in points d) – f) above by calling upon the relation between 
judgments of experience and phenomenally conscious experiences in a 
satisfactory way. In other words, the goal expresses that the only datum we 
undoubtedly have when analysing the relation between phenomenal 
consciousness and the self-consciousness putatively involved in it is the fact 
that we tend to report the former in first-personal terms, and states that this 
needs to be explained. 
With this first goal in mind, the second desideratum that, I think, theories 
on the SEO must meet focuses on what I take to be a central feature of the 
relation between phenomenally conscious experiences and the judgments by 
which we report them. It is not far-fetched to claim that the following has been 
a tacit assumption throughout some of the classical, most influential 
approaches to subjectivity and the mind: there is a necessary connection 
between the occurrence of phenomenally conscious experiences and their 
subject’s awareness that the experience is theirs. 
A paradigmatic example of this can be found, for instance, in Descartes’ 
reasoning for his “first item of knowledge”. On the grounds of his certainty 
about the occurrence of a specific type of mental state, namely doubt, 
Descartes famously claimed that the proposition “I am, I exist” is true, and 
pinned down his point with the idea that entertaining this very proposition 
necessarily implies its truth (Med. 2, AT 7:25). This first item of knowledge then 
paved the way for his inquiry into the nature of the I “that now necessarily 
exists” (ibid.). The specific reasoning put forward by Descartes between his 
First and Second meditations evinces that he took, on the one hand, the claim 
that there is thought31 to warrant the claim that I am thinking; and on the other 
hand, the latter to be the case, metaphysically speaking. These epistemic and 
metaphysical assumptions involved in the Cartesian reasoning for the cogito 
                                                 
31 In a broad sense of thought, which includes the conscious mental states the existence of the 
intentional objects of which has been put into question by the Cartesian meditating subject 
(and it includes them as states the existence of the intentional objects of which is into 
question). As Descartes puts it in reply to Gassendi’s objections, “I can’t say ‘I am walking, 
therefore I exist’, except by adding to my walking my awareness of walking, which is a thought. 
The inference is certain – meaning that it makes the conclusion certain – only if its premise 
concerns this awareness, and not the movement of my body” (Replies 5, AT 7:352). 
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have been extensively discussed.32 The point I intend to stress here is, however, 
more fundamental and less controversial than these issues. Still, it is plausibly 
involved in the motivation for these assumptions: the categorical Cartesian 
claim that “I am, I exist”, made on the grounds of the awareness of there being 
thought, can be taken as following naturally from the fact that one intuitively 
finds the connection between being phenomenally aware of mental states and 
self-attributing them very compelling – compelling to the point that the step 
from one to the other might go unnoticed, and philosophically very significant 
conclusions are drawn from it. That this connection seems compelling is the 
point I want to stress now. The point is noncommittal, at least in the sense that 
acknowledging it is still compatible with endorsing the criticism according to 
which being aware of there being thought does not warrant the claim that it is I 
who thinks. 
The acknowledgment of this compellingness yields what, I contend, is the 
second desideratum for all theories on the SEO: 
 
[Intuitive Goal – E]: any account on the SEO must specify it in terms that 
explain the seemingly necessary link between undergoing a phenomenally 
conscious experience and being aware of it as being one’s own. 
 
As happened with the Intuitive Goal in the case of the SBO, the Intuitive Goal 
– E talks about a seemingly necessary link between phenomenally conscious 
experiences and the report thereof in the first person. This phrasing is 
motivated by the existence of cases of so-called thought insertion, reported in the 
literature (Jaspers, 1963; Frith, 1992; Gallagher, 2004). 
Taken to be a ﬁrst-rank diagnostic symptom of schizophrenia (Schneider, 
1959), thought insertion is a case of delusion consisting in the subject’s 
episodic experience of thoughts which are not her own intruding into her 
mind. Not only do patients report feeling as if the thoughts themselves were 
not theirs, but also sometimes they attribute them to an external entity. 
Patients who suffer from thought insertion characteristically make reports such 
as the following: 
 
“I look out of the window and I think the garden looks nice and the grass looks 
cool, but the thoughts of Eamonn Andrews come into my mind. There are no 
                                                 
32 For classical discussions on these issues, see Lichtenberg’s notes in his Waste Books (2012, 
152) and Russell (1945). 
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other thoughts there, only his … He treats my mind like a screen and flashes his 
thoughts on to it like you flash a picture.” (Mellor, 1970, 17) 
 
How to best interpret the phenomenon of thought insertion is much discussed 
in the literature. Some construe it as a case in which subjects lack a “sense of 
ownership” over their thoughts (Metzinger, 2003; Martin and Pacherie, 2013). 
In contrast, what we could take as the standard account today has it that 
patients still retain a “sense of ownership” for their thoughts but lack a “sense 
of agency” for them, namely the sense of having been their producers 
(Stephens and Graham, 1994; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). The standard 
account is motivated by the idea that the way how patients access the relevant 
thoughts is still first-personal, in the sense that they still report to feel that 
these thoughts are in “their mind” or in their own stream of consciousness. 
Part of what is involved in disentangling this debate has to do with 
terminological precisions, such as clarifying what each of its participants might 
mean by the expressions in between quotation marks above. The report just 
reproduced, however, suffices to see that the case of thought insertion might 
be problematic even if what one has in mind when assessing it is the notion of 
a SEO at stake in this dissertation – a notion that has been proposed as the 
most noncommittal possible. According to [SEO], subjects have a SEO for the 
thoughts they entertain when they are aware of them as their own, namely 
when they would report them by using a first-person pronoun in the subject 
position. The fact that the patient claims that “the thoughts of Eamonn Andrews 
come into my mind” makes it doubtful whether, in this particular case, the 
patient would take the statement “I am thinking (the thoughts)” to be an 
accurate description of his experience at this moment.33 Hence, judging from 
what the empirical literature reveals, there might be actual cases that challenge 
the intuition that, whenever there are conscious mental states, the subject 
undergoing them will be aware of them as her own. This recommends that the 
Intuitive Goal – E be formulated in terms of “seeming necessity”. 
Again, as happened in the case of the Intuitive Goal for theories on the 
SBO, it might be said that once the relevant pathologies are common 
knowledge in the literature, it is doubtful that it seems to us that the self-
attribution is necessary. In the particular case under discussion now, one might 
claim that once thought insertion is on the table, there is a sense of seeming in 
                                                 
33 As far as I know, there are no reports in the literature in which this ambiguity is definitely 
resolved. 
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which it is no longer true that it seems to us that the link between being 
phenomenally aware of a given mental state and self-attributing it is necessary. 
This is, again, a fair concern, that allows me to bring in some clarifications 
about the Intuitive Goal – E. 
When discussing the SBO, I introduced the intuition of necessity by 
underlining a contrast between somatosensation and visual perception of 
bodies when it comes to the judgments we conceive of them as possibly 
yielding. Whereas it is natural to think of a state of visual perception of a body 
that does not yield a self-attribution, on the part of the subject of the 
perception, of the body represented in it, the case is remarkably different for 
bodily sensations. As I pointed out, this intuitive difference probably tracks the 
fact that in normal conditions the only body we access somatosensorily is our 
own, and more importantly, in normal conditions we do self-attribute the body 
when we access it in this way. On these grounds, our folk notion of a bodily 
experience, unlike that of a visual perception, might itself involve the self-
attribution of the perceived object, so that our intuitions are shaped in the 
direction described. 
 The relevant self-attribution in the case of the SEO does not concern the 
content of a given class of mental states, but rather mental states themselves. 
Also in this case, the intuition I am appealing to can be articulated by pointing 
to a contrast case, as follows. There are several ways in which subjects can 
know about the occurrence of conscious experiences. For instance, I can see 
you cry out of grief for an important loss, or hear you report how you have 
been struggling with your professional commitments lately because of constant 
distress. Empathic as I might be, there is a clear sense in which none of these 
ways of getting to know about occurrent experiences of grief and distress leads 
me to judging that I myself am the subject of these experiences. Similarly, my 
therapist might conclude, on the grounds of my account of a few childhood 
anecdotes, that I currently feel envy for my older brother. But if this is the only 
way in which I get to know about occurrent envy, she might have to make a 
remarkable effort to convince me that I am envious indeed. 
The Intuitive Goal – E intends to capture, precisely, the peculiarity 
involved in the self-attribution of conscious mental states when one is aware of 
them by consciously undergoing them. Our awareness of mental states indeed 
happens to be relevant to philosophical discussions on self-awareness, but 
admittedly there is one way of being aware of them that strikes us as the 
interesting way: phenomenal awareness, unlike other ways in which one can get 
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to know about mental states, seems to us to concern ourselves in a specially 
compelling way. 
As far as I can see, the existence of cases of thought insertion does not by 
itself blur the distinction I am tracing here between ways of accessing 
experiences when it comes to the compellingness with which each of them 
seems to us to yield reports in the first-person. In fact, that the standard 
account of thought insertion be one which resists the conclusion that there are 
cases of conscious awareness of mental states without awareness of them as 
one’s own might be an illustration of this tendency. Other illustrations are found 
in leaps such as the Cartesian, or so I have suggested above. 
Paralleling the considerations I made on the SBO, I speculatively suggest 
that the following would explain the intuition at stake here: our folk concept of 
a phenomenally conscious experience is one according to which phenomenally 
conscious experiences involve a SEO – thus being somehow unconceivable 
that an experience we know of in this way occurs without it involving 
awareness that it is our own. Correspondingly, this concept might well be 
based on the fact that, in normal conditions, it is indeed our own experiences we 
are aware of in this way34 – and more importantly, in normal conditions we do 
take the experiences we are aware of in this way to be our own. The Intuitive 
Goal – E involves that, whatever it is about phenomenally conscious 
experiences that explains the awareness that they are mine, it will on the one 
hand hold the key to explaining why this is so in normal circumstances, and on 
the other hand, it will help make sense of the mentioned intuition of necessity. 
In sum, it is central to both the notion of a SBO and a SEO, not only that 
they involve a self-attribution, either of a body or of an experience, but also 
that this self-attribution is seemingly compelling. This commonality between 
our relations to two elements which are otherwise metaphysically very distinct 
is, I think, a philosophically relevant datum. 
The third and last goal for theories on the SEO is dictated by the fact that 
they concern a phenomenon of an empirical nature: there are facts about 
conscious subjects being aware of the experiences they undergo as being their 
own. In this sense, the relevant theories on what this awareness consists of 
must be extensionally adequate. Straightforwardly put: 
 
                                                 
34 Insisting on the point about factivity I made in 1.4.2, it might even be the case that what 
makes an experience S’s experience is just the fact that S is phenomenally aware of it, 
regardless of whether she takes it to be her own or not. 
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[Empirical Goal – E]: any account on the SEO must leave room for the 
specific, sometimes abnormal relations between phenomenally conscious 
experiences and the awareness of them as one’s own we seem to have 
evidence for in some pathological and experimental cases. 
 
Thought insertion is of course a central case in this respect. Another case 
reported in the literature that is relevant to the present discussion is 
depersonalisation. Broadly speaking, depersonalised patients report to have a 
feeling of detachment from their mental states, but also from their bodies, 
actions, and generally from “themselves”. They have a feeling of unreality that 
leads them to take “the thing” they are aware of as something that should not 
be referred in the first-person – either because they feel it is multiple or plural, 
because they feel they access it in a third-personal or observational way, 
because they feel absent, or because they claim that referring to it as “I” is 
somewhat artificial, similar to how a machine would do it (Billon, 2017a). 
Construing this syndrome in one way or another will partly be a function 
of the descriptive possibilities afforded by our favoured view on the SEO. For 
instance, if a theory establishes that the SEO is necessarily involved in all 
conscious mental states, then it must be possible to interpret all the relevant 
reports, either as indeed involving a (disguised) self-attribution of the relevant 
state, or as the output of deficient reasonings made on the grounds of 
conscious states that indeed involve a SEO. In contrast, if a theory 
characterises the SEO in terms such that allow for there being conscious 
mental states without a SEO, then it will be possible to describe the symptoms 
as cases thereof. In any case, the power of a theory on the SEO needs to be 
measured relative to its capacity to accommodate and offer a fair description of 
the evidence provided by the relevant reports – namely those in which a 
subject aims at describing her own conscious experiences. 
 
1.4.4. Landscape of Views on the SEO 
 
That the discussion on the SEO can be outlined in the terms mentioned in the 
subsection just closed evinces that the general worries that motivate it are 
mutatis mutandis similar to those motivating the discussion on the SBO. A 
symptom, or a consequence, of this fact is that the views within the debate on 
the SEO can be taxonomised in a way partially parallel to that used to describe 
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the views on the SBO, starting from the initial division between 
Experientialism and Judgmentalism. 
Just to recall, the question addressed by those attempting to account for 
the SEO concerns the nature of the awareness involved in being aware of the 
phenomenally conscious experience one undergoes as being one’s own 
(Constitutive Question – E). Two main lines of answer to this question are 
found in the literature. 
The first line of answer is the one endorsed by Experientialist Accounts on 
the SEO. Experientialism is the view that there is a component of 
phenomenally conscious experiences themselves that stands for the first-
person that eventually figures in the subject position in the judgments in which 
we report them. Hence, on this view, the epistemic bases for judgments of 
experience that are de se in the way now relevant involve a genuinely first-
person element. 
Experientialists disagree on whether all our experiences have this “mark of 
ownership”, or rather just a subset of them. For the sake of this debate setting, 
let us establish that an author holds an Experientialist Account on the SEO if 
she assumes that at least some of our phenomenally conscious experiences 
involve a first-person component in the way described. It is in principle 
compatible with (most versions of) Experientialism that creatures that do not 
entertain conceptually articulated judgments of experience, or that do not have 
the capacity to do so, have a SEO. This is so because, from this point of view, 
the only requirement for creatures to enjoy a SEO is that they have 
experiences of the right kind.35 
Within Experientialism, one can endorse either of two broad options. 
Firstly, Inflationism is the view that conscious experiences involve a dedicated 
first-person quale that is not reducible to any of their other components, and 
which can be missing in some pathological cases (Billon, forthcoming). 
According to inflationists, the awareness involved in phenomenally conscious 
mental states that they are one’s own consists of this specific quale. Hence, on 
this view the first-person that finally shows up in judgments has the status of 
an experiential primitive. 
                                                 
35  Of course, that creatures that do not entertain conceptually articulated judgments of 
experience, or that do not have the capacity to do so, enjoy a SEO would not be compatible 
with a possible version of Experientialism according to which only conceptually loaded mental 
states such as thoughts involve an experience of ownership. To my knowledge, no one defends 
this type of Experientialist Account. 
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One can be an experientialist and still not endorse inflationism, though. 
All non-inflationist positions have in common the denial of the existence of a 
dedicated first-person quale: the SEO is phenomenally rich, they defend, but it 
can be described in relatively independent terms by appealing to other 
experiential qualia. As I see it, there are two ways of endorsing Non-Inflationism 
in the literature. In the absence of better labels, let me call them Deflationism 
and Reductionism. Deflationists about the SEO spell out the first-personal 
element of experiences in terms of an aspect or dimension of their overall 
what-it-is-likeness: the “how” or “mode of givenness” of experiences, as they 
put it (Zahavi, 2005; Fasching, 2009; Zahavi and Kriegel, 2015; Gallagher, 
2015, 2017). 
Following in the tradition of classical phenomenologists (e.g. Husserl, 
1970), authors within this trend take this special mode of givenness to be a 
“pre-reflective” feature of experiences, in that it serves as categorical basis for 
full-blown first-person thought, thereby being a “minimal” form of selfhood. 
A recurrent argumentative strategy for deflationists is to defend the need for 
this sort of experiential form of ownership as the best explanation of certain 
crucial features of our self-related concepts, of self-reference in judgment, and 
of the justification of first-person thoughts (Grünbaum, 2012; Guillot, 2016, 
2017; Nida-Rümelin, 2017). This sort of inferences to the best explanation in 
favour of Experientialism are often found specially helpful to counter the 
intuition, famously articulated by Hume, that the self is not introspectively 
accessible 36  – an intuition that even some deflationists endorse (Kriegel, 
forthcoming). 
Still within Experientialism, instead of cashing out the SEO as an aspect 
or dimension of the overall phenomenology of conscious mental states, 
reductionists identify it with some particular element or other within the relevant 
experiences, such as a putative phenomenology of agency (Duncan, 2017). 
Within this trend, many actually defend that the SEO is jointly realised by 
various phenomenally loaded elements including affective valence, perspective, 
agency, and reflection (Lane, 2012; Howell and Thompson, 2017); or 
integrated representations of system specific information and information 
about the system’s environment (Metzinger, 2003). 
                                                 
36 In Hume’s (1739/1975) words, “[f]or my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call 
myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and 
never can observe anything but the perception” (I.iv.6). 
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The general outline just sketched exhausts, I think, the theoretical options 
within the literature as for the defence of Experientialism on the SEO. This is, 
however, only one of the two possible lines of reply to the Constitutive 
Question – E. The second line of answer is the one offered by Judgmentalist 
Accounts on the SEO. The guiding idea of this line of thought is that subjects 
are aware of the experiences they undergo as being their own only to the 
extent that they judge that the experiences are their own – or, to put it more 
generally, to the extent that they exercise the judging capacities relevant to this 
effect. These views are thus compatible with the thesis that there is no 
component of phenomenally conscious experiences themselves that stands for 
the first-person that eventually figures in the subject position in judgments of 
experience – that is, they are compatible with conscious experiences being, so 
to speak, selfless. Hence, from this point of view the SEO consists, maybe 
only partially but crucially, of judgments involving the I-concept that might go 
beyond anything in the content of experiences themselves. 
Note that Judgmentalist Accounts are actually compatible with there being 
some phenomenology specifically attached to the SEO, maybe cognitive 
phenomenology. Yet, it is essential to this line of thought that this 
phenomenology, if existent, is not part of the epistemic basis of judgments of 
experience, but a byproduct of them. A possible, extreme consequence of this 
sort of view is thus the claim that the transitions from conscious experiences to 
the self-attribution thereof in judgments of experience are, in general, unsound 
or unwarranted (Chadha, 2018). Note also that, in principle, a consequence of 
Judgmentalist Accounts is that creatures that do not have the relevant 
judgment related capacities do not enjoy a SEO, even if they undergo 
experiences otherwise identical to those that would yield judgments of 
experience, and hence a SEO, in creatures with the relevant conceptual 
capacities. 
Ways of endorsing Judgmentalism include the exploitation of the 
mentioned Humean intuition about the non-introspectibility of the self (Prinz, 
2011); the metaphysical construal of subjects in ways that exclude the very 
possibility that anything like a SEO be experientially vivid (Dainton 2008, 
2016; but also the elaboration of Buddhist ideas on the self, found for instance 
in Siderits, 2011 and Chadha, 2018); or argumentations to the effect that the 
explanatory tasks that experientialists assign to the first-person 
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phenomenology can be fully covered without appealing to it (Praetorius, 2009; 
Schear, 2009; Salje and Geddes, forthcoming).37 
This cursory sketch of views covers in rough outlines the two broad ways 
in which authors working on the SEO address the Constitutive Question – E 
in the literature. The level of detail offered in this section is, I think, enough to 
convey the spirit of the discussion. In particular, it suffices to convey its 
common traits with the debate on the SBO. 
 
To recap, through the various subsections of section 4 I have addressed (iii), 
the Supplementary Substantive Point; (iv), the Supplementary Programmatic 
Point; and (v), the Descriptive Point. I have proposed that there exists a SEO 
typically involved in all conscious experiences, and hence in particular in bodily 
experiences. I have motivated the idea that the co-occurrence of the SBO and 
the SEO in bodily sensations is not merely this: rather, it indicates that several 
aspects of a single subject are disclosed to this very subject via a token mental 
state when she has a conscious bodily experience. Besides, I have proposed 
that the SEO features three defining characteristics that need to be accounted 
for by theories about it: philosophers working on the SEO aim at spelling out 
the awareness subjects have of the phenomenally conscious experiences they 
undergo as being their own in a way such that accounts for the self-attribution 
of the experience typically yielded by one’s undergoing it (Judgment Formation 
Goal – E); for the seeming compellingness of this self-attribution whenever 
conscious experiences are undergone (Intuitive Goal – E); and for the 
empirical cases relevant to the discussion (Empirical Goal – E). I have also put 
forward the landscape of views on the SEO available in the literature. I have 
thereby suggested that the spirit of the inquiries into the SEO and the SBO in 
the literature is relevantly similar, which probably explains why the notion of a 
sense of ownership has become popular in the two contexts. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Besides, higher-order thought theories of consciousness have it that (i) in order for a given 
mental state T to be conscious, there needs to be a further mental state of a cognitive kind T’ 
that has T as its content; and (ii) T’ has an assertoric content of the form “I am in mental state 
T” (Rosenthal, 2002). This seems to fall under Judgmentalism about the SEO, since it excludes 
the possibility of there being conscious mental states, and in particular conscious mental states 
that involve a first-person component, in the absence of conceptually loaded thoughts about 
these states in which one self-attributes them. 
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1.5. Conclusion 
 
The various points put forward in this chapter jointly constitute part of the 
motivation for the sort of view about the SBO that I will defend in the second 
half of this dissertation. In other words, the notions and arguments presented 
up to now lead me to a further Motivating Point. 
The claims that I have called substantive above, together with the descriptive 
one, are specially relevant in this connection. On the one hand, we can claim 
that there exists a SBO and a SEO, whose characteristic features are 
comparable. On the other hand, both phenomena co-occur in bodily 
experiences, and their co-occurrence is not merely anecdotal. There seem to be 
two types of the same phenomenon, say self-consciousness, involved in the 
particular case of bodily sensations. These facts give reasons not to treat the 
SBO and the SEO as completely unconnected or isolated from one another, as 
well as to at least welcome explanations of either of them as they are 
instantiated in bodily sensations that mention the other. 
The view that I will develop in the second half of this dissertation has it 
that the SBO – a type of self-consciousness specifically involved in bodily 
experiences – significantly depends on the SEO – namely a type of self-
consciousness involved in all conscious experiences, and in particular in 
conscious bodily sensations too. This is one way of advancing a unified 
account of the two forms of self-consciousness involved in somatosensation, 
as I think is recommended by the mentioned Descriptive Point. Furthermore, 
the strategy has good prospects when it comes to underpinning the fact that 
the SBO and the SEO share some central features, and to do so in a way that 
is explanatorily rich. It will be part of my proposal to motivate the idea that we 
actually gain something by appealing to the SEO in our account on the SBO, and 
to specify what it is exactly that we gain. 
Notice that in the sections above I have remained silent with respect to 
the possible combinations of views on the SBO and the SEO. Even if it is 
tacitly assumed that such combination would finally yield a full account of self-
consciousness in somatosensation, going into this discussion goes beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. As said, my aim is to put forward a view on the 
SBO, as well as to assess some views on it available in the literature. Despite 
the claim of dependence that I will favour, I will not offer a view on the SEO, 
nor address the discussion on it besides those specific points relevant to my 
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own proposal. Offering a full account of self-consciousness in 
somatosensation remains a task for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
On Experiences of Bodily Ownership 
 
 
The present chapter principally has a critical aim. In particular, I assess the two 
main forms of Deflationism about the SBO. I analyse Spatial Deflationism in 
the first place (section 2.2), and devote the second half of the chapter to 
Property Deflationism (section 2.3). I will bring to light the limitations of these 
two accounts by assessing how they fare with respect to the goals for accounts 
on the SBO put forward in Chapter 1. I will argue that both Spatial and 
Property Deflationism fail at satisfactorily meeting the Judgment Formation 
Goal and the Intuitive Goal. Before engaging in the description and 
assessment of deflationist views, I make some preliminary considerations. In 
them I justify the scope of this critical chapter as part of the overall project of 
this dissertation. 
 
2.1. Preliminaries: Scope of the Project 
 
In the previous chapter I mentioned the following datum: if I claim that I can 
feel that my legs are crossed, the individual of whom I intend to say, on the 
grounds of the mental state of feeling crossed legs, both that she has a 
somatosensory experience and that she has crossed legs, is one and the same, 
namely myself. 
The most relevant aspect of this datum is that picking out myself is exactly 
what I intend to do by tokening the first-person pronouns in my claim. This 
contrasts with cases in which I might pick out a subject that happens to be me, 
yet without realising that this is the case. The peculiarity of the first-person 
pronoun is that it is part of what it means to use it correctly that this lack of 
awareness that the subject referred to is oneself is necessarily out of the 
picture. 
Perry (1979) famously articulated this idea. One of his most celebrated 
examples to this effect reads thus: 
 
I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down 
the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the 
shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip 
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around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. 
Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch. (3) 
 
While pushing his cart down the aisle before the revelation, Perry was plausibly 
entertaining the following judgment: “Someone is making a mess”. Since, 
unbeknownst to him, he was the person actually making the mess, his thought 
in fact referred to Perry himself. More generally put, the person entertaining 
the judgment and the person thought of in the judgment as making a mess 
were the same (Guillot, 2016, 139). Yet, before the revelation, Perry wasn’t 
thinking of himself as himself: he wasn’t aware that he himself was the person 
making the mess. Once he came to realise that this was the case, he moved on 
to endorsing the following judgment: “I am making a mess”. Entertaining this 
judgment, instead of the first “Someone is making a mess”, has important 
practical consequences: for instance, after the revelation, but not before, Perry 
is in a position to remove the torn sugar sack from his shopping cart. The 
crucial difference between the first judgment and the second, “I am making a 
mess”, is that in the latter not only the person entertaining the judgment and 
the person thought of as making a mess are the same, but also this very fact is 
part of what is grasped in entertaining the judgment (ibid.). Indeed, this fact is 
exactly what is expressed by tokening “I” instead of “someone” in the subject 
position after the revelation. To the extent that in canonically expressing the 
judgment things are expressed thus, we can say that the thinker is aware of this 
fact, together with the fact that she is the person entertaining the judgment. 
Full-blown first-person statements are reflexive in this sense.38 
Let us now take a somatosensory judgment expressed as “I can feel that 
my legs are crossed”. The analysis of the first-person as reflexive in the sense 
just described applies as well to its appearance in the content position of canonical 
expressions of the judgment, which now takes the possessive form “my”. 
However, it displays some very important specificities. In “I can feel that my 
legs are crossed”, the person picked out as the experiencer of the 
proprioceptive experience, and the person the felt legs are legs of, are the 
same. Importantly, the expression of the judgment actually grasps this fact. That 
                                                 
38  The difference between one type of judgment and the other has been expressed by 
Castañeda (1999, 256) in terms of external reflexivity and internal reflexivity, full-blown first-person 
judgments being internally reflexive. Guillot (2016) usefully coins this type of reflexivity super-
reflexivity. In this dissertation, I will not be drawing on this terminology in particular, although a 
notion of reflexivity described immediately will be central. 
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the person picked out as the experiencer and the person the felt legs are legs of 
are the same is part of what is grasped by the thinker in entertaining the 
expressed judgment. 
Now, crucially, this judgment of somatosensation is a case of full-blown 
first-person judgment in the sense of involving “I”, instead of e.g. “someone”, 
in the subject position.39 It is exactly for this reason that the way in which the 
relevant fact is expressed – namely the fact that the person picked out as the 
experiencer, and the person the felt legs are legs of, are the same – is by 
tokening the first-person pronoun “my” to qualify the felt legs. In other words: 
“I can feel that my legs are crossed” is not prima facie synonymous with “I can 
feel that the legs of the experiencer of this somatosensory experience are crossed”. That 
the definite description in the latter is naturally captured by the expression “my 
legs” in “I can feel that my legs are crossed” is due to the phenomenon 
described by Perry (1979): I am aware that the person entertaining the 
judgment, and the person thought of as having the relevant somatosensory 
experience, are one and the same. Besides, I am aware that this person is 
myself. 
This yields an analysis of what I express when I express awareness of the body 
I feel as being my own, namely when I manifest to have a SBO. In other words, 
this yields an analysis of what is actually expressed by tokening “my” in the 
content position of judgments of somatosensation. What is expressed by 
tokening “my” in the content position in expressing the judgment “I can feel 
that my legs are crossed” can be decomposed thus: “I can feel that the legs of 
the experiencer of this somatosensory experience are crossed, and I am the experiencer of 
this somatosensory experience”. 
The moral of this analysis is this: the token of the first-person possessive 
pronoun in the content position in canonical expressions of judgments of 
somatosensation contains a reference to the subject of the experience qua subject of the 
experience. This is the specific sense in which judgments of somatosensation are 
reflexive.40 Recall now the Judgment Formation Goal and the Intuitive Goal 
introduced in Chapter 1: 
 
                                                 
39 In other words, this judgment involves a SEO. 
40 This connects with the Motivating Point made in the conclusion of Chapter 1. There are 
reasons to think that the SBO is connected to, and is somehow subsidiary of, subjectivity more 
broadly construed. 
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[Judgment Formation Goal]: any account of the SBO must explain the fact 
that we self-attribute the felt body for all judgments of somatosensation in 
which we do so. 
 
[Intuitive Goal]: any account of the SBO must specify the SBO in terms that 
explain the seemingly necessary link that bodily experiences, but not 
exteroceptive experiences, have with the awareness of the experienced 
body as one’s own. 
 
Explaining the peculiar de se character of judgments of somatosensation, as 
required by the Judgment Formation Goal, means accounting for the specific 
kind of reflexivity just described. Besides, as the Intuitive Goal indicates, it 
means doing so by proposing an explanatory device distinctive enough of 
somatosensation. 
Hence, within the project of accounting for the SBO, advocating either 
for Judgmentalism or for Experientialism might well depend, in part, of an 
answer to the following question: is it possible to cash out the contents of bodily 
experiences themselves in a way that captures this specific kind of reflexivity? With 
this question in mind, in this chapter I begin an exploration of the feasibility of 
a fully experientialist view on the SBO. In particular, my interest lies in 
exploring the feasibility of the most minimalist form possible of 
Experientialism about the SBO. Let me now justify the scope of this interest. 
On the one hand, Experientialism about the SBO seems worth exploring vis 
à vis what I take to be a prima facie limitation of Judgmentalism. If we can 
cash out the contents of somatosensory states in terms that fully grasp the sort 
of reflexivity explained, then we have characterised the content of 
somatosensory states in a way that reflects the structure that the content of 
judgments aimed at reporting these states typically has. This dissertation does 
not directly deal with epistemological matters; yet, one can foresee that this 
scenario affords a gain in the epistemological front. If this possibility is 
available, then we have made a step forward to resist the conclusion that 
judgments of bodily self-attribution are generally unwarranted. 
This conclusion arguably is a natural continuation of the very same idea 
endorsed by Judgmentalists about the SEO: that judgments of self-attribution 
of mental states we are phenomenally conscious of are generally unwarranted, 
given the lack of a specific reference to the self as part of any of these states 
(e.g. Chadha, 2018). Given the pervasiveness of bodily self-attributions in our 
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mental lives and discourse, steps towards the possibility of resisting this 
conclusion seem to me desirable. If we can cash out the contents of 
somatosensory experiences themselves in terms that fully grasp the sort of 
reflexivity explained, then the possibility of a transition “without gaps” from 
the experiences to judgments of somatosensation is granted.41 
On the other hand, the possibility of a minimal form of Experientialism is, 
I think, valuable per se, and hence worth exploring. To recall, on a minimal 
description, bodily awareness in token somatosensory experiences consists in 
the sensation as of a property instantiated in a location. For instance, one can feel 
the Position of one’s arm, the Movement of one’s feet, or the Throbbing of 
one’s temples, all of which are qualitatively rich experiences. Participants in the 
debate on the SBO generally agree on this assumption. A minimal form of 
Experientialism is one that demands as parsimonious a content to bodily 
experiences as all authors addressing the problem of the SBO agree on. As far 
as I see, if this parsimonious content yields an account of the SBO, then that it 
does is interesting by itself. 
For this reason, in this chapter I start the inquiry into this possibility by 
analysing views on the SBO that are committed only to this minimal set of 
aspects to the content of bodily experiences, namely Deflationist Accounts. In 
two separate sections, I put forward the main tenets of the analyses of 
somatosensation presented by Spatial Deflationism and Property Deflationism 
respectively. I will argue that, as they stand, these forms of Deflationism do not 
meet the Judgment Formation and the Intuitive goals. Throughout the chapter, 
however, I will stress the aspects of each of these views that, I submit, do yield 
a complete account of the SBO if considered jointly. 
 
2.2. Spatial Deflationism42 
 
In this section, I critically address one type of Deflationism. In particular, I 
engage with several proposals in the literature according to which the SBO is 
to be spelled out in terms of the spatial content of bodily sensations. The first 
spatial account that I will assess was put forward by Martin (specially Martin, 
                                                 
41 A much more involved discussion of the reasons not to opt for Judgmentalism about the 
SBO is offered by de Vignemont (2018, Chapter 1, section 1.2). Her reasons concern the 
incapacity of this sort of views to account for the RHI and disownership syndromes. 
42 The material in this section draws on my paper “The Bounded Body. On the Sense of 
Bodily Ownership and the Experience of Space”, forthcoming in M. García-Carpintero and M. 
Guillot (eds.), The Sense of Mineness (OUP). 
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1995; but also Martin, 1992 and Martin, 1993). The second account is 
Bermúdez’s (1998, 2017) version of Spatial Deflationism. Finally, I will also 
mention in this context de Vignemont’s (2007) view, presented as a 
continuation of Martin’s proposal.43 Each in their own specific way, all three 
proposals give a central role to the notion of a sense of boundedness in accounting 
for the SBO. The following thesis generally expresses what is common to these 
views: 
 
[Boundedness Thesis]: the SBO consists at least partly of the fact that, when 
having bodily sensations, the body is felt as having certain boundaries. 
 
In line with the idea that bodily experiences involve awareness of bodily space, 
in that they involve being aware of properties instantiated in the body, the 
Boundedness Thesis stresses the relation that seems to hold between 
perceiving properties as instantiated in a given body, and singling out this body 
in the experience. The latter plausibly means perceiving the limits of the 
relevant body with respect to other physical objects or to its surroundings. The 
Boundedness Thesis says that the SBO consists at least partly of this awareness 
of the bodily boundaries, or of the body as a bounded object. 
In the subsections below I distinguish two different specifications of the 
Boundedness Thesis. The first, defended by Martin, focuses on the following 
phenomenological datum: the felt localisation of properties in somatosensation 
entails a sense of the boundaries of the body. Each of the points in space where 
the properties are felt to be localised contribute to the delineation of a figure, 
and this figure is that of the body for which one has a sense of ownership. 
Crucially, on this view, we have a sense of ownership for the relevant body in 
virtue of being aware of the delineation. Here is a more specific formulation of 
this view: 
 
[BT-First Version]: the experienced location of the properties felt in bodily 
sensations entails awareness of the body as bounded. The SBO consists of 
this awareness of the body as bounded. 
 
                                                 
43 De Vignemont’s view on the SBO has evolved very significantly since 2007. In this section I 
will refer to her 2007 view because it is connected to a type of Spatial Deflationism. I will refer 
to it with the aim of shedding light on what seem to me compelling reasons to go beyond it. 
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It has actually been disputed that Martin’s discussion of the sense of 
boundedness were originally aimed at the sort of explanatory project about the 
SBO that I have described in Chapter 1. Bermúdez (2017, fn. 8), for instance, 
claims that Martin seems to treat the awareness of the body as bounded more 
as an explanandum than as an explanans. On these grounds, Bermúdez 
disregards Martin’s view in his taxonomy of accounts aimed at grounding 
judgments of ownership. 
To my mind, however, there is textual evidence that Martin should be read 
as one of the main interlocutors in this debate. Martin (1995, 273) introduces 
his analysis of the SBO by saying that “[t]his phenomenological quality, that 
the body part appears to be part of one’s body – call this a sense of ownership – is 
itself in need of further elucidation”. After offering his own elucidation in 
terms of a sense of boundedness, he claims that “[t]his account of the sense of 
ownership explains how our bodily experiences can have as part of their 
phenomenological content that the region falls within one’s own body” (my 
emphasis). Assuming that Martin acknowledges the uncontroversial existence 
of judgments of ownership, the analysis of “the phenomenological content” of 
bodily experiences in terms of a sense of boundedness, framed as an analysis 
of the “appearance” that felt bodily locations fall within one’s body, seems to 
me to stand exactly as the type of proposal that would ultimately explain that 
judgments of ownership occur. This seems to me to be so, may we interpret 
“appears” in the first quoted extract as a phenomenally loaded notion – as 
Martin’s own phrasing suggests –, or as involving a more neutral notion of 
awareness.44 
On the other hand, Bermúdez’s spatial proposal falls under a slightly 
different version of the Boundedness Thesis. This version of the thesis was 
arguably advanced by de Vignemont (2007). These authors also endorse the 
phenomenological datum that having bodily experiences involves a sense of 
the boundaries of the body. Yet, they point out that the phenomenally 
conscious localisation of the felt properties is ultimately explained by the 
subject’s possession of a representation of the body: one has a map of one’s 
own body, and when having bodily sensations, one pinpoints various locations 
within it. This allegedly makes the boundaries of the represented body, namely 
one’s own, phenomenally salient. By locating spots within a map, sensations 
                                                 
44  De Vignemont (2007, 2013, 2018) and Gallagher (2017) seem to share my reading of 
Martin’s proposal, since they do take him to be an interlocutor in the debate on the SBO, 
understood as I have defined it. 
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convey a sense of the limits of the map, as well as of what the map represents. 
Straightforwardly put, the second version of the Boundedness Thesis says the 
following: 
 
[BT-Second Version]: subjects possess a representation of their own body as 
a bounded volume. When having bodily sensations, properties are 
experienced as localised within this representation. In virtue of this, when 
having bodily sensations subjects experience the body as a bounded 
whole. The SBO consists, at least partly, of the awareness of the body as 
bounded. 
 
BT-Second Version adds to BT-First Version the appeal to a bodily 
representation. As a type of Experientialist Account in the spirit of the 
Boundedness Thesis, it assumes that the sense of boundedness involved in 
bodily sensations plays a crucial role in accounting for the first-person figuring 
in the content position in judgments of somatosensation. Yet, it claims that the 
relevant bodily representation carries out further explanatory work by 
accounting for the fact that bodily properties can be felt as localised, and in 
particular as localised within what is felt as one’s own body. 
Without further ado, I shall now discuss each of these views in turn, 
assessing them under the light of the basic desiderata defined in the previous 
chapter. 
 
2.2.1. On the Felt Bodily Boundaries 
 
In order to address BT-First Version, we first need to spell out the idea that 
the experiences of, for example, a prick in the toe or a tickle in the nape of the 
neck, entail awareness of the body as bounded. Mike Martin develops this 
point thoroughly. A natural way to present it is to start from the description of 
the peculiarities of the phenomenology of haptic touch, to eventually notice 
that its core feature, namely the awareness of boundaries, shows up in all 
bodily experiences at least to some degree. This is how I shall proceed.45 
                                                 
45 In the following paragraphs I stick to Martin’s description of haptic experiences, which fits 
what de Vignemont and Massin (2015) have called a template model of touch. De Vignemont 
and Massin discuss this model, and put forward the alternative pressure theory of touch, 
according to which touch consists in the direct perception of pressure and tension. The 
criticism I develop in this section focuses specifically on the role that the awareness of the 
bodily boundaries can have in an account of the SBO. As far as I see, the involvement of an 
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In haptic perception, one perceives objects through touch by directly 
exploring them in an active and controlled way. Haptic touch typically unfolds 
over time and involves a range of bodily movements, the experience finally 
comprising cutaneous stimulation along with motor feedback (Fulkerson, 
2014, 6). Feeling the irregularities of the edge of a table by caressing it with the 
fingertips, for instance, is a case of haptic touch. Haptic experiences are mainly 
object-directed, in that one engages in them to perceive the properties of 
objects other than the body. Yet, their content is typically said to be dual: it 
involves awareness both of external objects and of the body. When touching 
the surface of my worktable, not only do I feel the roughness of the wood, but 
also I am aware that my fingers are depressed by the contact and pressure of 
the table against them. 
The relation between exteroceptive perception and bodily awareness in 
touch is not uncontroversial.46 In what seems a neutral enough claim, however, 
we can say that the tactually accessed properties we are aware of in haptic 
experiences will be attributed, in judgments about these experiences, to two 
different entities: the touched object – the Rough table – and the body – 
namely fingers being Depressed. Reporting the experience in one way or the 
other involves an attentional shift. Either one attends to the object, as seems 
more natural in exploratory touch, or one makes an attentional effort and 
focuses on the body felt while touching.47 Pursuing this attentional effort, a 
description of the phenomenology of bodily awareness in haptic touch will 
plausibly include the idea that “[o]ne measures the properties of objects in the 
world around one against one’s body” (Martin, 1992, 203. My emphasis). Haptic 
perception crucially involves the experience of contact between body and 
objects: the bodily awareness involved in it is the awareness of the limits of the 
body in correlation with the pressure of objects against them. In this sense, 
touch is a clear case of a bodily experience in which the awareness of bodily 
boundaries is phenomenally salient. Feeling the fingertips in exploring the 
surface of the table implies becoming aware of their silhouette. 
                                                                                                                            
awareness of the bodily boundaries in touch is compatible, as well, with the pressure theory. 
Any theory of touch that intended to exploit the phenomenological datum of a sense of 
boundedness for an account of the SBO is susceptible to be targeted by my considerations in 
this section. 
46 See Fulkerson (2014), Chapter 4, for a careful review of different views in this respect. 
47 In Martin’s (1992) analysis, exteroceptive awareness in touch is a result of attending to bodily 
awareness in a certain way. See Fulkerson (2014) and Scott (2001) for comments on Martin’s 
view. See also Husserl (1989) and Katz (1989) for related claims about the role of attention in 
unfolding the duality of touch. 
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On Martin’s account, this invites a reflection on the role of a sensory field in 
touch, which he contrasts with the function that the sensory field has in sight. 
As Martin puts it, “[n]ormal visual experience is essentially experience of 
objects as they fall within the visual field; tactual experience is essentially 
experience of objects as they press from the outside onto the limits of a felt 
sensory field” (ibid., 210). While the sensory field in sight is the visually 
perceived area within which objects are distributed, the objects of touch appear 
in virtue of our awareness of certain bodily regions that, exactly matching the 
shape of perceived objects, constitute the field. To the extent that the sensory 
field is identified with the dimension of bodily awareness of the experience, the 
perception of objects involved in it will properly be described as that of 
something that falls outside of the field. 
Indeed, tactile experience typically involves awareness that the touched 
object is not the body. More generally, “…the cutaneous sense field is only a 
tactual field containing objects of touch in as much as it is embedded within a 
space which extends beyond any such field” (ibid., 209. My emphasis). Touch 
qua bodily sensation involves the awareness of bodily boundaries, which in 
turn equates to the awareness of such boundaries standing out against a wider 
space. This turns out to be, on Martin’s account, a common feature of all 
bodily sensations. 
It is rather straightforward to see how these considerations generalise to 
other bodily experiences. Consider the situation in which you raise your hands 
above your head and are kinaesthetically aware of their relative position (1995, 
271; 1993, 212). You feel your hands by having kinaesthetic sensations from 
them, which means that they seem to extend to at least the point in space 
where you feel sensation (1993, 210). This awareness thus consists of an 
awareness of how the hands are placed within a space that goes beyond that in 
which you actually feel them to be – since it implies feeling the hands as 
outlined. By appealing to the awareness of boundaries, the idea of the dual 
content posited for tactile experiences is generalised mutatis mutandis. To the 
extent that somatosensory qualities are grasped as localised somewhere in the 
body, they count as signalling the points to which the body extends, namely 
where its limits are and where the space in which it is inscribed begins. An 
acute prick in the toe indicates a particular point beyond which there might be 
a thorn; a tickle in the nape of the neck conveys a sense of there being an 
immediately contiguous area in which the air is moving in an unusual way. 
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By now we have clarified part of BT-First Version by spelling out the 
claim that experiencing the body through localised bodily sensations entails an 
awareness of it as bounded. Let us assume that this description of the 
experience of bodily space is accurate. I shall now discuss the central claim of 
this version of the Boundedness Thesis, namely that the SBO consists of the 
awareness of the body as bounded. 
The view under consideration states more specifically that “wherever a 
sensation feels to be located, one’s body appears to extend to at least that point in 
space” (1993, 210. My emphasis). The boundaries are the limit between what 
one feels as the own body and what is felt as other. When, exploring my 
worktable, I switch the focus of attention from the texture of the wood to the 
sensation on the fingers, what I am actually doing is switching attention from 
what is going on beyond one of my boundaries to what goes on beneath it 
(1995, 270). This is how BT-First Version is finally defined: the experienced 
location of the properties felt in bodily sensations entails an awareness of 
boundaries that is awareness of my body as bounded. Martin’s account is 
rounded up by the observation that, typically, bodily sensations only involve 
the body that is in fact one’s own. This plays a crucial role in his definition of 
bodily sensations as perceptual: when we genuinely perceive a body, then it can 
only be our own. 
Up to this point, the view certainly conveys a descriptive analysis of the 
bodily experience of space. In particular, it proposes a notion of sensory field 
that involves awareness of objects outside of it. In close connection with this, 
it specifies the Cartesian intuition that I am not present in my body as a sailor 
in a ship (1996, 81): contrary to how the sailor presumably experiences the 
properties of the ship she is in, the spatial distribution of somatosensorily felt 
properties is such that they fall within what I feel as my own space. 
However, the claim that we experience certain regions at one of the sides 
of certain perceived boundaries will not be particularly explanatory unless it is 
further substantiated in a way that, conceptually, is sufficiently independent 
from the very notion of bodily ownership. The notion of a boundary the 
relevance of which stems from the fact that it appears as the limit between 
what is felt as one’s own body and what is felt as other seems unsatisfactory in 
this respect. For, we could still ask: on what grounds does the subject take the 
body on one of the sides of the boundary – the body instantiating Depression 
in the worktable example – to be her own in the relevant sense, while taking 
the object on the other side – instantiating Roughness – not to be hers? Why 
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should either side of the perceived boundary have the special import it has? 
Considerations along the lines that bodily sensations only involve, at one of the 
sides of the boundary, the body that is in fact our own, are tangential to this 
question: on the one hand, because a view that grounds the SBO on this fact is 
likely to leave unexplained the illusory cases in which the body part one is 
aware of as one’s own does not exist. On the other hand, and in connection 
with the former, because we are concerned with the phenomenal counterpart of 
the first-personal characterisation of the felt body, and this might depart from 
how things actually are. 
At this point, one might worry that I am missing the point about what 
deflationary views are supposed to be. The SBO just is the sense that one’s own 
body extends up to certain boundaries: “for me to feel as if some part of my 
body occupies a region of space… is for it to seem to me as if that region falls 
within one of the boundaries of my body” (Martin, 1995, 270). This certainly 
deflates the SBO, and it is misplaced – the worry goes – to demand, of an 
account of what it is to feel a particular bounded body as my body, that it be 
conceptually independent of the notion of ownership. 
As far as I see, this objection itself involves a misunderstanding regarding 
what is essential to Deflationism. Insofar as we are dealing with Experientialist 
Accounts, the phenomenological analysis of sensations must be sufficient to 
explain why, given a bodily sensation, we typically use a first-person pronoun 
to describe its content; and Deflationism is supposed to do so without 
appealing to a specific mineness component. In particular, in the view at stake 
it must be the representation of space, independently described, which explains 
its manifesting itself first-personally in judgment. The fact that we experience 
properties on what is felt as our own side of a boundary does not meet this 
independence constraint. 
The proper way to defend BT-First Version would be to show that the 
bare description of bodily sensations in terms of perceived properties 
distributed in space so that they delimit boundaries can do the expected 
explanatory work. This is what I want to question immediately in what follows. 
On my view, this description falls short of explaining why we tend to report 
the relevant experiences in first-personal terms. This is clear if we observe that 
the notion of a sense of boundedness, with its corresponding duality, is 
involved as well in episodes of visual perception whose contents we do not 
self-attribute. 
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Husserl noted that visual experience is such that at every moment we are 
aware that the world extends beyond what is actually falling within our visual 
field at that moment (1983, §27).48 An anticipation of subsequent perceptions 
seems to be built into the content of each particular perception, as follows: the 
visual field is experienced as related to other regions of space of which we are 
aware in a different way, and to which we might or might not eventually turn 
our attention – such as, for example, the region behind our bodies. It doesn’t 
seem far-fetched to claim that objects with properties are distributed within the 
visual field to fill it up to its boundaries, which delimit it with respect to other 
non-actually-perceived regions of space. This questions the sufficiency of such 
a description of spatial experience to explain what it is that makes us typically 
judge that one of the sides of the perceived boundaries in bodily sensations is 
our own in the relevant sense, in contrast to what occurs with the space and 
objects we represent visually – that is, those we perceive as falling within the 
visual field. Objects and space falling within the visual field, namely within the 
currently-visually-perceived side of the seen boundary, can perfectly be such 
that we do not self-attribute them. 
Summing up, what we have up to now is this. Once postulated, as Martin 
does, that not only the body belongs to the content of somatosensation, but 
also objects and space adjacent to it, via our awareness of the bodily 
boundaries, then our question becomes why any of the objects and regions of 
space perceived in somatosensation is the designated one: in virtue of what is one 
of the perceived objects, and not the others, taken to be my own body? I have 
claimed that an answer such as “because it is felt as mine” shouldn’t in principle 
be available to Deflationism. By the same token, neither should be the answer 
“because it is the body on my side of the perceived boundary”. The latter seems 
to be the suggestion of the kind of Deflationism now discussed, provided with 
the notion of a sense of boundedness. Without such an appeal to a primitive 
mineness component, however, the general similarity just described between 
somatosensation and visual perception is a threat to the proposal. 
The problem just explained can be put in terms of our initial aims. BT-
First Version fails at meeting, on the one hand, the Intuitive Goal: there 
doesn’t seem to be a necessary link between having visual experiences and self-
attributing their contents, even if a sense of boundedness is plausibly part of 
their phenomenology. Hence, BT-First Version’s specification of the SBO 
                                                 
48 Dokic (2003, 326) also appeals to this idea through Merleau-Ponty to discuss Martin’s view. 
However, his point is different from the one I make here. 
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doesn’t pick up a distinctive enough element of bodily experiences vis à vis 
exteroception to account for the compelling involvement of the first-person in 
the former. On the other hand, by the same token, the view falls short of the 
Judgment Formation Goal. The notion of a sense of boundedness doesn’t 
suffice to explain why bodily sensations are expressed first-personally, since a 
sense of boundedness is generally involved in visual experiences which do not 
yield judgments in which we self-attribute visual contents. Besides, note that a 
consequence of BT-First version is that, necessarily, if a subject has a localised 
sensation, she will feel the body part where it is localised as her own. 
Somatoparaphrenia constitutes a powerful counterargument to this (de 
Vignemont, 2013). Hence, it is also doubtful that BT-First version meets the 
Empirical Goal. 
At this point, the defendant of BT-First Version could call attention to the 
notion of sensory field, certainly appealed to as part of her defence of a sense of 
boundedness. Her suggestion might actually be the following. The body is the 
designated object of somatosensation because it has a special status with respect to 
any other object belonging to the contents of somatosensory experiences: that 
is, it has the status of a sensory field. This, she might point out, establishes a 
disanalogy between the sensory fields of sight and somatosensation. Parts of 
Husserl’s and Martin’s respective descriptions of the visual and the tactile fields 
are of use to convey this disanalogy. In Husserl’s words, in the visual case “I 
can let my attention wander away from the writing table which was just now 
seen and noticed… to all the Objects I directly ‘know of’ as being there and 
here in the surroundings of which there is also consciousness” (1983, §27). In 
vision, I am aware of an environment standing beyond the currently perceived 
visual field which is in principle visually accessible. In other words, visual 
perception involves awareness of the fact that one could perceive what 
currently stands at the other side of the boundary of the visual field in the same 
way as one perceives what falls within it.49 Objects in the environment can, as it 
were, enter into the field of vision, and thereby be visually perceived. In 
contrast, in bodily sensations “the sense of falling within a boundary may be 
no more than the sense that the location in question is within a space that 
                                                 
49 Interestingly, for Husserl this is correlated with the subject’s kinaesthetic awareness, which 
indicates her possibilities for action (1997, Section IV; 1989, Section I, Ch. 3). The relatively 
recently vindicated Gibsonian notion of affordance (Gibson, 1986) incorporates this point. On 
the connections between the Husserlian and the Gibsonian analyses of visual perception, see 
Zahavi (2002). 
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seems to extend into regions that one could not currently be aware of in this way” 
(Martin, 1995, 271. My emphasis). 
Pulling this thread, the defendant of BT-First Version might want to insist 
that there is no object in vision that has a role akin to the role the body has in 
somatosensation; that the body is the designated object of somatosensation 
because one is aware of it in a way in which one could not be aware of any other 
object, this being part of the content of token somatosensory experiences. This 
peculiarity of the subject’s awareness of one side of the boundary in contrast 
with the other could then ground the SBO – the suggestion goes. 
I find this line of argument very promising. In fact, my own proposal on 
the SBO in Chapter 3 of this dissertation exactly exploits and articulates this 
very idea of the spatial deflationist. My contention, however, is that a story 
needs to be told about why the status of the body as a sensory field makes it 
stand out with respect to other objects of somatosensation in a way that is at all 
relevant to the first-person and self-awareness. In Chapter 3 I put forward a proposal 
to this effect. Importantly, my proposal will be informed by the moral of the 
present section: if one claims, as Martin does, that all there is to the SBO is a 
peculiar representation of space, specified in terms of awareness of boundaries 
and properties perceived as instantiated at sides thereof, then ultimately one 
does not capture the reflexivity intrinsic to the SBO. On my view, the 
perception of boundaries is part of what is needed to motivate the special 
status of the body with respect to other somatosensorily perceived objects. 
Yet, it is not sufficient to explain the fact that we self-attribute, as we do, only 
the object at one of the sides of these boundaries. 
 
2.2.2. The Role of Bodily Representations 
 
The points just made about Spatial Deflationism do not in principle rule out 
the possibility that a more sophisticated account of spatial representation in 
bodily sensations can meet the goals set for theories on the SBO satisfactorily. 
Informed by empirical evidence that disputes the adequacy of a view based 
only on the phenomenology of bodily sensations, BT-Second Version adds a 
further element to the picture. To recall, BT-Second Version reads thus: 
 
[BT-Second Version]: subjects possess a representation of their own body as 
a bounded volume. When having bodily sensations, qualities are 
experienced as localised within this representation. In virtue of this, when 
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having bodily sensations subjects experience the body as a bounded 
whole. The SBO consists, at least partly, of the awareness of the body as 
bounded. 
 
On this version of the Boundedness Thesis, a sense of boundedness identical 
to a sense of one’s own boundaries is still crucial in accounting for the SBO. I 
just discussed the limitations of an appeal to this phenomenological datum 
alone as a deflationist strategy on how self-attribution of the felt body is 
possible. BT-Second Version offers a further explanatory tool: what ultimately 
grounds the subject’s awareness of the felt boundaries as her own is that the 
properties felt in bodily sensations are pinpointed within a representation of 
what is in fact the subject’s own body. The relevant representation putatively 
explains why the awareness of boundaries that follows from the location of 
sensation involves a phenomenology of ownership: by falling within the 
representation, the boundaries made salient by the location are those of the 
subject’s actual body. 
I move on now to assessing this version of the Boundedness Thesis. 
Generally speaking, my aim is to point out the limitations of the appeal to 
spatial bodily representations in the context of Deflationism about the SBO. 
More specifically, I will point out that this appeal does not save Spatial 
Deflationism from (a version of) the problem that I have just described for 
Martin’s account. 
 
It is generally accepted in debates on bodily awareness that embodied subjects 
deal with different representations of their bodies – representations cashed out 
here minimally as mental resources that track the state of the body and encode 
it. The content of bodily experiences relies on representations of the body that 
are multimodal, resulting from the integration of visual, proprioceptive, and 
vestibular information (de Vignemont, 2014). Elaborating on some of the 
theses about bodily self-consciousness already advanced in his The Paradox of 
Self-Consciousness (1998), Bermúdez (2017) presents a proposal on how space is 
represented in bodily experiences, now explicitly inscribed within the debate 
on the SBO. In his own words, Bermúdez aims at describing the “experienced 
spatiality of the body” (122), to which he ascribes the role of ultimately 
explaining judgments of somatosensation. 
It is fair to note for a start that, strictly speaking, Bermúdez does not 
articulate his view explicitly in terms of bodily representations: that is, the term 
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“representation” is not central in his paper. On a general description, though, 
he cashes out the content of bodily sensations as conveying certain bodily 
properties as localised within a relatively stable background by reference to 
which this location can be specified. I think this speaks in favour of reading his 
view as falling under BT-Second Version. In what follows, I start by 
motivating this reading of Bermúdez’s view in detail. I then proceed to 
assessing the view under the light of our initial desiderata. 
The first feature that Bermúdez proposes as distinctive of our experience 
of space in bodily sensations has clear echoes from BT-First Version. He calls 
it Boundedness, and it reads thus: “Bodily events are experienced within the 
experienced body (a circumscribed body-shaped volume whose boundaries 
define the limits of the self)” (124).50 
Boundedness puts three elements into play. Firstly, the bodily events 
conveyed to the subject by her experiences. Secondly, the experienced body. 
Finally, a relation between both: bodily events are experienced within the 
experienced body. Via a preliminary definition of the experienced body, 
Boundedness finally states that, in bodily sensations, bodily events are 
experienced as localised within a body-shape volume whose limits define the limits of the 
self. A plausible way of interpreting Boundedness, and in particular the appeal 
to a limited “self”, is as an acknowledgment of the fact that bodily events, as 
conveyed by bodily sensations, typically seem to take place within what one 
takes to be one’s own body. 
Judging by Boundedness, it seems clear that the notion of experienced body 
will be crucial to Bermúdez’s view. One first thing we know about the 
experienced body is that it is an area such that, may perceived bodily properties 
be localised in it, this results in the self-attribution of the body (part) 
experienced as instantiating the properties. In particular, the experienced body 
is a circumscribed area with this feature. Bermúdez also indicates that “[t]he 
boundaries of the bodily self in the experienced body can extend beyond the 
limits of the physical body” (124). Hence, the experienced body is an entity 
that tracks the physical body, and can do so accurately or inaccurately. In 
particular, it can include parts that do not correspond to actual bodily parts. An 
example of this would be phantom limb experiences. Finally, the boundaries of 
the experienced body, even if relatively fixed at any given moment, are 
                                                 
50 Bermúdez talks about bodily events instead of bodily properties. In my comment of his view, I 
will use one or the other indistinctly, assuming bodily events to be instantiations of properties 
by a body. 
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malleable and adaptable over time, responding to organic bodily growth, 
trauma, and demands on movement and action (125). 
Note that these features of the experienced body are still neutral with 
respect to the following two possible readings of Boundedness: 
 
(i) For any occurrent bodily sensation conveying localised bodily 
properties, the limits of the body-shaped self extend to the point 
where the properties are experienced to be localised. This “owned” 
extension is constituted by the occurrent perceptions of bodily 
properties and events. 
(ii) Bodily sensations convey bodily properties as localised within a 
background by reference to which their location can be specified. 
This background is not necessarily constituted by occurrent perceptions 
of bodily properties and events. 
 
Reading (i) would be a reading of Boundedness along the lines of Martin’s 
thesis, namely as falling under BT-First Version. In contrast, reading (ii) would 
be a reading of Boundedness as falling under BT-Second Version. To my 
mind, the second feature that Bermúdez puts forward as defining the 
experienced spatiality of the body in conjunction with Boundedness speaks in 
favour of reading (ii). This feature is what he calls Connectedness: “[t]he spatial 
location of bodily events is experienced relative to the disposition of the body 
as a whole” (126). 
Connectedness specifies Boundedness in terms of how exactly perceived 
bodily properties are localised within the experienced body: in relation to the 
disposition of the rest of the body-shaped volume. Bermúdez develops 
Boundedness and Connectedness in a somewhat technical way through his 
notions of A-location and B-location, which clarify each feature respectively. 
The A-location of a bodily event is the location in a specific body part that this 
event is felt to have relative to an abstract map of the body, without taking into 
account the actual position of the body as a whole. The B-location of a bodily 
event, in contrast, is its location in a particular body part, where the 
specification of this location takes into account the position of other relevant 
body parts. He proposes that in bodily experience the body is represented, in 
terms of A and B locations, as a system of generalised cones: the location of a 
given bodily event in a given limb is to be specified as within a cylinder whose 
origin is at the midpoint of the joint immediately controlling the position of 
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that limb (A-location), as well as by “supplementing the A-location with a 
chain of relative joint angles that collectively specify the location of the given 
limb relative to the immoveable torso” (B-location; 136). 
Technical details aside, the spirit of the proposal is that, for each bodily 
sensation we are conscious of, we do not experience the relevant bodily 
properties or events in isolation, but as nodes of a network of other bodily 
locations. Consider any given bodily experience E, taken by the experiencing 
subject to indicate bodily property P as occurring in L. Bermúdez’s proposal 
says that the content of E should be specified both in absolute terms, as 
conveying P as localised within a given limb, and in terms of P’s location 
relative to various other bodily locations L1, L2…Ln. The system made up by 
L1, L2…Ln is therefore relevant to specifying the content of E, and in particular 
L, whereas it is not identical to L. 
Bermúdez does not go into detail as for the relation, at any given moment, 
between L of a given experience E, and the system L1, L2…Ln, made up by 
other bodily locations. It is not clear, for instance, if the centrality of the latter 
to the specification of the content of E has to do with attentional distribution 
in any relevant sense. In any case, the distinction between L and the system L1, 
L2…Ln elicited by his view arguably introduces two aspects to bodily 
experiences that bear a foreground-background relation respectively. Locations 
L1, L2…Ln plausibly make up the experienced body. The experienced body, let 
us recall, is the body-shaped volume within which currently perceived bodily 
events are localised: an extended, yet delimited whole that typically maps the 
physical body of the experiencing subject, and which can do so accurately or 
inaccurately. Bodily experiences partly gain their spatial content, L, because L is 
localised within the system made up by L1, L2…Ln. In virtue of this relation, by 
having any bodily experience E subjects are aware of the body as a whole 
(Connectedness), and in particular as a bounded whole (Boundedness). 
Crucially, this analysis is put forward as an account of the SBO: the SBO 
consists of this sort of spatial experience. 
As far as I see, this squares with BT-Second Version: 
 
[BT-Second Version]: subjects possess a representation of their own body as 
a bounded volume. When having bodily sensations, qualities are 
experienced as localised within this representation. In virtue of this, when 
having bodily sensations subjects experience the body as a bounded 
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whole. The SBO consists, at least partly, of the awareness of the body as 
bounded.51 
 
In this context, the notion of experienced body putatively holds the 
explanatory burden with respect to the SBO involved in token somatosensory 
experiences. To repeat, the notion is introduced via Boundedness, according to 
which “[b]odily events are experienced within the experienced body (a 
circumscribed body-shaped volume whose boundaries define the limits of the self)” 
(my emphasis). I rephrased Boundedness as the claim that all bodily events are 
felt as falling within one’s own bodily boundaries. Note that this makes 
Bermúdez’s view a clear specification of the Boundedness Thesis. Besides, by 
Connectedness, we know that this body-shaped volume is experienced as a 
continuous whole. The view finally is that the properties felt in token bodily 
sensations gain their first-person component in virtue of being related to the 
experienced body in this way. 
At this point, however, a worry arises: in what sense does the experienced 
body exactly involve the first-person, so that all bodily sensations can be said to 
involve a phenomenology of ownership because they are localised within it? What is 
it exactly for the experienced body to represent a body as my own? Addressing 
this worry is crucial to an account of the SBO along the lines of Boundedness 
and Connectedness that is substantive. If the worry is not addressed, then the 
resulting view is plainly the following: all bodily events felt as falling within a 
certain region are felt as events of our own body, because their location makes 
salient the limits within which all events are felt as events of our own body. 
This, it seems to me, is uninformative. 
On these grounds, it is fair to expect that the notion of experienced body 
be further substantiated so as to yield a satisfactory answer to the worry. In 
what follows, I propose two substantiations of the notion that seem to 
possibly be in line with Bermúdez’s approach. On the one hand, Bermúdez 
might think of the experienced body as a conscious representation – for instance, 
as the background of sensations phenomenally manifest to the subject when 
                                                 
51 In Bermúdez’s version of BT-Second Version, it becomes relevant that the SBO consists of 
the awareness of the body as bounded at least partly. Indeed, the fact that the bodily boundaries 
are salient when having a bodily experience is relevant in his account: in virtue of this, we are 
aware of our body as a whole, namely as a bounded object. According to Bermúdez it is 
conceptually possible that bodily events are experienced within a space that delimits the self, 
and yet in isolation from everything else going on in that space (126). But this is anyway not 
the case in normal conditions. A complete description of spatial experience in 
somatosensation, Bermúdez says, needs to include Connectedness. 
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she has a focally attended occurrent bodily experience. Or, on the other hand, 
he might take it to be an unconscious representation, relevant to a proper 
specification of the location of any focally attended bodily experience, but yet 
not necessarily manifest to the subject when she is having the experience. I will 
address these two options in turn, and argue that none of them yields a 
satisfactory answer to the worry. I will thereby argue that neither of them yields 
an account of the SBO that meets our desiderata. 
The fact that Bermúdez calls his proposed representational device 
experienced body can be taken as evidence in favour of the first option. In fact, if 
as Connectedness demands we want specific bodily events to be experienced 
relative to the body as a whole, it is reasonable to think that at least part of the 
rest of the body besides the relevant bodily event will be somehow 
simultaneously experienced at the moment at which the event is perceived. Put 
otherwise, it seems plausible that, if our experience as of a’s location 
necessarily is an experience as of a’s location relative to b, then by being aware 
of a’s position we are in some sense aware of b’s position too. Bermúdez’s own 
words can be read as suggesting this line of elaboration, as he points out that 
“bodily events are experienced within a holistic framework that, although 
sometimes recessive, is normally an ineliminable part of the content of 
experience” (126), and there is no obvious reason not to take recessive 
awareness to be a form of awareness proper. A full elaboration of this proposal 
would involve, for instance, a clarification of the sense in which we are conscious 
of the location of the relevant bodily event, vis à vis the sense in which we are 
conscious of the various other locations that make up the experienced body, for 
instance along the lines of a scale of attentional distribution. 
We do not need to get into these details here, though. The basic lines of 
the view I am now considering are the following. For any given bodily 
sensation, the relevant bodily property is experienced as localised within a 
bodily representation; and by having the sensation, we are simultaneously 
conscious of various other bodily locations constituting the representation. 
Hence, token bodily experiences gain their spatial content partly by reference 
to other experiences of the same type. In virtue of this, we are conscious of 
(some of) the bodily boundaries because we experience the boundaries of the 
relevant representation. By being aware of the bodily boundaries, we are aware 
of the boundaries of our own body. 
As a description of the experience of space involved in token bodily 
sensations, this is certainly more detailed than Martin’s, and actually 
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encompasses it. However, is Connectedness by itself a step forward in the 
project of explaining the SBO, with respect to the phenomenological 
description of bodily sensations already provided by Boundedness? To my 
mind, there is at least one reason to doubt so. 
For one thing, it seems reasonable to claim that, if we are conscious of the 
experienced body as a whole when we have a bodily sensation, it is at least 
partly because we are somatosensorily conscious of it, even if recessively. Hence, 
on this reading of the view, the experienced body is constituted by (the 
spatially loaded content of) a set of conscious bodily experiences E1, E2…En. 
In other words, the representation to which we are appealing as providing each 
token bodily sensation of its spatial content and thereby of its phenomenology 
of ownership is itself constituted by conscious bodily sensations. Consider so a 
bodily experience E taken by the experiencing subject to indicate bodily 
property P as occurring in L. The view says that E involves a SBO because it is 
embedded within the system constituted by (the spatially loaded content of) 
experiences E1, E2…En. But any of the experiences constituting the 
experienced body is liable to the question about where it gets it “ownership 
load” from – and note that, for every case, an answer might have to mention E 
and its content L. Hence, despite the plausibility of the description of the 
phenomenology of bodily space in terms of determinate locations within a 
spatially loaded network, it is simply difficult to see how the set of bodily 
experiences works as an explanatory touchstone regarding the phenomenology 
of ownership putatively involved in each of its constituents, unless such 
phenomenology is a relatively unexplained emergent property of the system. 
With these remarks on the table, let us move on to the second 
substantiation of the notion of experienced body. On this reading, token 
conscious bodily experiences involve a SBO because they are inscribed within 
an unconscious representation of the body as a whole. Bermúdez himself 
indicates that the existence of structural limits to bodily awareness, grasped by 
Boundedness and Connectedness, is grasped as well by O’Shaughnessy’s 
(1995) notion of long-term body image – “an implicit understanding of the 
large-scale, structural properties of the body” (Bermúdez, 2017, 127. My 
emphasis). Inspired by this suggestion, I will model the notion of an 
unconscious experienced body on O’Shaughnessy’s long-term body image.52 
                                                 
52 The idea of there being relatively fixed body maps that offer the frame of reference for the 
localisation of bodily sensations is rather pervasive in the literature. For instance, de 
Vignemont (2018, 86) endorses the claim that there is a bodily map that is “the background on 
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O’Shaughnessy (1995) defines the long-term body image against the 
backdrop of what he calls short-term body images. On his view, there are three 
varieties of short-term body image: 
 
(α) the actually proprioceptively perceived at a given moment: it changes with 
bodily posture, distribution of attention, and intentional bodily 
occupations. 
(β) the proprioceptively perceptible at a given moment: the image we would 
arrive at by distributing attention all over the body while it remains in one 
given posture. 
(γ) the potentially perceptible at a given moment: the image we get if we take 
the content of (β) at the moment and augment it with all the points that 
might in principle come to consciousness were a highly localised tactile 
sensation to occur at that point. 
 
Type (α) is the only realisable short-term body image, whereas (β) and (γ) are 
abstractions constructed on the grounds of the specific realisations of (α) at 
any given moment. The three of them are the (possible) outcome of bodily 
posture, in the sense of “whatever mind-impinging phenomena posture 
regularly causes” (187), usually proprioceptive sensations. Specifically, (α) is 
mainly determined by those sensations that attentionally stand out. 
O’Shaughnessy observes that (α), (β), and (γ) have an overlapping spatial 
content that matches the physical body. Let us call this content C. The long-term 
body image is hypothesised as a psychological entity (“something at least 
cerebral”; 195), with relatively fixed content C, mostly innately determinate 
although malleable, which has the function of providing the short-term body images 
with their spatial content at any given moment, when supplemented with the 
postural sensations at that moment. It is crucial to the notion of a long-term 
body image, and in particular to its distinction with respect to the short-term 
body images, that experience is not built into it. If, speaking loosely, we were to 
say that the long-term body image has to do with how one seems to oneself to 
be in certain spatial respects, O’Shaughnessy insists that “[w]hatever variety of 
seeming it is that we are talking of, it can be none of the familiar psychological 
                                                                                                                            
which bodily sensations are experienced, their spatial frame of reference.” The exact nature 
and further functions of the relevant map are disputed, though. My aim in this section is 
limited to discussing that a map posited to fulfil the function of spatial frame of reference is 
suitable to ground the SBO. 
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‘seemings’: it is not a perceptual experience of a certain shape, nor an 
imagining-of or imagining-that one is possessed of a certain shape; indeed, it is 
not any kind of experience at all” (194). On the reading of Bermúdez’s view 
that I am now trying to articulate, the structure of cones that, according to 
him, fixes the space of the self would have a nature and function akin to that 
of the long-term body image thus understood. 
Of all the body images defined by O’Shaughnessy, the only phenomenally 
conscious one at any given moment is (α). Let us consider an extension of (α) 
that encompasses, not only the content of proprioceptive sensations – that is, 
sensations of posture –, but also that of all occurrent bodily sensations that are 
relatively attentionally demanding and that eventually inform the subject about 
the general condition of the body by presenting her with bodily properties in 
various locations – e.g. a throbbing pain in the temple, a certain tautness in the 
thigh, or the pressure of the surface of the desk on the forearm. Let us call the 
resulting image (α’) – and consider as well the correspondingly extended 
notions of (β’), (γ’), and C’. Image (α’) plausibly corresponds to what Bermúdez 
has in mind when he talks about the conscious awareness of bodily events at a 
given moment – taking several bodily sensations at this moment jointly. 
Thus defined, the view has it that α’ acquires its spatial content in virtue of 
being circumscribed within the long-term body image (or experienced body), 
with content C’; including the fact that α’ conveys a sense of (the relevant) 
bodily boundaries. The long-term body image, in turn, is unconscious. 
Boundedness applies straightforwardly, at least in the sense that α’ makes 
salient certain boundaries consistent with the body image. Connectedness 
might have to be restricted to a description of the way in which the various 
locations making up α’ are experienced: as mentioned above, it seems difficult 
to make sense of the idea that one is aware of the location of the bodily 
properties within α’ as related to locations constituting a long-term body image 
of which one is unconscious. Besides, crucially, all experienced bodily 
properties falling within the limits of the long-term body image are felt as 
properties of one’s own body: in particular, all felt bodily properties making up α’ 
are felt as properties of one’s own body. In fact, on this view this is putatively 
because they borrow their content from C’: the SBO consists of the awareness 
of the body as bounded and connected made possible by the subject’s 
possession of an unconscious long-term body image. 
Here arises a worry, however: how appropriate it can possibly be to say 
that somatosensory experiences involve a SBO because the long-term body 
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image thus understood provides them with their spatial content. For, in what 
sense does the long-term body image exactly involve the first-person, so that 
all bodily sensations can be said to involve a phenomenology of ownership because 
they are localised within it? I have stated above that the proposal will not 
constitute a complete account of the SBO unless it involves a satisfactory 
answer to this worry. And to my mind, the appeal to an unconscious 
representation can answer the worry only in a limited way. 
Speaking generally, it seems that if we posit a bodily map as a tool to 
explain how, in each token somatosensory experience, I am aware of a 
bounded body as my body, then the relevant map needs to be a representation of 
my body as mine, at the risk of the relevant sensations just being felt to delimit a 
body. Indeed, I might possess a very detailed map of my body, but being aware 
that the body represented in it is mine is a different and crucial issue. However, 
it is not at all obvious what it means for the unconscious, long term body-image 
to represent a body as my own, beyond the very fact that the representation 
elicits the behaviour typically taken to manifest that one takes a certain body to 
be one’s own – for instance, making assertions in which one uses “my” to talk 
about the felt body –, or the phenomenally conscious mental states that cause 
this behaviour. But this is precisely the fact that we aim at explaining. 
It is therefore difficult to see how a spatial representation of this sort can 
serve as the ultimate explanatory building block of the phenomenology of 
ownership putatively involved in token somatosensory experiences. There 
remains, as it were, an explanatory gap: one between the plain, non-reflexive 
representation of space, and the reflexive, first-personal, phenomenally 
conscious outcome of this representation. If it is not clear how token bodily 
experiences can acquire their putative “ownership load”, then it is not clear 
how we can cover the Judgment Formation Goal while remaining in an 
experientialist framework. Note that this is so even if the representation of 
space at stake – the long-term body image, in this case – is exploited 
exclusively by bodily sensations. 
The defendant of (this version of) Spatial Deflationism might be ready to 
put forward now her recalcitrant objection: the sort of explanation I am 
seeking simply builds too much into the notion of a phenomenology of 
ownership. Spatial deflationists about the SBO, the objection goes, only aspire to 
claiming that the SBO simply is a certain type of experience of space – in 
particular one involving the long-term body image as grounds for sensations 
whose phenomenology is characterised by Boundedness and Connectedness. 
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Whenever a bodily self-attribution shows up in a judgment of 
somatosensation, and does so in a seemingly compelling way, this indicates 
that this type of spatial experience is in place. 
By proceeding in this way, the spatial deflationist is offering an a posteriori 
identity between the SBO and certain facts about spatial representation. This 
sort of identity is indeed informative: talk about how space is represented in 
bodily experience adds up to the details of the phenomenon that we need to 
explain. This proposal might even be extensionally adequate, capturing all the 
relevant empirical cases. But it is one thing to propose a posteriori identities as 
brute facts, and another thing to bring forth the exact knitting between the 
identified phenomena, so that it is clear how one stands as an explanation of 
the other. 
In this case, this “exact knitting” would be fully revealed in an explanation 
that took into account that, when I claim that a body I feel is mine, I mean 
exactly that it belongs to the experiencer of the relevant sensations, where this 
experiencer is me. Within an experientialist framework, this means 
characterising bodily experiences themselves in a way such that they grasp this 
reflexivity. Indeed, if we can’t get a full explanation of this type, then we 
should resign ourselves to a posteriori identities of the sort discussed. The 
question, however, is whether we can. As far as I see, offering an explanation 
of the SBO that is fully explanatory in this specific sense is possible – or so I 
will argue in the second half of this dissertation. 
To conclude this assessment of Spatial Deflationism, it must be admitted 
that at least one mainly spatial deflationist account available in the literature 
contains hints in a direction in principle suited to overcome this difficulty. De 
Vignemont (2007) points out that Martin “reduces the sense of ownership to 
the sense of the boundaries of one’s own body” but he “does not go into detail 
about the delineation of the boundaries of one’s own body”. She then 
proceeds to investigate “the nature of the spatial representation of the body that 
underlies the sense of ownership” (436, my emphasis), submitting an account 
that intends to supplement Martin’s in the pursuit of a common aim. It 
therefore seems fair to read her view as an instance of BT-Second Version. 
In de Vignemont (2007), however, the type of bodily representation 
proposed as relevant for the discussion on the SBO is the body schema. The 
body schema is a sensorimotor map of the body based on information that can 
be constantly updated on the basis of afferent and efferent processes, including 
the posture and relative position of body parts, the size and strength of the 
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limbs, or the degree of freedom of the joints.53 From a functional point of 
view, the body schema enables and constrains movement and the maintenance 
of posture, being the kind of representation involved in the control of action. 
The relevance of the body schema in the discussion of the SBO is inferred 
from empirical evidence showing correlations between variations in ownership 
rating and functions typically associated with this body map. Bodily sensations, 
among other sensory inputs, are essential for the emergence of the schema, 
although they subsequently become weaker or disappear in the constitution of 
a bodily representation that is “most of the time unconscious” (444). 
I have just discussed the difficulties involved in claiming that token 
somatosensory experiences have a phenomenology of ownership because they 
borrow their content, or are integrated within, either a conscious or an 
unconscious bodily representation. In normal circumstances, the very 
formation of the body schema might well owe too much to (localised) bodily 
sensations to be able to function as an ultimate explanation of their 
phenomenology. In fact, a similar criticism, picking up directly on de 
Vignemont (2007), is raised by Peacocke (2015), who points out that if it is 
part of the representational content of the body schema that it marks body 
parts as one’s own, then it assumes the notion of ownership instead of offering 
a reductive explanation thereof. 
In fairness, though, we can read de Vignemont (2007) as suggesting that 
the first-personal component of the body schema is gained by the fact that it is 
the map of the body with which we act. In normal circumstances, this might 
not be completely independent from the fact that one perceives this body via 
the bodily sensations involved in one’s engagement in action: we experience as 
our own the one and only body with which we can perform direct actions, 
which we somatosensorily feel accordingly – and the body schema just 
happens to be the representation tracking this body.54 
                                                 
53 For reviews of the numerous terminological and conceptual confusions involved in this 
notion, in particular its conflation with the notion of body image, see Tiemersma (1989) and 
Gallagher (2005, Chapter 1). 
54 In principle, this doesn’t have to entail that bodily sensations are necessary for any subject to 
have a sense of agency, and to possess a bodily representation that plays the functional role 
typically associated with the body schema. Patients with deafferentation, for example, 
compensate their somatosensory deficits with visual tracking of the body (Cole and Paillard, 
1995). This suggests that the various sensory modalities typically involved in building the 
relevant bodily representation can compensate each other in cases of deficit (notice also that 
deafferentation is sometimes interpreted as a pathology in which motor deficits are 
compensated by mechanisms closer to the body image than the body schema; e.g. Gallagher & 
Cole, 1995; Wong, 2009). 
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This paves the way for a suggestive account of the SBO in which agency 
plays a crucial role: on this view, having a SBO would be tightly linked to the 
capacity to perform bodily actions. In this context, bodily sensations might 
well make the bodily boundaries salient, but the bounded body will be 
experienced as one’s own on the grounds of it being the body one has an 
experience as of acting directly with – a body indeed represented in the body 
schema. 
As I see it, this is tantamount to acknowledging the limitations of spatial 
representation as grounds for the SBO, and in particular of the notion of 
boundedness as has been presented up to now. The agentive view that follows 
naturally is one in which bodily sensations, provided with a spatial content, 
convey the limits of the body with which we can act directly; and this, in turn, 
gives rise to a specific bodily map attached to action, as well as to a sense of 
bodily ownership. Interesting as it sounds, this view departs from – in fact, it 
seems to deny – the claim that a sense of boundedness be sufficient as grounds 
for the SBO. This view thus goes beyond what would be strictly speaking 
Deflationism about the SBO.55, 56 
 
2.2.3. Summing up 
 
Bodily awareness in somatosensation involves, minimally, the sensation as of a 
property instantiated in a location. The common tenet of the several forms of 
Spatial Deflationism discussed is that the location of felt properties in 
somatosensation involves the phenomenal salience of the boundaries of the 
body. This phenomenological datum has not been disputed in the foregoing 
section. I have addressed, however, the Boundedness Thesis: 
 
[Boundedness Thesis]: the SBO consists at least partly of the fact that, when 
having bodily sensations, the body is felt as having certain boundaries. 
 
I have argued that Spatial Deflationism fails at meeting at least the Judgment 
Formation Goal and the Intuitive Goal – and, in some cases, also clearly the 
                                                 
55 I am thankful to one of the referees of my paper “The Bounded Body. On the Sense of 
Bodily Ownership and the Experience of Space” for helping me shape these remarks on 
agency. 
56 De Vignemont (2017, 2018) actually endorses this insufficiency claim, and offers a much 
more sophisticated view on the SBO that ultimately relies on affective phenomenology. For a 
brief comment on this view, see section 2.5 in this chapter. 
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Empirical Goal. In Martin’s version of this thesis, BT-First Version, nothing 
else but the sense of boundedness is called upon as grounds for the SBO. I 
have argued that the sense of boundedness alone doesn’t allow to explain why 
we self-attribute seemingly compellingly the body we perceive somatosensorily. 
This is because, on the one hand, something akin to the sense of boundedness 
is present also in exteroceptive perception; and on the other hand because, 
given the sense of boundedness, arguably more than one delimited object 
belongs to the content of somatosensation, and accounting for the fact that 
only one of them is experienced as one’s own needs to go beyond the fact that 
we are aware of its limits. 
Bermúdez and de Vignemont’s (2007) versions of the Boundedness 
Thesis, BT-Second Version, add an appeal to bodily representations as that in 
virtue of which token somatosensory experiences gain their spatial 
phenomenology, including the awareness of boundaries, and hence their 
phenomenology of ownership. I have argued that this strategy leaves us with 
an explanatory gap between plain, non-reflexive representation of space, and 
the reflexive, first-personal phenomenology putatively grounded on it. I have 
claimed that the farthest these sort of views can go is to establish a posteriori 
identities between the SBO and an element in the representational structure of 
somatosensation. Bridging the gap is likely to involve reexamining the 
phenomenology of somatosensation to add further aspects to it, such as a 
sense of agency. 
Is it possible, however, to cash out the content and phenomenology of 
bodily experiences so that it involves the due reflexivity, without yet appealing 
to these further components? Is it possible to describe the SBO by using 
resources that do not go beyond those Deflationism wants to commit to? Of 
course, we cannot rule out this possibility yet. The second main strand of 
experiential Deflationism confers the explanatory burden on the SBO to the 
kind of sensory qualities we are aware of in somatosensation – that is, to the 
nature of the properties involved in bodily experiences. In the following 
section I will assess this type of Deflationism. 
 
2.3. Property Deflationism 
 
The idea that the SBO needs to be spelled out in terms of the nature of the 
properties one feels instantiated in the body when undergoing bodily sensations 
has been defended by Jérôme Dokic (2003). On his view, the properties 
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involved in somatosensation are experience-dependent, and this is the crucial 
feature for an account of the SBO. To put it succinctly, Dokic’s central claim is 
the following: 
 
[Property Thesis]: the SBO consists of the fact that the properties involved 
in bodily sensations are experience-dependent. 
 
In this section I will discuss Dokic’s account, arguing that it also falls short of 
meeting the Judgment Formation and Intuitive goals, as did Spatial 
Deflationism. In what follows, I start by putting forward the details of the 
view, including the crucial notion of experience-dependency of properties. 
 
2.3.1. Translucence and Reflexivity 
 
On his way to articulating his proposal, Dokic (2003) puts forward an 
assumption about bodily experiences: on his view, bodily experiences are 
translucent.57 This is how Dokic defines the notion: 
 
[A]ny intentional object of bodily experience can be the intentional object of 
external perception, in particular by others. Whatever pain is, what I am 
perceiving in my hand when I feel pain is in principle open to observation by 
anybody else (or by me in the mirror). (324) 
 
Let me start by clarifying what Dokic is pointing to by endorsing the thesis of 
translucence – henceforth, Translucence. 
Bodies, just as other objects, have properties. And as happens with other 
objects too, experiencing subjects can pick out these properties in various 
ways. For an illustration, let us consider the following example: the peel of 
watermelons is typically smooth, and one can both visually and tactually perceive 
the smoothness of the peel of a watermelon. What it is like for a subject to see 
the smoothness of the peel of the watermelon is remarkably different from 
what it is like for her to tactually feel the smoothness of the peel of the 
watermelon. Nevertheless, there is a plain sense in which the “smothnesses” 
involved in these two experiences are the same: they capture a property the 
peel of the watermelon has. Let us call this property Smoothness. In the example, 
                                                 
57 Dokic in fact uses the term “transparent” instead of “translucent”. I have opted for a change 
in the terminology because in chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation I will be using the notion of 
transparency in another sense, more standard in the philosophy of mind. 
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the experiencing subject picks out Smoothness by exercising two different 
cognitive faculties, namely visual perception and tactile perception. The fact 
that Smoothness yields several distinct phenomenal experiences does not in 
principle tell against the idea that, by having these experiences, the subject is 
presented with what we can take to be a single property of the peel of the 
watermelon – in fact, with what the subject herself most probably takes to be a 
single property of the peel of the watermelon. 
Surely our bodies also have properties or find themselves in conditions we 
pick out. Imagine, for example, a child that falls down and scrapes her knee 
against the ground. Imagine also that, after the fall, she looks at her knee to 
discover a big graze on its skin. The child thereby visually perceives the knee’s 
skin damage caused by the sandy pavement. Another thing the child notices 
after the fall is an intense, burning sensation, which incidentally she will report 
to feel exactly in the knee’s graze when asked where it hurts. Arguably, what it 
is like for the child to see the wound will be remarkably different from what it 
is like for her to feel it hurting. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which both 
experiences capture a property the knee has. Let us call this property Damage. 
The scenario described is one in which the child picks out Damage via two 
different cognitive faculties, namely visual perception and somatosensation, 
and correspondingly has two presumably distinct phenomenal experiences. In 
any case, the latter does not tell against the fact that through both of these 
experiences the child is acquainted with the Damage of her knee. 
By putting forward Translucence, Dokic endorses a generalisation of 
which the case of Damage just described is just an instance. According to 
Translucence, on the one hand, Damage is exteroceptively graspable not only 
by the very subject whose body is damaged but also by others. Indeed, people 
other than the child will be able to see the child’s knee’s Damage when she 
shows them her graze, just as she herself is able to do so. In contrast, in 
normal conditions, Damage will only be presented somatosensorily, in the 
form of an experience of pain, to the subject whose body is actually wounded, 
in this case the child. 
This point allegedly applies to all bodily sensations. For instance, a 
subject’s legs’ being Crossed, as well as their Moving, can be somatosensorily 
picked out by her, or visually grasped by her and others; the Coldness of a 
subject’s body can be somatosensorily perceived by her, who will feel cold, and 
externally observed by her and others, for instance by hearing her teeth chatter. 
Translucence claims that there is a common structure to all these cases: given a 
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Property of a body, if it is possible for subjects to pick it out somatosensorily, 
then it is also possible for subjects to pick it out exteroceptively.58 Incidentally, 
the only subject who is capable of the former in normal conditions is the one 
we normally count as the owner of the body bearing the Property. In contrast, 
in normal conditions, not only the owner of the body, but other subjects as 
well, are capable of the latter.59 
At this point it might be noticed that it is doubtful that Translucence 
actually generalises without exception to all bodily sensations. A 
counterexample to this generalisation might be some cases of phantom limb 
pain, in which subjects have a sensation as of a Property localised in a body 
part, whereas no trace of the physical Damage in the body can be 
exteroceptively observed. 
In any case, that Translucence cannot be generalised to all sensations is 
not problematic for Dokic’s purposes, nor for my purposes in this section. 
Here is why. Dokic’s point in putting forward Translucence in the context of a 
project on the SBO is to stress that we are in need of an explanation of the 
difference between perceiving properties of bodies exteroceptively and 
perceiving them somatosensorily. The acknowledgment of this difference, and 
of the need for an explanation thereof, is precisely what has led me to 
formulating the Judgment Formation and the Intuitive goals in Chapter 1 of 
this dissertation. Admittedly, in order to convey the need for this explanation, 
it is dialectically powerful to mention cases in which the Property perceived 
exteroceptively and somatosensorily is, on some rather uncontroversial 
reading, the same. I think it is uncontroversial that there are at least some cases 
of somatosensation for which Translucence holds. The examples mentioned in 
the previous paragraphs are cases in point. 
On Dokic’s view, what distinguishes the somatosensory perception of 
properties from the exteroceptive perception of (the same) properties is the 
reflexivity embedded only in the former. Reflexivity is a technical notion of his, 
to be defined immediately. Dokic is committed to all bodily experiences being 
reflexive. As far as I see, it is unproblematic to read him as sticking to the 
                                                 
58 My reformulation of Translucence in terms of picking out properties – or, in the previous 
paragraphs, in terms of being acquainted with properties, or of properties being presented to 
subjects – intendedly remains neutral as to whether the status of the properties in the 
experiences is that of an intentional object. Dokic’s original point explicitly assumes it is. I do 
not need to endorse this assumption for my points in this section to go through. 
59 Note that this formulation is neutral with respect to whether the answer to the metaphysical 
question “which body is subject S’s body?” should take into account which body S is capable 
of perceiving somatosensorily in normal conditions. 
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generality of this claim even if, against his own proposal, we assume that 
Translucence might not hold for all cases. This is because bodily experiences in 
general typically involve a SBO, regardless of whether Translucence holds for 
them or not, and the SBO is exactly what the notion of reflexivity is aimed at 
accounting for. In what follows I shall introduce Dokic’s notion of reflexivity. 
Afterwards I shall argue that it is not sufficiently distinctive of 
somatosensation. Hence, I shall argue that it falls short of providing an 
account of the SBO that meets our goals. 
On Dokic’s view, bodily experience, in contrast to external perception, is 
reflexive “in the sense that it is about instantiated properties which entail the 
experience itself” (327). Let us call this thesis Reflexivity. We can articulate 
Reflexivity by exploiting a bit more the terms used in putting forward 
Translucence. 
Translucence has it that, given a Property of a body, if it is possible for 
subjects to pick it out somatosensorily, then it is also possible for subjects to 
pick it out exteroceptively, at least in some cases. Uncontroversially, subjects 
perceive bodily properties somatosensorily. Stipulatively, the following is a way 
of putting forward the same point: given a Property of a body, if it is possible 
for subjects to have an experience involving PropertyS, namely a 
somatosensory experience, then at least in some cases it is also possible for 
them to have an experience involving PropertyE, namely an exteroceptive 
experience, where the superscripts “S” and “E” stand for “somatosensation” 
and “exteroception” respectively. Uncontroversially, subjects have 
somatosensory experiences involving PropertiesS. 
This notation has only an instrumental purpose: PropertiesS are properties as 
they are involved in somatosensation, and PropertiesE are properties as they are involved in 
exteroception, where this is yet intended to be neutral with respect to the nature of 
the relevant properties as part of the content of the experiences. As an 
illustration, note that a new way of describing the example of the child above is 
now available: when she and other people look at the wounded knee, they have 
a visual experience which involves DamageE. In turn, when the child has that 
unpleasant sensation in the knee, she has a somatosensory experience which 
involves DamageS. The experience involving DamageE and the experience 
involving DamageS presumably are phenomenologically distinct – which in 
principle doesn’t tell against the fact that, by these experiences, subjects are 
acquainted with Damage in the child’s knee. 
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Reflexivity says that PropertiesS are such that they entail the experience itself. 
On Dokic’s view, this means that PropertiesS are constitutively dependent on the 
occurrence of the token experience they are a content of. In other words, each 
token PropertyS is such that it could not be instantiated if the token experience 
it is a content of didn’t occur. In this specific sense, PropertiesS are experience-
dependent. In turn, for an experience to be reflexive means for it to have as part of 
its content an experience-dependent property. What Reflexivity says, then, is 
that bodily experiences are reflexive, in the specific sense of including as part 
of their content an experience-dependent property.60 
We are now in a position to offer the schematic characterisation of bodily 
experiences that flows from Dokic’s proposal: 
 
(*) Experience (P is instantiated in L), where P is constitutively dependent 
on this particular experience. 
 
The brackets enclose the content of the experience, namely that a certain 
property is instantiated at a certain (bodily) location. In turn, the clause after 
the brackets nuances this: P is to be understood as constitutively dependent on the 
occurrence of the token experience it is a content of. An experience thus 
defined is reflexive, since it has as part of its content a property of this type. 
Finally, and crucially, Dokic’s claim is that all and only somatosensory 
experiences are reflexive in this sense, insofar as they present their subject with 
qualified body parts. Consider again the child’s case as an instance of this 
generalisation: the child has a visual experience which involves DamageE, as 
well as a somatosensory experience which involves DamageS. By Reflexivity, 
the child’s somatosensory experience of DamageS – namely, to be clear, her 
experience of pain – is reflexive because DamageS is experience-dependent, 
that is, it would not be instantiated if the child’s token experience of pain were 
not occurring. 
Crucially again, (*) is a complete description of token bodily experiences on 
Dokic’s view. This means that, on this view, (*) contains the elements 
sufficient to account for the SBO. In particular, on this view the fact that 
                                                 
60 It is important for dialectical purposes to note that, on Dokic’s Reflexivity, the properties 
involved in somatosensory experiences concern the experiences themselves in a peculiar way (they 
“entail” them, in Dokic’s words). The notion of reflexivity I have put forward at the beginning 
of this chapter as characteristic of judgments of somatosensation has it that the canonical 
expression of these judgments contains a reference to the subject of the experience qua subject of the 
experience. 
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bodily experiences are reflexive is what allegedly accounts for the SBO. In 
Dokic’s own words, “the sense of ownership peculiar to bodily experience 
results from facts about the perceived properties … – more precisely, from a 
constitutive relation holding between the instantiation of these properties and 
the experience itself” (326. My emphasis). In this sense, Dokic is a deflationist 
about the SBO. In particular, one claiming that bodily experiences involve a 
SBO in virtue of the qualitatively rich properties one feels instantiated in the 
body when undergoing bodily sensations – more specifically, in virtue of a 
metaphysical feature of these properties. Dokic thus defends the Property 
Thesis: 
 
[Property Thesis]: the SBO consists of the fact that the properties involved 
in bodily sensations are experience-dependent. 
 
Before moving on to assessing Dokic’s view in the next section, it is important 
to stress that, on his view, bodily experiences are reflexive only implicitly: it is not 
part of the content of bodily experiences that the properties involved in them 
are experience-dependent. This was clear in the schematic description of bodily 
experiences yielded by the view, 
 
(*) Experience (P is instantiated in L), where P is constitutively dependent 
on this particular experience, 
 
in which the experience-dependency of P is stated outside the brackets. By 
having an experience of pain in the knee, for instance, the child is presented 
with DamageS as localised in the knee, but the fact that DamageS is actually 
experience-dependent does not figure in the content of her experience. Hence, 
what Dokic proposes as accounting for the SBO is a metaphysical fact about 
the properties involved in somatosensation that is not itself reflected in the 
content of bodily experiences. 
Speaking generally, Dokic’s Property Deflationism contains a twofold 
suggestion. On the one hand, the properties we somatosensorily experience the 
body as having are, by nature, linked to the occurrence of experiences in an 
intimate way; on the other hand, this somehow has to do with the fact that we 
experience the body in which we take these properties to be localised as very 
intimately ours. I find this suggestion very interesting. However, I do not think 
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that Dokic goes far enough in exploiting it. In the next section I articulate my 
reasons to doubt that his proposal fulfils its intended aim. 
 
2.3.2. The Significance of Experience-Dependency 
 
In order to develop my objection to Property Deflationism as clearly as 
possible, I will stick to the toy case of the child with the wounded knee. I have 
stipulated that, by having an experience as of pain in the knee, the child is 
presented with DamageS. Besides, when looking at her knee, she has an 
experience as of DamageE in her knee. By Reflexivity, the child’s bodily 
experience of DamageS, namely her experience of pain, is reflexive, given the 
experience-dependency of DamageS. 
The criticism I will put forward in the forthcoming paragraphs takes issue 
with what the precise nature of DamageS, and in general PropertiesS, might be. 
It runs as follows. As far as I see, there are two reasonable ways in which 
DamageS, and in general PropertiesS, can be further substantiated so that they 
are, metaphysically speaking, experience-dependent. In any of these two 
specifications, I will argue, the resulting schematic description of bodily 
experiences, offered as allegedly sufficient to account for the SBO, might 
actually also apply to experiences of external perception. However, the latter 
do not (seemingly) necessarily involve a link between the occurrence of the 
experience itself, and the awareness of the perceived body as one’s own. This 
means that in none of these two readings does Property Deflationism meet the 
Intuitive Goal: the experience-dependency of the properties involved in the 
experience is not distinctive enough of somatosensation vis à vis external 
perception. By the same token, the view neither meets the Judgment 
Formation Goal: the experiences of external perception that the resulting 
description also applies to do not yield first-person judgments. Therefore, the 
description in question is not sufficient to explain the fact that we self-attribute 
the felt body in judgments of somatosensation in which we do so. 
The first way in which DamageS, and in general PropertiesS, can be further 
substantiated is by taking them to be qualitative properties. It is rather 
uncontroversial that there is something it is like to feel pain, namely that there 
is a quale attached to this experience. Let DamageS be this quale. On this 
reading, DamageS is indeed a type of property such that, in order for it to 
possibly be instantiated, an experience that has it as its content needs to occur. 
On this first reading, then, “P” in the schematic description 
 81 
(*) Experience (P is instantiated in L), where P is constitutively dependent 
on this particular experience 
 
is to be understood as a quale. Here is a more precise schematic description of 
the relevant experiences, adapted to this first reading of Property Deflationism. 
The superscript “Q” in it stands for “quale”. In this new description, the 
metaphysical proviso after the brackets admittedly becomes rather redundant: 
 
(*Q) Experience (PQ is instantiated in L), where PQ is constitutively 
dependent on this particular experience. 
 
The possibility of specifying properties such as DamageS as qualia seems 
reasonable: there is a sense in which, by being in pain, the child is aware of the 
quality of her painfulness. Surely, the child will most likely take her qualitatively 
rich experience of pain in a knee to indicate the presence of objective Damage 
in her knee, and not so much the presence of a quale in her knee. In principle, 
this observation doesn’t make the substantiation of DamageS as a quale 
unreasonable. Rather, it suggests that, if one endorses such substantiation, then 
one should supplement one’s theory, so as to explain why an experience whose 
content is specified primarily in terms of qualitative properties is ultimately 
reported as revealing the state and condition of a physical object. 
We do not need to get into these details to assess this first specification of 
DamageS, though. The problem with Dokic’s view on this first reading is that 
nothing in it tells against the possibility of taking PQ in (*Q) to be DamageE, 
assuming that there are qualia associated to visual perception, and in particular 
to visually perceiving a red graze on a knee. This assumption seems plausible 
enough – specially in a context in which, we have assumed, there are qualia 
associated to a type of conscious sensory states, namely somatosensory 
experiences. In other words, the problem with Property Deflationism on this 
first reading is that, in principle, nothing in it tells against the possibility of 
taking the experience described in (*Q) to be a visual experience.61 
Let me unpack this objection in a bit more detail. We know that, after the 
fall, the child, and probably the adults around her, have looked at her knee to 
discover a big red graze on its skin. In other words, they have had an 
                                                 
61 I will put forward the objection focusing on the case of visual perception, but it could be 
equally run by focusing on any other possible mode of exteroceptive perception of bodily 
properties. 
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experience involving DamageE, namely a visual experience. There is something 
it is like for them to have these experiences, that is, their respective visual 
experiences have a certain qualitative character. Let DamageE be the quale 
associated with having a visual experience as of a red graze on the knee. The 
question is now the following: what prevents (*Q) from being a description of 
an experience bearing this quale? Consider it again: 
 
(*Q) Experience (PQ is instantiated in L), where PQ is constitutively 
dependent on this particular experience. 
 
As a qualitative property, DamageE certainly meets the condition of not being 
instantiated unless an experience occurs such that the experience involves it – 
namely the condition of being experience-dependent. Hence, DamageE could 
occupy the place of variable PQ. What this means, in sum, is that visual 
experiences could fall under description (*Q). 
Indeed, for this to be the case we would have to be assuming that the 
contents of visual experiences need to be spelled out primarily in terms of 
qualia. A theory along these lines is not completely uncontroversial: for 
instance, it will need to be supplemented with an explanation of why visual 
experiences seem to present us with objective properties of physical bodies. I 
do not need to engage in this discussion to make my point, however. In order 
for my objection to get off the ground, the only possibility of extending the 
analysis of bodily experiences to exteroceptive experiences suffices. Various 
authors in the literature, endorsing several distinct views on the content of 
visual perception, take qualitative properties to figure in it in one way or 
other. 62  Dokic’s analysis of bodily experiences, and ultimately of the SBO, 
stands in a notably bad position, if its plausibility for the somatosensory case 
depends on the denial of the claim that qualia belong to the content of 
exteroceptive experiences in any of the ways in which they might. 
As an aside, note also that taking both bodily experiences and 
exteroceptive experiences to fall under description (*Q) would be compatible 
with Transparency. The relations between Damage and the corresponding 
qualitative properties DamageS and DamageE would simply have to be 
sufficiently specified, for example in the direction of taking the qualia to be 
                                                 
62 E.g. classical sense-data theories, but also projectivism (see Boghossian and Velleman, 1989) 
or sensationalism (see Peacocke, 2008). 
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caused by, and to indicate, one and the same property instantiated by the 
relevant object. 
To finish unpacking the objection, let me make explicit the reason why the 
possibility of extending (*Q) from somatosensory experiences to exteroceptive 
experiences is problematic. According to Property Deflationism, the SBO 
involved in somatosensory experiences consists in the fact that they are 
implicitly reflexive. On the  reading of the proposal now assessed, somatosensory 
experiences would be implicitly reflexive in virtue of involving qualia as part of 
their content. 
Now, given the nature of DamageE qua quale, visual experiences involving 
DamageE in the way indicated by (*Q) would also be implicitly reflexive. 
However, they do not involve a SBO in the way bodily experiences do: to the 
extent that we can conceive of visually perceiving a knee as damaged without 
thereby self-attributing it, it is clear that there doesn’t seem to be a necessary 
link between having an experience involving DamageE and experiencing the 
damaged bodily part as one’s own. And this is perfectly conceivable. Actually it 
is often the case: in normal conditions, when people other than the child 
would see the child’s torn skin, they would typically unproblematically attribute 
it to her, and not to themselves. We can even think of the child herself 
mistaking her damaged knee with, say, that of some likewise adventurous 
friend of hers. Hence, the experience-dependency of the properties involved in 
somatosensation, understood as the experience-dependency of qualia, and 
hence the putative implicit reflexivity of somatosensory experiences, is not 
sufficient to account for the SBO, involved in them but not in exteroception. 
Put in terms of our goals, under this reading Property Deflationism would 
not satisfy the Intuitive Goal. 63  It would not offer an answer to the 
Constitutive Question that, picking out an element of bodily experiences 
distinctive enough of them, accounted for our contrastive intuition: if one 
experiences a body somatosensorily, one will be aware of it as one’s own, but 
this is not necessarily so in cases in which one experiences a body 
exteroceptively. By the same token, the view doesn’t meet the Judgment 
Formation Goal either. The point just made is that exteroceptive experiences 
might be implicitly reflexive, in the sense now relevant, without yielding 
                                                 
63 Incidentally, Dokic explicitly articulates the intuition that motivates the Intuitive Goal. As he 
puts it, “[w]hatever property we can be aware of ‘from the inside’ is instantiated in our own 
apparent body. Bodily experience seems to be necessarily short-sighted, so to speak, since it 
cannot extend beyond the boundaries of one’s body. The very idea of feeling a pain in a limb 
which does not seem to be ours is difficult to frame, perhaps unintelligible” (325). 
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judgments in which one qualifies the perceived body with a first-person 
pronoun. Therefore, if implicit reflexivity in the sense now relevant were a 
feature of bodily experiences, it would not be sufficient to explain the fact that 
we self-attribute the felt body in judgments of somatosensation in which we do 
so. 
As advanced, there is yet another way in which DamageS, and in general 
PropertiesS, could be specified such that Reflexivity would be respected. Let us 
still hold the rather uncontroversial assumption that there is something it is like 
to undergo bodily experiences, and in particular pain. Now, let DamageS be the 
relational property something has just in case it is currently producing the quale 
of pain in a subject appropriately related to it. 64  Here is the schematic 
description of bodily experiences yielded by this substantiation of PropertiesS. 
The superscript “P” indicates that we are talking about the property of 
currently producing a quale. In this new description, the metaphysical proviso 
after the brackets is again rather redundant: 
 
(*P) Experience (PP is instantiated in L), where PP is constitutively 
dependent on this particular experience. 
 
On this second reading of Property Deflationism, somatosensory experiences 
have as part of their content a property that can directly seem to us to be 
instantiated by the body itself. Yet, in turn, this property is experience-
dependent: it is not possible for a body to have the property of currently causing 
a given token quale unless an experience (of a subject appropriately related to 
the body) occurs that instantiates the relevant quale. On this second reading of 
Property Deflationism, experiences are implicitly reflexive in virtue of 
involving as part of their content the property something has just in case it is 
currently producing qualia in a subject appropriately related to it. 
As far as I see, this specification of PropertiesS is liable to the same 
objection I put forward to the first proposal. In principle, nothing in this 
understanding of bodily experiences tells against the possibility of taking PP in 
(*P) to be DamageE. Doing so would mean that we specify DamageE as the 
property of currently producing the quale associated to exteroceptively 
perceiving a red knee in a subject appropriately related to the bearer of the 
property. In this case, however, the experience described would be a visual 
experience. Again, this goes on the rather uncontroversial assumption that 
                                                 
64 These properties are modelled on Shoemaker’s (1994, 2000) phenomenal properties. 
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there is something it is like to perceive, say, a red graze on a knee, and hence 
that there are qualitative properties associated to having this experience. If this 
is so, then we can cash out the property of currently producing the relevant 
visual quale in a subject, and endorse the idea that objects appropriately related 
to subjects with qualitatively rich experiences are perceived as instantiating this 
property. 
It is not at all uncontroversial that our visual experiences have properties 
of this type as part of their content. However, it is not uncontroversial either 
that bodily experiences do. Again, my point here is that if one puts forward an 
analysis of somatosensation in terms of this sort of experience-dependent 
properties, then the door is open to the involvement of this type of properties 
in other sorts of sensory experiences as well.65 To repeat, this is problematic 
because visual experiences involving, say, DamageE, which also on this reading 
are implicitly reflexive, do not involve a SBO for the body experienced as 
instantiating the relevant property. In contrast, bodily experiences involving 
DamageS do. Hence, the metaphysical feature we are alluding to as grounds for 
the SBO, namely the experience-dependency of the properties involved and 
the subsequent implicit reflexivity of the experiences, is not sufficient to 
explain that we self-attribute the felt body in judgments of somatosensation, 
nor a fortiori the fact that we do so typically. In other words, it is not sufficient 
to meet the Judgment Formation and Intuitive goals. 
In fairness, Dokic himself seems to be sensitive to the general lines of the 
problem that I have just detailed. He writes that, on his view, 
 
[a]ll that is explicitly represented in bodily experience is that bodily properties are 
exemplified at particular locations in objective space. The difference between 
observing and feeling pain is traced to a fact which is not represented in the 
subject’s experience. So how can it be phenomenologically significant? (329) 
 
The worry becomes more pressing if, as I have suggested, the fact that is 
supposed to explain this difference is possibly common to bodily experiences 
and exteroceptive experiences. Responding to his own worry, Dokic suggests 
that “[t]he general idea that the subject can manifest sensitivity to that fact, not by 
representing it, but implicitly, by differentiating on a functional level internal 
                                                 
65 In fact, Shoemaker (1994) analyses both visual and somatosensory experiences in the same 
terms. 
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perception from external perception has not been shown to be incoherent” 
(330. My emphasis). And he goes on to propose that 
 
[o]ne way (perhaps not the only one) of implementing the general idea would be 
to claim that the sense of ownership is at least partly determined by the subject’s 
finding the transition from a particular case of bodily experience to a judgment 
like ‘My arm is hurting’ primitively compelling in Peacocke (1992)’s sense (ibid.). 
 
Admittedly, this suggestion is only embryonic in Dokic’s paper. Nevertheless, I 
think there are reasons to be sceptic about its prospects as a solution to the 
problem it intends to resolve. One might agree with Peacocke (1992) that 
possessing certain concepts consists of finding the (rational) transitions from 
certain experiences to judgments in which the relevant concepts are articulated 
primitively compelling. In particular, in the context of the present discussion, 
one might want to endorse the idea that possessing the concept of a body 
being one’s own (partly) consists of finding the transitions from bodily 
experiences to judgments in which this concept is articulated primitively 
compelling. It would presumably be part of the view Dokic seems to be 
pointing at that, by involving the first-person in the relevant sense, the 
judgments manifest the subject’s sensitivity to features of the experiences over 
and above their explicit contents. On these grounds, the view might be that the 
SBO consists of possessing the concept of a body being one’s own, where the 
articulation of the concept in judgment is linked, in a primitively compelling 
way, to having certain experiences. 
So, indeed, the notion of primitive compellingness might be found useful 
to explain what it is to possess the concept of a body being one’s own. However, 
the appeal to primitive compellingness doesn’t overrule the question about 
what it is, of bodily experiences, that makes them the class of experiences from 
which de se somatosensory judgments rationally follow in this way. As a matter 
of fact, that the transitions from bodily experiences to judgments with a certain 
form are tied specially tightly has never been under discussion. Quite the 
opposite, it is one of the starting points of this debate, which aims at figuring 
out why this is so. The problem is that, according to Property Deflationism, 
the feature of bodily experiences over and above their content that subjects 
will “manifest sensitivity” to by making the relevant judgments – namely the 
fact that putatively explains the tight link – is their implicit reflexivity. And this, 
I have argued, is a feature they might share with states of visual perception. 
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This being so, it remains unclear why only bodily experiences, but not visual 
experiences, will end up yielding judgments of ownership primitively 
compellingly. 
Again, the deflationist has his own recalcitrant response ready: it is just a 
brute fact that the SBO consists in the implicit reflexivity of bodily 
experiences. For a start, this strategy is specially doubtful here, given the 
possible analogies drawn in this subsection: it is difficult to see the postulation 
of this brute fact as a non ad hoc explanation of the phenomenon at stake. 
Besides, as mentioned before, I find this line of argument generally 
unsatisfactory: it is a resource just in case it is not possible to put forward 
detailed explanatory relations between the elements identified. 
 
2.3.3. Summing up 
 
The dimension of bodily awareness of our somatosensory experiences involves 
the sensation as of a property instantiated in a location. According to Property 
Deflationism, it is the nature of the properties one feels instantiated in the 
body when having the sensation which explains the SBO. More specifically, 
Property Deflationism is defined by its defence of the Property Thesis: 
 
[Property Thesis]: the SBO consists of the fact that the properties involved 
in bodily sensations are experience-dependent. 
 
In this section I have argued against the sufficiency of the experience-
dependency of properties, and hence of the implicit reflexivity of the 
experiences bearing them, to account for the SBO. I have thereby concluded 
my critical analysis of Deflationism about the SBO. 
The objections raised against Spatial Deflationism and Property 
Deflationism are of a similar type. In general, if one claims that our experience 
of our bodies as our own consists in a feature common to exteroception and 
somatosensation, then it is not clear why only in the latter the body stands out, 
as an object specifically designated in contrast to the rest, in the peculiar way it 
does. I have pointed out that, in this context, the farthest these theories go is 
to posit a posteriori identities between the SBO and the feature selected to 
specify it. They thereby leave an explanatory gap between the representation of 
space, or the metaphysical characterisation of the properties, and the putatively 
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first-personal phenomenology of these experiences. To recall, Experientialism 
is committed to there being such a phenomenology. 
Importantly, this gap isn’t necessarily bridged by positing any device as 
explanatory of other aspects of the phenomenology of bodily experiences – 
such as, for instance, bodily representations that account for the kind of spatial 
content of somatosensation. The commitment of Experientialist Accounts is 
that there is some component of bodily experiences themselves that stands for 
the first-person that eventually figures in judgments of somatosensation. 
Hence this component, apart from being sufficiently distinctive of 
somatosensation, should grasp the specific kind of reflexivity displayed by the 
canonical expressions of these judgments. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
At the outset of this chapter I pointed out that the canonical expression of 
judgments of somatosensation is reflexive in a specific sense: the token of the 
first-person possessive pronoun in the content position thereof contains a reference 
to the subject of the experience qua subject of the experience. Experientialism about the 
SBO assumes that there is a component of bodily experiences themselves that 
stands for the first-person that eventually figures in the content position of 
judgments of somatosensation. I have pointed out that for an experience to 
fully meet this condition is for it to have embedded in its content and 
phenomenology the kind of reflexivity mentioned. A proposal along these lines 
will surely meet the Judgment Formation Goal, allowing for no gaps in an 
explanation of the fact that we self-attribute the felt body in judgments of 
somatosensation in which we do so. 
I framed this chapter, and this dissertation more generally, as an 
exploration of the feasibility of the most minimalist form possible of 
Experientialism about the SBO. The most minimalist form of Experientialism 
would be one that grounded the SBO in the spatial dimension or the sensory 
qualities involved in somatosensory experiences. Pursuing this project, I 
devoted the present chapter to examining the Deflationist Accounts in the 
literature that focus on these aspects of somatosensation as grounds for the 
SBO, namely Spatial Deflationism and Property Deflationism. I concluded that 
none of them yields a satisfactory account of the SBO. 
On my view, however, the tenets put forward by deflationists do yield a 
complete account of the SBO if considered jointly and exploited conveniently. In the 
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next chapter I present such account. The view that I will propose takes in, on 
the one hand, the idea that in somatosensation a spatially extended and 
delimited body is experienced. It thus borrows the notion of a sense of 
boundedness, central to Spatial Deflationism. On the other hand, it endorses the 
maybe more controversial notion of experience-dependency of the properties 
involved in somatosensation – and therefore the idea that bodily experiences 
are reflexive in the sense of involving, as part of their content, properties the 
instantiation of which depends on the occurrence of the experiences 
themselves. 
Being a hybrid of these two forms of Deflationism, my proposal amends 
and goes beyond both of them. In particular, it points out the following: if 
properly cashed out, the notion of a sensory field associated to the sense of 
boundedness entails, not only that the properties involved in somatosensation 
are experience-dependent, but also that this very fact is part of the content of 
bodily experiences, and thereby of their phenomenology. Hence, on my view, 
bodily experiences are not implicitly reflexive, but explicitly so. This move is 
key, I will argue: thereby the SEO becomes relevant for the analysis of bodily 
experiences. This is what ultimately provides bodily experiences with the 
specific type of reflexivity manifested in canonical expressions thereof. 
Before starting to deploy my view in the second half of this dissertation, I 
will close this chapter by adding an excursus in which I briefly refer to two 
further experientialist views on the SBO that have been published fairly 
recently. Indeed, the shortages of Deflationism justify that philosophers who 
pursue the experientialist project on the SBO ground the SBO in aspects of 
somatosensory experiences beyond their qualitative and spatial components, 
without yet embracing Pure Inflationism. In this work I will not engage 
critically with these further experientialist views. What I do in the forthcoming 
excursus is clarify where in the logical space of possibilities my proposal stands 
with respect to these further views, and what about this relative position in the 
logical space of possibilities makes my proposal worth exploring. 
 
2.5. Excursus: Agency and Affectivity 
 
Peacocke (2017) frames his interest in terms relatively similar to the 
considerations about reflexivity I opened this chapter with. As he puts it, “the 
first-person notion is the notion individuated by the fundamental reference 
rule that on any occasion of its occurrence in a mental state or mental event … 
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refers to the subject of that state or mental event” (295). Within the project of 
settling on a basic, nonconceptual form of self-representation, Peacocke notes 
that mental states with contents specifiable as “this leg is bent” are not 
genuinely first-personal, in that they do not bring the subject into their truth-
conditions. It is relevant that a lot of his examples concern bodily events. His 
worry thus involves what it is for a subject to nonconceptually represent a 
body in a way that captures what is expressed in claims of the form “my leg is 
bent”. 
Peacocke’s proposal can be seen, at least partly, as an elaboration of the 
agentive account pointed to above. The scope of his proposal is in fact 
broader, since he addresses the problem of the most fundamental forms 
possible of first-personal representations, conscious or unconscious. His view, 
however, encompasses the discussion on the SBO, that is, how to characterise 
bodily experiences so that they are experiences as of one’s own body. He proposes 
two conditions, each of which necessary and together jointly sufficient, for a 
nonconceptual component c of the content of a given mental state to be the 
genuine first person i:66 
 
(1) there is a range of action notions A for which the creature must be capable 
of being in mental states or of enjoying mental events with the content 
c is A-ing 
where the state or event is produced by the initiation of an A-ing by the 
reference of c; and 
(2) there is a range of notions F of bodily properties, spatial properties, and past 
tense properties F such that the creature is capable of being in mental states 
or enjoying mental events with the content c is F; where in these attributions, 
c is F 
is accepted (in central basic cases) if and only if 
this body is F 
is also accepted. (293) 
 
The second condition picks out a set of potential predicates, including spatial 
predicates, such that accepting that they apply to c entails accepting that they 
apply to a body, suitably described as “this body”. On Peacocke’s view, 
applying certain properties to c, where c affords the description “this body”, 
makes of c a genuinely first-personal content – hence suitably captured in 
                                                 
66 In Peacocke’s nomenclature, lower case letters indicate the nonconceptual nature of the 
contents at stake. 
 91 
descriptions like “my body” – insofar as the first condition is met as well. The 
first condition states that the reference of c must be such that it is possibly 
thought of as initiating an action within a given range of actions, where the 
initiation of the action is what causes the mental state in which the reference of 
c is thought of in this way.67 A given mental state will have a first-personal 
content of the type “my leg is bent” only if it is possible for its subject to have 
mental states in which actions are predicated of this leg, where these actions 
are initiated “by the leg” and, crucially, this initiation is what causes the mental 
state of the subject. 
Because of the second condition, Peacocke calls his account the Agency-
Involving Account. The Agency-Involving Account incorporates a reference to 
the subject within the content of first-personal mental states involving the 
body. It does so by means of appealing to the fact that the body in question is 
the body of the initiator of a given bodily action. In other words, a body is 
represented as one’s own if it is the body with which the creature having the 
relevant mental states can act, and the actions of which cause the occurrence of 
the mental states that represent things thus. Hence, it seems to be a 
consequence of the view that one will experience a body as one’s own, not only if it 
necessarily is the body the spatial (and past) properties of which one 
experiences, but also if it is the body one is capable to relate with as an agent. 
De Vignemont (2017, section 2; 2018, section 9.1, Chapter 9) puts 
forward a set of objections to purely agentive accounts on the SBO.68 She 
indicates, on the one hand, that action planning, based on the body schema, is 
impervious to the fact that subjects feel ownership for the rubber hand in the 
RHI. On the other hand, she points out that tools are incorporated in the body 
schema, and hence taken into account for action planning, but we do not feel 
ownership for them. De Vignemont does not take these data to indicate that 
agency plays no role in ownership. Rather, on her view, the set of actions A 
relevant for a subject to feel the body with which she makes one of the actions 
in A as her own needs to be refined. In particular, A is a set of protective actions. 
De Vignemont’s current view incorporates the idea that token conscious 
bodily sensations gain their spatial content by reference to a background, 
multimodally informed bodily map which is relatively stable. She uses the 
metaphor of a rubber band (2018, 92) to convey the idea that the shape and 
limits of the map are flexible, but yet only limitedly modifiable. This being so, 
                                                 
67 By “thought” here I simply intend to capture c’s status as the content of a mental state. 
68 Among which her own 2007 account. 
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she makes a case for the best candidate map to ground the SBO to be what she 
calls the protective body map. This is a type of hot map, containing both descriptive 
information and directive indications, just as the body schema does. Yet, the 
kind of actions that this map is posited to elicit are actions intended to protect 
the body from potential threats. On her view, “the protective body map 
represents the body that has a special value for the organism’s evolutionary 
needs” (182), so that “one experiences as one’s own any body parts that are 
incorporated in the protective body map” (ibid.).69 
The role of the body map in de Vignemont’s proposal is refined. It is not 
via an appeal to the map itself that bodily sensations putatively gain their 
phenomenology of ownership. Sensitive to the objections to her own view 
raised by Peacocke (2015), similar in spirit to the ones raised in this chapter to 
Bermúdez’s spatial account, de Vignemont writes the following: 
 
[T]he bodyguard hypothesis assumes only that the function of the protective 
body schema is to represent the boundaries of the body that matters for survival; 
it does not assume that it represents the boundaries of the body that matters for 
survival qua one’s own, even in a nonconceptual way … But then one may wonder 
what is at the origin of the first-personal dimension of the sense of bodily 
ownership: how am I aware that this hand is mine? (2017, 227. The first emphasis 
is mine) 
 
This way of phrasing the problem, as well as the answer she proposes to the 
question, seem to me an acknowledgment of the need to cash out bodily 
experiences in a way that captures the reflexivity articulated at the outset of this 
chapter. On de Vignemont’s view, the reference to the subject is gained by the 
affective phenomenology associated to those sensations falling into the 
protective body map. 
The protective body map does not only represent the body’s spatial 
boundaries, but it represents spatial boundaries that have an affective valence. 
This lies at the basis of its motivational force – it lies at the basis of the set of 
actions motivated by the map, namely protective actions (2018, 186). In this 
context, the SBO has a characteristic phenomenology that goes beyond the 
sensory component of bodily experiences and cannot be reduced to it: rather, 
it is affective phenomenology which marks out felt limbs as one’s own. 
                                                 
69 The latter quote expresses her bodyguard hypothesis. 
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The kind of move by which, on de Vignemont’s view, protective action is 
crucial to the reflexivity of bodily sensations is, I think, similar to Peacocke’s 
(2017), although more selective as for the kind of actions relevant. Protective 
actions are narcissistic, in that I perform them on the body, or for the sake of 
the body, that is significant for me or that I care about: “under normal 
circumstances bodily experiences present the body in its narcissistic relation to 
the self: I am aware of the evolutionary significance of this body part for me” 
(2017, 228. My emphases). In both views, the appeal to bodily actions brings in 
an appeal to a more general notion of subjectivity beyond the very fact that we 
need to explain – namely beyond the fact that we qualify a body in first-
personal terms. In particular, bodily actions bring in an appeal to the subject of 
whom we want to say that she feels the body as her own. The subject is brought 
in either as the agent of the bodily actions or as the subject for whom the body 
has enough of an import. 
This sort of move seems to me to be exactly on the right track. As I put it 
in the opening of the present chapter, what I express by tokening “my” in the 
content position in “I can feel that my legs are crossed” can be decomposed 
thus: “I can feel that the legs of the experiencer of this somatosensory experience are 
crossed, and I am the experiencer of this somatosensory experience”. This was just an 
illustrative way of conveying a general moral: the token of the first-person 
possessive pronoun in the content position in canonical expressions of 
judgments of somatosensation contains a reference to the subject of the 
experience qua subject of the experience. To my mind, this is exactly what it 
means for bodily experiences to concern “the self”. This is the specific sense in 
which judgments of somatosensation are reflexive, I claimed. It is also the 
specific sense in which, I argued, the deflationist accounts assessed are not 
reflexive enough. 
The proposal that I put forward in the next two chapters does not appeal 
to agency or affectivity. Assessed in relation to Peacocke (2017) and de 
Vignemont (2017, 2018), the proposal points out the following: (part of) the 
sensory content of bodily experiences that both authors assume yields, by 
itself, a picture of bodily experiences that grasps the relevant sort of reflexivity. 
On my view, the involvement of localised properties in bodily experiences – 
contained in Peacocke’s second condition, and in de Vignemont’s thorough 
analysis of bodily space representation (2018, Part II) – suffices to bring in an 
appeal to the self that makes for an account of the SBO. This is so, I will 
 94 
argue, if we take into account a further datum about our psychological lives, 
namely that we have a SEO. 
This is not to say that the capacity to control the body, or the affectively 
loaded reactions we have for its sake, are not part of ordinary experiences of 
ownership. Rather, the project is to settle the explanatory building blocks of 
the SBO on a more fundamental level that might, in turn, ground our sense of 
agency and bodily affectivity. Given this difference, it seems to me worth 
having my alternative proposal articulated, if only for the purposes of later 
carrying out a thorough comparison between it and agency or affectivity based 
accounts. This comparison might well tip the balance in favour of one of them. 
In any case, I will not carry it out further in this dissertation. 
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Chapter 3 
 
My Body Is the Subject’s Body 
 
 
In this chapter I put forward a novel account of the SBO. I will call it Explicit 
Reflexivity. The view I will defend is an Experientialist Account: it is a new 
attempt to spell out the first-person that shows up in the content position of 
judgments of somatosensation in terms of the contents and phenomenology of 
experiences themselves, independently of bodily self-attributions. Here is a 
brief statement of the view: 
 
[Explicit Reflexivity]: for a subject to have a SBO is for her to be aware of: 
 
A. the experience-dependency of the properties involved in the content 
of somatosensory experiences – even when, in reports of these 
experiences, we predicate properties of the body itself; 
B. the relevant experiences (namely somatosensory experiences) as being 
her own. 
 
I open the chapter by presenting a quick layout of Explicit Reflexivity in 
section 3.1. This layout contains all the main tenets of the view, as well as an 
introduction of the basic terminology and working definitions. The various 
notions and argumentative steps will not be fully substantiated at this stage. 
Hopefully, though, this layout will offer the reader an overall picture of the 
proposal that will help her go through the chapter. Note that the order of 
appearance of the various parts of the view in this layout might not exactly 
coincide with their order of appearance later in the chapter. 
 
3.1. Explicit Reflexivity: A Layout of the View 
 
The following points summarise the various moving parts of Explicit 
Reflexivity: 
 
(i) The content of somatosensory states generally has a dual structure. 
On the one hand, somatosensation involves bodily awareness. On the 
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other hand, it involves awareness of non-bodily or worldly objects or 
space. 
(ii) Our focus is on bodily awareness in somatosensation. On a very 
minimal description, bodily awareness in a given somatosensory 
experience consists in the sensation as of a property instantiated in a 
location: for instance, the sensation as of one’s finger being 
Depressed against an obstacle. I will use the label “PropertiesS”, 
where the superscript “S” stands for “somatosensation”, to refer 
generally to properties as they are involved in somatosensation. Token 
somatosensory experiences hence involve PropertiesS as part of their 
content. 
(iii) There is something it is like to feel PropertiesS. For instance, there is 
something it is like to feel one’s finger Depressed against an 
obstacle. In this sense, PropertiesS are qualitatively rich. 
(iv) The sensation as of the location of PropertiesS involves the 
phenomenal salience of the boundaries of the felt body in somatosensation. In 
virtue of this, (i) is the case. 
 
(v) Claims (i) to (iv) support the contention that somatosensation 
involves a sensory field. I will call this sensory field bodily field. The 
bodily field allows somatosensory experiences to represent non-
bodily or worldly objects or space. 
(vi) PropertiesS are sensational properties: they are properties of the bodily field. 
This explains the notion of experience-dependent properties in the 
context of Explicit Reflexivity. 
(vii) Somatosensory experiences typically present PropertiesS as properties of the 
bodily field. This explains the notion of being aware of the 
experience-dependency of properties central to Explicit Reflexivity. 
(viii) Therefore, token somatosensory experiences have as (part of) their 
content properties of the bodily field that are presented as such. The 
primary object of token somatosensory experiences are 
PropertiesS.70 
 
(ix) PropertiesS ground representational properties. The latter stand for, 
and are typically taken to stand for, properties of the actual, physical body 
                                                 
70 Note that, once claims (v) to (viii) are motivated, it will be justified to read the superscript 
“S” in “PropertiesS” as standing for “sensational”. 
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that has caused the relevant somatosensory experience. Let us call 
these representational properties PropertiesRB, where “R” stands for  
“representation”, and “B” stands for “body”. 
(x) It is arguable that PropertiesS ground yet another type of 
representational properties, which we can call PropertiesRW. This is 
because, in virtue of the instantiation of PropertiesS, somatosensory 
experiences also represent non-bodily or worldly objects or space. 
 
(xi) The bodily field is constituted by a sufficient set of actual and potential 
PropertiesS. In other words, it is constituted by the composition of the 
contents of a sufficient set of occurrent or possible somatosensory 
experiences. 
(xii) The spatial content of token somatosensory experiences will have to 
be specified relative to (the contents of) other experiences making 
up the field. 
(xiii) By (ix), the bodily field is a representation of the body: it stands for the 
actual, physical body that typically causes the relevant set of 
somatosensory experiences. 
(xiv) In judgments of somatosensation, we often predicate properties of 
our actual, physical body. A paradigmatic case of this is proprioception. 
The relation between PropertiesS and PropertiesRB explains this fact. 
(xv) Some of our concepts of sensation arguably refer to sensations 
themselves instead of referring to properties of the actual, physical 
body. This might be the case of the concept Pain. Explicit 
Reflexivity can appeal to a special phenomenal saliency of 
PropertiesS in these cases in order to explain this fact. 
(xvi) Proprioceptive experiences and experiences of pain are alike as for 
the involvement of PropertiesS in their content. 
 
(xvii) For each conscious somatosensory experience, it has as part of its 
content a PropertyS presented as such. 
(xviii) In other words, for each conscious somatosensory experience, it has 
as part of its content an experience-dependent property presented as 
such; or subjects experience (part of) their content as dependent on 
the occurrence of the very experience it is (part of) the content of. 
(xix) Subjects typically have a SEO for the somatosensory experiences they undergo. 
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(xx) Therefore, subjects typically have a SBO: they self-attribute the contents 
experienced as dependent on the occurrence of their own 
experiences. 
(xxi) There is typically one single physical body suitably wired so as to 
cause the relevant somatosensory experiences of a subject. Her 
judgments of self-attribution will latch naturally onto this one single 
physical body. 
 
Claims (ii) to (iv) summarise some basic assumptions of the debate, as well as 
some central tenets of Spatial Deflationism. I will draw on them in my 
argument for Explicit Reflexivity, but I will not argue for them. Claim (v) 
brings in and elaborates the notion of sensory field contained in Martin’s 
version of Spatial Deflationism. Claim (vi) brings in and elaborates the notion 
of experience-dependency, and hence of reflexivity, contained in Dokic’s 
Property Deflationism. The argument for claims (v) to (viii) is offered in 
sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3 of this chapter, which also specify claim (i). By 
this argument, clause A of [Explicit Reflexivity] is defended. 
Claims (ix) to (xiii) are articulated in section 3.3.1; and claims (xiv) to (xvi) 
are articulated in section 3.3.2. These claims offer a complete substantiation of 
clause A of [Explicit Reflexivity]. Claim (xix) was put forward as an assumption 
in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. I will delve into it in section 3.3.3 of the 
present chapter, drawing on reformulations (xvii) and (xviii) of the previous 
points, but will not argue for it further. Note that (xix) corresponds to clause B 
of [Explicit Reflexivity]. The last two claims, (xx) and (xxi), summarise how 
Explicit Reflexivity accounts for the SBO. I will clarify this in section 3.3.4. 
Figure 1 at the end of this chapter illustrates the main tenets of the view. I 
invite the reader to check the figure throughout their reading of the chapter. 
 
The discussion to come contributes, at the very least, to the by itself worth 
pursuing project of filling in the logical space of possibilities as for accounts on 
the SBO. More ambitiously, I actually suggest that if we cash out the contents 
of somatosensory experiences in the way proposed – and if the reasons I offer 
to do so are sound –, then a view on the SBO is at our disposal that has a 
remarkable explanatory potential. 
To start with, recall that the three desiderata advanced at the outset of this 
thesis have been proposed as the yardstick to assess any given view on the 
SBO. These desiderata were motivated by several facts that, I contend, theories 
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on the SBO ultimately intend to explain. As a central virtue over the proposals 
critically examined in Chapter 2, Explicit Reflexivity allows to meet the goals, 
or so I will argue.71 Moreover, I contend that my proposal accounts for the 
SBO in a way that avoids establishing a brute identity between the SBO and 
that which specifies it. Finally, Explicit Reflexivity establishes an explanatory 
relation between the SEO and the SBO, as it holds that the SBO depends on, 
or is partly constituted by, having a SEO for the experiences the content of 
which one self-attributes. Prime facie it makes sense that this, and not its 
converse, is the explanatory relation holding between the SEO and the SBO, 
since the former is a much more pervasive phenomenon than the latter. The 
advantage of this explanatory move has been sufficiently motivated: knitting 
things this way, Explicit Reflexivity paves the way for a unified account of self-
consciousness in somatosensation. As I see it, all these factors contribute to 
the appeal of the view that I now proceed to present. 
 
3.2. First Pass 
 
Let me repeat Explicit Reflexivity from above: 
 
[Explicit Reflexivity]: for a subject to have a SBO is for her to be aware of: 
 
A. the experience-dependency of the properties involved in the content 
of somatosensory experiences – even when, in reports of these 
experiences, we predicate properties of the body itself; 
B. the relevant experiences (namely somatosensory experiences) as 
being her own. 
 
In this section I proceed to defending clause A, which contains various 
elements. To begin with, clause A features the idea that the content of bodily 
experiences involves properties. Clarifying the nature of these properties is an 
essential part of what is involved in spelling out A. For the moment, I will 
proceed on the assumption that, when one feels the body in somatosensation, 
one has a sensation as of a property instantiated in a location. For instance, one 
might feel the Painfulness72 of an ankle, the Position of a hand, the Movement 
                                                 
71 See Chapter 4, section 4.2. 
72 Called “DamageS” in the previous chapter. I will stick to “DamageS” later in this chapter. 
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of one’s guts, or the Depression of a finger against an obstacle. Following in 
the notation introduced in the previous chapter, I will use “PropertiesS” as a 
placeholder for properties such as Painfulness, Position, Movement, or 
Depression: properties as they are sensed in somatosensation, where this is still 
neutral with respect to their nature. The superscript “S” in “PropertiesS” stands 
for “somatosensation”. 
The examples just mentioned bring out a second relevant element 
involved in clause A: in judgments of somatosensation, we often predicate 
properties of, or locate them in, the actual, physical body. For instance, we 
claim that our leg moves or that our ankle hurts. This is a fact that we need to 
retain throughout this first pass. Explicit Reflexivity certainly must be able to 
accommodate this fact. I contend that it can do so, but the tools needed to 
detail how will only be at our disposal in the second pass of the argumentation 
(section 3.3). 
More controversially, clause A also states that PropertiesS are experience-
dependent. Hence, Explicit Reflexivity has it that for all PropertiesS, they need to 
be understood as properties that constitutively depend on the token experience 
they are a content of, in the sense that they would not be instantiated if the 
experience were not occurring. Besides, by clause A Explicit Reflexivity holds 
that, when undergoing bodily sensations, subjects are aware of the experience-
dependency of PropertiesS. This marks a crucial departure from Property 
Deflationism: the experience-dependency of PropertiesS is itself part of the 
explicit content of the experiences, and thereby informs their phenomenology. 
The task of clarifying what is exactly involved in PropertiesS being 
experience-dependent amounts to spelling out the nature of the properties: the 
task is to specify the nature of these properties in a way such that they have 
this feature. The claim that subjects are aware of the experience-dependency of 
PropertiesS does not follow straightforwardly from the claim that PropertiesS 
are experience-dependent: it requires a further argumentative step. These steps 
will be taken immediately in what follows by means of introducing the bodily 
field. 
 
3.2.1. A Sensory Field 
 
In a nutshell, I shall unpack the notions of experience-dependency and awareness of 
experience-dependency in this subsection by relying on the following pattern of 
reasoning: in the case of sensory states, experience-dependent properties can 
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be cashed out as properties of a sensory field. In particular, the properties 
involved in somatosensory experiences are experience-dependent in the sense of 
being properties of a sensory field. Therefore, for a property of this sort to be 
experienced as experience-dependent means for it to be experienced as a property 
of a sensory field. Being aware of the experience-dependency of perceived 
properties thus means being aware of a sensory field as such. In the particular case of 
somatosensation, the sensory field involved in bodily experiences is 
experienced as such in all non-pathological cases. I shall call this sensory field 
“bodily field”. 
Let me now proceed to substantiate the reasoning by establishing the 
notion of sensory field, as well as introducing the idea of a subject being aware 
of it as such. I will do so by borrowing some of Christopher Peacocke’s73 
 
ideas 
on the visual field in his account of colour perception. My subsequent points 
about the bodily field will work by comparison to some of his remarks about 
the visual field. However, nothing of what I will say about the phenomenology 
of bodily experiences hangs on Peacocke’s picture being adequate for colour 
perception. 
On Peacocke’s account, it is essential to perceptual experiences that they 
have what he calls sensational properties: properties relevant to the specification of 
the experience’s what it is likeness that the experience does not possess in 
virtue of its representational content. According to Peacocke, an illustrative 
example of an experience with this sort of properties would be the following: 
When you close your eyes and point your head in the direction of the noonday 
sun, you have a visual experience in which there are colours and shapes, and 
usually some motion, in your visual field. It does not thereby look as if there are 
objects or events in your spatio-temporal environment. (2008, 8-9) 
 
If the experience has no representational content, and yet it can be said to have 
properties, in that there is something it is like to be in it, then these properties 
are not possessed by the experience in virtue of its representational properties: 
these are sensational properties. For instance, the Redness one might perceive 
as free floating when pointing one’s head, eyes closed, at the noonday sun, is a 
property of this sort. However, on Peacocke’s view the experience here 
described is anyway relational:74 it involves a relation between the experience 
                                                 
73 Peacocke (1984) and (2008). 
74 I borrow here Pautz’s (2010) terminology. 
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itself and some item different from it. This object of the experience is, on his 
account, a visual field: to the question “What is the free floating Redness in 
this scenario a property of?”, the answer is: “It is a property of a visual field.” 
One reason to posit the existence of a visual field modified by intrinsic 
sensational properties is the very possibility of experiences as the one just 
described. Along the same lines, it can be argued that the possibility of 
afterimages supports this notion too: suppose that, after pointing your closed 
eyes to the sun, you open them and let your gaze rest on a surface in front of 
you. As a result of the intense light on your retina, you keep seeing a few red 
free floating patches occluding some bits of the surface – crucially, patches that 
you do not take to be actual objects in the environment, nor stains on the 
surface itself. These patches arguably are properties of your field of vision.75 
However, on Peacocke’s view, all colour properties are properties of a 
visual field. Otherwise stated, all visual experiences are such that they involve a 
visual field that instantiates some of its properties. The reason to hold this 
thesis is that, in principle, in all cases of visual perception one can perform a 
switch of attention so that one focuses on sensational properties. The 
following is an example of this: 
 
Suppose you are in a flat area of Japan. You may perceive a bullet train in the far 
distance, and you may perceive it as moving extremely fast. Your experience has 
the representational content that it is moving fast. But it may be moving rather 
slowly across your visual field, and that too is something of which you can 
become aware. It may be moving across your visual field at the same rate as a 
nearby cat that is moving very slowly across a path in front of you. This 
sensational property is a property that the train and the cat can share with some 
speck of colour that moves slowly across your visual field in an experience which 
… has no representational content. (ibid., 15-16) 
What we would be doing in this case would just be making the visual field 
apparent, that is, focusing on it in the experience. The difference between the 
ordinary visual experience as of a train at the far distance and the experience 
that results from the switch of attention is that, in the latter, one is aware of the 
visual field as such. This is what focusing on sensational properties is about. The 
                                                 
75 This account of afterimages, which Peacocke defends, is not uncontroversial. In fact, as I 
shall argue below, an alternative account of afterimages might be preferable (see Chapter 4, 
section 4.1.1). I am resorting to this description of the phenomenon, which I find prima facie 
intuitive, to help illustrate what we understand for a visual field, as well as for experiencing the 
visual field as such. Nothing in my view hangs on this account of afterimages being adequate. 
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noonday sun case and the case of the afterimage would be analogous to this, 
the only difference being that, in them, the visual field becomes apparent 
without the need of an attentional effort. What is crucial to all these cases is 
that one is aware of the properties of the visual field without taking them to be 
properties of anything in the environment. 
To repeat, the possibility of performing switches of attention of the sort 
described in all visual experiences gives reason to claim that something like a 
visual field is involved in all such experiences as that of which at least colour 
properties are actually properties of. Notice that the experiences in which one 
is aware of the visual field as such are experiences in which something like a 
“veil of colours” stands in front of the perceived objects (Boghossian and 
Velleman, 1989, 95). Thus, a fair question that a supporter of this view will 
have to address is how to account for the characteristic transparency of visual 
experiences – namely how to explain the fact that, in ordinary experience, 
nothing like such a veil seems to stand between us and represented objects, or 
in other words, that colour properties are actually predicated of the objects in 
the environment.76 
This is, however, not a worry I have to deal with right now. My aim here is 
to use the foregoing cases and Peacocke’s discussion of the notion of a visual 
field in order to offer a definition of a general notion of sensory field. The 
visual field is something it makes sense to talk about in the context of 
occurrent visual experiences: it is the region in which objects visually appear. 
In parallel, sensational properties have been defined as properties of the visual 
field. In this sense, these properties – colours, in our example – are experience-
dependent properties. Being aware of the visual field as such – namely focusing 
on the “field of experience”, as opposed to focusing on the objects that appear 
in it as represented in the experience – is just being aware of the properties of 
the field as properties of the field. In other words, it just means being aware of 
these properties as experience-dependent. At the risk of stretching the meaning 
of his words a little, Peacocke seems to have something along these lines in 
mind when he says that “[i]nsofar as we can make sense of a subjective space at 
all, it is precisely such space as is alleged to be involved in the visual field” 
(2008, 10. My emphasis). 
More generally, the sensory field of a given experience type is the frame 
within which the objects represented in experiences of the type appear. For 
this reason, it makes sense to talk about a sensory field only to the extent that 
                                                 
76 Peacocke (2008, 16) addresses this point. 
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experiences occur such that they involve objects appearing within the field. 
Besides, the sensory field is also that of which properties of the experience can 
be predicated that are not properties the objects represented within the field 
are experienced as having. Yet, one can focus on these properties, since they 
are experiential properties. 
To recall, the central thesis contained in clause A of [Explicit Reflexivity] is 
that in bodily experiences we typically are aware of properties as experience-
dependent. This can now be restated thus: in normal cases, bodily experiences 
are experiences in which a sensory field is apparent as such. The latter should 
unpack the former via the claim that, in bodily experiences, we typically are 
aware of properties as properties of the sensory field. Note that this assumes, 
rephrases, and supersedes the central tenet of Property Deflationism, namely 
that bodily experiences involve experience-dependent properties. 
At this point, two steps need to be motivated in order to make my claim 
sound, which parallel the considerations just made about the visual case. The 
first one: it makes sense to talk about somatosensation as involving a sensory 
field – namely it makes sense to talk about a bodily field. The second one: in bodily 
sensations we are aware of the bodily field as such. In the next subsection I will 
motivate these two points in turn. In order to do so, I will draw on the 
considerations about a sense of boundedness included in Spatial Deflationism. 
 
3.2.2. The Bodily Field 
 
When it comes to somatosensation, the involvement of a sensory field is 
specially salient in haptic touch. I will now resort to the observations on this 
type of experience made in Chapter 2, in order to establish that there is at least 
one case of somatosensation for which it is sound to claim that it involves a 
sensory field.77 Afterwards I will proceed to generalise the point to all bodily 
sensations. 
Haptic touch is the perception of objects by actively exploring them with a 
body part. Recall that feeling the irregularities of the edge of a table by 
caressing it with the tip of the fingers is a case of haptic touch. This experience, 
                                                 
77 Specifically, I resort to the observations made in section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2. Note that, on 
the grounds of these observations, Martin (1992) concludes that the way the sensory field is 
involved in touch is crucially different from the way a sensory field is involved in sight. On 
Martin’s view, this difference concerns the salient role of bodily awareness in the latter. In this 
chapter I operate with a general notion of sensory field that encompasses both vision and 
touch, and yet is compatible with there being the difference between the two described by 
Martin. 
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and haptic experiences generally, is mainly object-directed: one engages in it in 
order to perceive the properties of an object other than the body. The external 
objects perceived in touch arguably constitute what is represented in the 
experience. However, when touching the edge of the table not only do I feel 
the rough wood but I am also aware of the pressure on my fingers. In fact, the 
content of haptic experiences is typically said to be dual: it involves both 
awareness of external objects and of the body. In other words, at least the 
following is true: the tactually accessed properties we are aware of in haptic 
experiences will be attributed to two different entities in judgments about such 
experiences, namely the touched object, to which we might attribute 
Roughness, and the body. For instance, we might feel the fingers Depressed to 
different degrees by the irregular surface. 
The involvement of the body in haptic experiences in this sense is crucial 
to my point: the objects of touch appear in correlation with our awareness of 
certain bodily regions that match the shape of perceived objects. The body is 
part of what one is aware of in haptic experiences: it is the region where the 
non-bodily objects of experience appear. Contrasting the phenomenology of 
touch with that of vision, Mike Martin said that “[n]ormal visual experience is 
essentially experience of objects as they fall within the visual field; tactual 
experience is essentially experience of objects as they press from the outside 
onto the limits of a felt sensory field” (1992, 210). This is so to the extent that, 
as mentioned, the objects of touch appear distributed within, or against, the 
surface of the body. 
Let us settle on bodily field as a label for the sensory field as involved in 
touch. This label intendedly grasps the following ambiguity: on the one hand, I 
am talking about a region where the worldly objects of the relevant sensation, 
namely touch, appear. This entitles me to talk about a sensory field. On the 
other hand, it is clear that the involvement of the field in the experience has to 
do with our awareness of the body in the experience. This explains why I talk 
about a bodily field. The imbrication between these two features – the 
involvement of a sensory field in somatosensation, and the bodily awareness in 
the experience – will be spelled out in due time. For the moment, let us stick to 
the idea that the bodily field gains its status as such with respect to objects other 
than the body.78 
                                                 
78 More specifically: with respect to objects other than the body qua bearer of the status of field of 
sensation. Of course, haptic touch can be directed towards the body: one can palpate a lump on 
one’s thigh with one’s hand, for instance. In this case, the thigh is the object represented in the 
 106 
To sum up, the tactile experience in which one perceives, for instance, the 
Roughness of the table and focuses on it involves awareness of the Depressed 
fingers. The latter is an experiential property that is not experienced as a 
property of the represented object, and the element to which this property is 
attributed in the experience is that against which the object of the experience 
appears. However, it must be added, one can switch attention in the experience 
and focus on what one feels on one’s fingers, namely their being Depressed, 
when touching the table. 
Before moving forward in the reasoning, a caveat is in order. In the 
reflections on the visual field above, it was shown that sensational properties 
are not properties of the seen objects, but still they are experiential properties 
because they are properties of the field. Now the properties that, I have just 
claimed, hold the key to positing the bodily field in somatosensation are 
properties such as being Depressed. However, on the face of it, being 
Depressed is a property we would predicate of the fingers – even more: it is by all 
means a property of them, namely of the physical body. Even if I have claimed 
that the involvement of the bodily field in the experience has to do with our 
awareness of the body in the experience, it has also been indicated that the 
imbrication between the two needs to be spelled out: it is not meant to imply 
that the bodily field involved in somatosensation is identical to the body – which 
would follow if being Depressed were, simultaneously, a property of the field and 
of the body. Hence, for the sake of caution and neutrality on this front, it is 
convenient to stick to our familiar notation to label the experiential property 
involved in this toy case of somatosensation: to be precise, the haptic 
experience just described involves the property of being DepressedS. Recall 
that this label just stands for the property as that of which we have a sensation: 
in any case, one that will not be predicated of the touched table. Cashing out 
the property in this way allows to capture the aforementioned ambiguity: we 
are talking about a property of the region where the object of touch appears; 
and the involvement of this region in the experience is somehow related to our 
awareness of the body in the experience. As a matter of fact, no more than 
these elements are needed to make the current point about the bodily field in 
somatosensation. 
                                                                                                                            
tactile experience, at least in the sense that attention will typically focus on it; and in parallel, 
the touching hand is that against which the thigh appears – namely that which provides the 
sensory field to the tactile experience. 
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In sum, the foregoing considerations establish that it makes sense both to 
talk about haptic touch as involving a sensory field, and to call this field 
“bodily field”. The claim to be motivated, however, is not only that (the 
relevant case of) bodily experience can be plausibly described as involving a 
bodily field, but also that this is how we experience the field in the sensation: as 
a sensory field. Now, what does this exactly amount to? 
In the discussion on the visual field above, it was pointed out that the 
experiences in which one is aware of the visual field as such would be ones in 
which something like a “veil of colours” would stand in front of the perceived 
objects. And it was noticed that, while this veil of colours might be an intuitive 
element to posit in experiences such as the one involved in the noonday sun 
case or in afterimages, it seems to be in tension with the characteristic 
transparency of ordinary visual experiences, in which nothing like such a veil 
stands in front of represented objects. In this sense, by being aware of the field 
as such, one’s sensory experience becomes non-transparent. 
The observations just made about haptic touch give us the clue to the 
following: sensory experiences that involve a bodily field are not transparent, 
precisely because of the involvement of the field. On these grounds, the claim 
that, in them, we are aware of the bodily field as such is sound. 
The details of the previous example allow to show this point clearly. When 
feeling the irregularities of the edge of a table by caressing it with the tip of the 
fingers, one has a tactile experience that represents the edge of a table and its 
properties. But, we said, haptic touch involves bodily awareness. More 
specifically, in tactile experiences in which objects other than the body are 
represented, the region where the objects of touch appear is always itself 
present, at least in the sense that there are properties that will be attributed to it 
in subsequent judgments about the experience. These will be properties of the 
experience that will not be attributed to the non-bodily object represented in it. 
The property of being DepressedS is one of these. To put it briefly, in haptic 
touch the body always “stands on our way” to objects. 
To conclude the reasoning, note that bodily awareness is typically said to 
be recessive: we do not normally pay attention to the body we feel but rather, 
for example, to the objects of touch. Even so, it is not clear what it would 
mean to be aware of the objects of touch if bodily awareness were not 
involved in the experience at all. In other words, the following counterfactual 
seems true: we could not be tactually aware of objects if we were not aware of 
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the body while touching them. 79  The involvement of bodily awareness in 
haptic touch seems necessary. Still, whether or not bodily awareness is necessary 
to tactile awareness of objects is not integral to the point I am making. The 
point is rather this: if we are aware of the body in touch, then we are aware of 
it as something which veils, and against which, objects of touch appear. In any 
case, there doesn’t seem to be anything wrong to the idea that recessive 
awareness be, anyway, awareness proper. These considerations should suffice 
to establish that, at least for one type of bodily sensation, it makes sense to talk 
about it as involving a sensory field we are aware of as such. 
 
3.2.3. Generalisation 
 
The point is now sufficiently clear for the case of touch. However, the 
proposal submitted in this work is supposed to generalise to all bodily 
experiences – from touch to pain or proprioception. The alleged difficulty of 
this generalisation lies in the following: pain or proprioception – among others 
– do not clearly involve worldly, non-bodily objects as objects of the 
experience. However, the notion of sensory field I have been dealing with here 
is, for a start, that of a field within which objects represented in sensory 
experience appear, where these objects stand as distinct from the field – from 
the bodily field in this case. On these grounds, how can we say of pain or 
proprioception that they involve a sensory field? And how can we ultimately 
say, then, that by having these experiences we are aware of a sensory field as 
such? 
In order to answer this worry, I will resort to some of the observations on 
the sense of boundedness put forward and discussed in the previous chapter. 
These phenomenological considerations help to show that the awareness of 
the body indisputably involved in these cases is similar, in the relevant respects, 
to that involved in haptic touch. Thus, we can draw similar conclusions relative 
to the bodily field as involved in these experiences.80 
Bear in mind that according to Martin, Bermúdez and de Vignemont 
(2007), by being aware of properties localised in the body, in bodily 
experiences we are aware of the boundaries of the body. For instance, being 
aware of the relative disposition of one’s arms by having proprioceptive 
                                                 
79 In fact, Martin (1992) goes so far as to say that we are aware of objects of touch in virtue of 
paying attention to the body in a special way. 
80 At this point of the argumentation, I still retain the ambiguity between talking about a 
sensory field and talking about bodily awareness, captured in the expression bodily field. 
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feedback from them implies being aware of their (apparent) extension, that is: 
the limbs seem to extend to at least the point in space where the relevant 
properties feel to be located (Martin, 1993, 210-2; 1995, 271). This being so, 
localised bodily experiences involve awareness of how the felt body is disposed 
within a space that goes beyond that in which one actually feels the body to be. 
The idea of being aware of the bodily boundaries thereby allows to extend, 
mutatis mutandis, the idea of the dual content just discussed for haptic 
experiences: somatosensation involves awareness of the limits of the body with 
respect to something which is different from the body. In this sense, it is not 
true that only the body itself is involved in the content of the mentioned 
somatosensory experiences. 
Surely, the fine-grainedness with which we can typically describe the 
features of the external objects of touch is usually greater than that with which 
we can describe anything beyond the body based on proprioception, for 
instance. For example, I could in principle give various details regarding the 
knots and bumps of the worktable I touch with the tip of my fingers, whereas 
what I can predicate of the space surrounding my legs on the basis of my 
current proprioceptive experience of them does not go much beyond the fact 
that no objects in it are adjacent to my limbs. But the greater fine-grainedness 
with which we can describe the objects of touch plausibly is a function of the 
fact that, in it, objects press against the bodily boundaries: in other words, it 
depends on the fact that the bodily boundaries themselves are also 
phenomenologically much more precise and salient in tactile experiences than 
they are in other cases. That the awareness of boundaries, and hence the 
awareness of that which is non-bodily, is gradable, is anyway compatible with 
its involvement in each conscious bodily sensation. 
In sum, the point now is that pain or proprioception, by involving bodily 
awareness in the way they do, involve awareness of something which is other 
with respect to the body. But admittedly this is not yet a claim about the 
former constituting a field within which, or against which, this “other” object 
of bodily sensation appears. In fact, this idea seems particularly obscure if that 
“other” is just the (empty) space within which the body is inscribed. 
Insisting anew on the boundedness involved in ordinary bodily sensations 
will help overcome this difficulty: the bodily dimension of our tactile 
experiences, on which we can focus by switching attention in the experience, is 
phenomenologically akin to the bodily awareness involved in our localised 
sensations of pain, position, or movement, in that the spatial component of all 
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such experiences conveys the feeling of a body extended to a certain point, 
more or less precisely delimited. In the cases in which the bodily boundaries 
are not marked by the pressure of objects against them, the body is anyway 
something that would “stand on our way” to objects if there were any – and this 
is something we manifest awareness of, for instance behaviourally, by trying to 
dodge the objects in our immediate vicinities by adapting the trajectory of our 
bodily movements in accordance with the size and shape of the limbs. 
Generally speaking, our awareness of the body is an awareness of non-bodily 
objects appearing within it, or against it, actually or potentially. In this sense, the 
dual content of bodily sensations still allows us to characterise them as 
involving a sensory field – more broadly construed: a region where non-bodily 
objects could appear. Again, this qualifies as a bodily field. 
The move I made above in order to argue that, in a given conscious 
sensory experience, the subject is aware of the sensory field as such, relied on 
transparency: the sort of awareness of the field I am appealing to is that which 
results in the experience being non-transparent with respect to the objects 
beyond the field, precisely because the field veils them. This was shown by 
pointing out that, in subsequent judgments intended to describe the relevant 
experiences, some properties are not attributed to the objects represented in 
the field. In the cases under discussion now, this is obviously so: PropertiesS 
belong to the experience, but they are not attributed to anything beyond the 
boundaries of the field of sensation. In particular, these properties are 
ultimately attributed to the body itself – which, as said, would “stand on our 
way” to objects. This should suffice to establish that, in somatosensation 
generally, subjects are aware of the bodily field as such. 
It could be objected that the status of PropertiesS in experiences such as 
pain or proprioception is not quite that of “properties that can be predicated 
from the experience but which are not properties the object of the experience is 
experienced as having” – which was the formulation I used above to talk about 
experiential properties that are experienced as properties of the sensory field. 
The reason why this characterisation might not seem to apply in these cases is 
that there is a sense in which CrossedS or DamageS, if they are involved in the 
somatosensory experiences at all, they are involved in them precisely qua 
properties of the object of the experience: say, the legs or the ankle 
respectively, namely the body more generally. This makes sense as the other 
side to the coin of the fact I opened this section with: pain or proprioception – 
to mention just two relevant cases – do not clearly involve worldly objects as 
 111 
objects of the experience. If anything, these states concern the body, and it is 
the body we typically predicate the relevant properties of when reporting them. 
The question is now whether this disqualifies the argument I just offered 
as one to the effect that we are typically aware of PropertiesS as properties of 
something that makes the experience non-transparent. The answer is that it 
doesn’t disqualify it. This is clear if we recall that, generally speaking, a sensory 
field gains its status as such with respect to objects other than itself: it is the 
condition of possibility of representing these objects. In particular, the bodily 
field gains its status as such with respect to objects other than the body.81 In this 
section I motivated the idea that such objects might be just potentially in touch 
with the body: this goes with the involvement of boundaries in our bodily 
experiences, and the duality of content this results in. What is important to 
notice at this point is that, still in these cases, PropertiesS  will typically not be 
predicated of anything beyond the felt bodily boundaries: they will not be 
predicated of the worldly objects one could bump into. It is with respect to 
these objects that the relevant experiences are non-transparent. More 
specifically, PropertiesS will typically be predicated of that which would allow 
for anything beyond the felt bodily boundaries to be represented within, or 
against, the bodily field: that is, the body. My second-pass articulation of 
Explicit Reflexivity will make clear the compatibility between the fact that 
PropertiesS are properties of a sensory field and hence experience-dependent, 
as well as experienced as such, and the fact that we predicate properties of the 
body when reporting at least some somatosensory experiences. This will enable 
us to see that none of the above excludes the possibility of claiming the body 
to be part of the content of a given somatosensory experience at a given 
moment, at least in the sense that attention can be focused on it. 
 
3.3. Second Pass 
 
3.3.1. The Bodily Field, Bodily Experiences, and the Body 
 
The considerations in section 3.2 show that clause A of [Explicit Reflexivity] 82 is 
sound. This second pass is devoted to showing how the proposal defended can 
be articulated. The claim we are at now is that somatosensory experiences 
                                                 
81 That is, the body qua bearer of its status of field of sensation. 
82  Namely the claim that for one to have a SBO (partly) is for one to be aware of the 
experience-dependency of the properties involved in the content of somatosensation. 
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include as (part of) their content properties of a sensory field we are aware of 
as such, namely the bodily field. Otherwise stated, the content of token 
somatosensory experiences has to be cashed out primarily in terms of 
sensational properties. The expression “primarily” here indicates that, as I will 
immediately suggest, there are other types of properties involved in the content 
of somatosensation. Yet, they are grounded on sensational properties. On my 
view, it is the characterisation of PropertiesS in terms of sensational properties 
which finally allows for a complete account of the SBO. 
I have claimed above that the involvement of the bodily field in the 
experience has to do with, or is somehow related to, our awareness of the body in 
the experience. A task to be undertaken in this full-fledged articulation of 
Explicit Reflexivity is to clarify this ambiguous claim by spelling out the 
relation between the bodily field and the body. 
The first step needed to this effect is to get a clearer idea on what the 
bodily field is. We are now finally in a position to address this issue. A 
definition already available to us is the following: the bodily field is an entity 
made up of PropertiesS. This means that it is via the contribution of various token 
somatosensory experiences, and of the composition of their contents, that the 
bodily field exists. A further step can be taken at this point. To the question 
about what kind of entity the bodily field is, I propose the following answer: a 
representation. In this respect, the bodily field might be peculiar vis à vis, for 
instance, the visual field: it is not just that worldly objects and events are 
represented in somatosensory experiences against the backdrop offered by the 
bodily field; but also the bodily field itself represents something. 
Specifically – and unsurprisingly – the bodily field I am proposing represents 
the body. This is so in virtue of the fact that it is constituted by PropertiesS, as 
follows: bodily experiences have PropertiesS as part of their content, but 
PropertiesS are not representational properties. Yet, PropertiesS have 
“representational counterparts” that are grounded on them – let us call them 
PropertiesRB. PropertiesRB represent properties of the body. In virtue of this, the 
bodily field stands for (regions of) the body. Therefore, my proposal is that the 
object of token somatosensory experiences is, primarily, a constituent of a field of sensation, 
namely the bodily field; and secondarily, the body itself, via the representational properties 
grounded on the constituents of the field. In bodily experiences, we typically are aware of 
the body as a sensory field. 
As an illustration, consider again the sensation of caressing the edge of the 
worktable with the tips of the fingers – consider, specifically, its somatosensory 
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aspect, namely the feeling of our fingers being Depressed against the edges of 
the table. The content of this bodily experience needs to be cashed out 
primarily in terms of the property of being DepressedS. Yet, when having this 
sensation we represent our fingers’ being Depressed via DepressedRB, which is 
grounded on DepressedS. Incidentally, this experience also involves the 
perception of certain properties of the table, such as the Roughness of its 
edges. It is arguable that DepressedS contributes to the perception of the table 
by grounding, as well, a representational property that stands for the table’s 
roughness. More generally, it is arguable that somatosensory experiences 
involve, as a function of PropertiesS, the representation of the properties of 
worldly objects and space – we can call them “PropertiesRW”.83 
Moving forward in defining the notion of bodily field, it is now in order to 
see how to specify the relations between the content of token bodily 
experiences and the bodily field. Note that I have claimed, on the one hand, 
that the content of token bodily experiences needs to be specified in terms of 
PropertiesS, which are properties of a bodily field; and on the other hand, that 
the bodily field represents something in virtue of properties grounded on 
PropertiesS. This means that the content of the bodily field is fixed via the 
contribution of PropertiesS, whereas what these properties ultimately stand for 
needs to be fixed at least partly by reference to the representation they are 
constituents of. 
These two ideas are seemingly in tension with one another. One way to 
make them compatible is to understand the relations between token bodily 
experiences and the bodily field in terms analogous to how Frege’s Context 
Principle (Frege, 1950) and the Principle of Compositionality are taken to be 
compatible in language. 84  According to Frege’s Context Principle, lexical 
entries have their content fixed in virtue of the content of the sentences in 
which they occur as constituents. In turn, according to the Principle of 
Compositionality, complex expressions such as sentences have their content 
fixed by their structure and the contents of their constituents, e.g. lexical 
                                                 
83 Since the view defended here is one about the SBO, which concerns the aspect of bodily 
awareness of somatosensation, I do not actually need to commit myself to the idea that the 
metaphysical relation of grounding between PropertiesS and PropertiesRW goes in the direction 
mentioned. This direction seems, however, prima facie plausible, specially for cases such as 
proprioceptive experiences. Still, it is important to bear in mind that the sensational status of 
PropertiesS is gained when we consider how we experience them relative to non-bodily 
properties. 
84 This move was suggested to me by Manolo Martínez, who referred me to his own PhD 
dissertation (Martínez, 2010). 
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entries. Prima facie, these two principles might seem logically incompatible. 
Besides, they also cast doubt on how the actual learning of the meaning of 
linguistic expressions might occur. 
The apparent logical tension between the two principles has been 
addressed in the literature by appealing to the notions of generic and specific 
dependence (García-Carpintero, 2010). On this reading, the principles are 
compatible because the dependence postulated between complex expressions 
and lexical entries, and that between lexical entries and complex expressions, 
have to be understood as different in kind. Applying this compatibilist reading 
to the case that concerns us here, the idea is the following: on the one hand, 
the content of the bodily field depends specifically on the semantic properties of 
each particular bodily sensation making it up. This means that it is determined 
by the specific PropertiesS it involves, with their corresponding PropertiesRB. In 
this regard, my contention is that, at any given moment, the bodily field is 
constituted by the set of PropertiesS actually instantiated at that moment, plus a 
sufficient set of potential PropertiesS – and that it gets its content via the 
relevant PropertiesRB. 
On the other hand, the content of token bodily sensations depends generically 
on the content of the bodily field. This means that the content of each token 
bodily sensation could not be specified without mentioning the content of some 
or other further constituent of the bodily field it takes part in.  
Note that this chimes well with one of the central contributions of Spatial 
Deflationism on the phenomenology of bodily space. Bermúdez claimed that 
the felt location of the properties belonging to the content of token bodily 
experiences has to be specified in terms of its relations to the properties 
belonging to the content of other bodily experiences. Explicit Reflexivity can 
assume this point. PropertiesS are only metaphorically localised, in this sense: 
specifying the location of any given PropertyS is specifying its relations to other 
actual or potential, equally experience-dependent properties. In turn, bodily 
experiences, via the corresponding PropertiesRB, convey the relative disposition 
of actual body parts – they convey, if veridical, the actual location of bodily 
properties and events. In sum, these considerations establish that it is 
compatible to hold that the content of a representation results from the 
composition of its constituents, and that the constituents get their content fixed 
by reference to the representation. 
The Principle of Compositionality and the Context Principle might also be 
found to yield an unclear picture of the actual learning and understanding of the 
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meaning of linguistic expressions. By Compositionality, understanding the 
meaning of a complex expression depends on understanding the meaning of its 
constituents, and the way they are composed. By Context, understanding the 
meaning of lexical entries requires grasping the content of at least some of the 
complex sentences in which they could appear. A fair concern here is how one 
can actually start to learn a language – namely how one can start to actually 
acquire and master simple and complex contentful linguistic items. In this 
regard, we can think of the process thus: first, for a sufficiently big set of 
sentences of the language, the meaning of the sentences in this set is learned in 
toto, namely without relying on their subsentential components and structural 
features. Then, the meaning of the constituents of the sentences in the set is 
worked out from the known sentential meanings, relying on the Context 
Principle. Finally, the meaning of all other possible sentence-constituents and 
sentences is taken from the information learned in the previous two stages, 
with the help of the Context Principle and the Principle of Compositionality 
(Martínez, 2010, 117). When it comes to explaining how it can actually come 
about that a subject has a set of bodily experiences that have a certain content 
partly in virtue of their participation in the composition of a bodily field, while 
simultaneously bearing a bodily field whose content is to be spelled out in 
terms of the content of the experiences that constitute it, a process analogous 
to the one just sketched for the linguistic case can be hypothesised. 
To round up this exposition, let me add two more relevant points. Firstly, 
note that in normal conditions, for each subject there is a single body suitably 
wired so as to cause the experiences the contents of which make up a bodily 
field. Stated otherwise, the bodily properties which have a sensational and 
representational correlate in a given bodily field typically belong to one single 
body. The bodily field stands for this one body. Given the experience of 
boundedness, and the relation of representation between the bodily field and 
the body, the felt boundaries are typically taken by the subject to coincide with 
the boundaries of the physical object it stands for. To put it somewhat 
metaphorically, the body “fills in the whole of the space” within which we can 
possibly represent non-bodily objects in somatosensation. 
This helps answer a worry that could legitimately arise in light of some of 
the objections to Deflationism I pressed in the previous chapter: 85  if the 
content of bodily experiences is always dual in the way described, why is it 
typically the case that only one of its sides, namely the bodily side, is 
                                                 
85 Specially those against Mike Martin’s account (section 2.2.1, Chapter 2). 
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designated, in the sense of being taken as our own? Explicit Reflexivity allows us 
to answer this question by appealing to the relative stability of the bodily 
representation vis à vis the variability of the non-bodily objects perceived in 
relation to it as something that contributes to the awareness that the former, 
rather than the latter, is the sensory field. The characterisation of bodily 
awareness in somatosensation in terms of an awareness of the body as a sensory 
field – together with part B of Explicit Reflexivity, still to be discussed –, is 
what discharges the explanatory burden with respect to the SBO. 
Finally, to conclude this section, it is worth pointing out that Explicit 
Reflexivity offers the theoretical tools to spell out the following facts: on the 
one hand, there is a sense in which our bodily experiences are never wrong. 
Indeed, if one feels a pain somewhere in the body, it is by necessity the case 
that the pain is occurring (see e.g. Block, 2006). Bodily experiences certainly 
cannot be wrong if evaluated with respect to the bodily field: the bodily field 
by definition includes, at any given moment, the PropertiesS instantiated at that 
moment. On the other hand, however, there is a sense in which our bodily 
experiences are sometimes inaccurate: bodily illusions, or certain pathological 
conditions such as phantom limb pain, are wrong in that they do not track the 
actual state of one’s physical body. The fact that the bodily field ultimately has 
the status of a representation allows to say that the experiences making it up 
are inaccurate, if evaluated with respect to the properties of the specific body 
that the field has the function, and is actually taken, to represent. 
With this proposal on the table, in the next section I will show how 
Explicit Reflexivity can accommodate some relevant phenomenological 
nuances of our bodily experiences. I take this capacity to be an advantage of 
the view. 
 
3.3.2. Getting the Phenomenology Right 
 
D. M. Armstrong (1962, 1968) famously proposed a division between transitive 
and intransitive bodily sensations. On his view, when one has a transitive bodily 
sensation it seems to one, on the face of it, that one’s body or body part is 
some mind-independent way.86 In contrast, intransitive bodily sensations are 
those that do not involve a clear distinction between the sensation itself and an 
objective state of affairs conveyed by it (1968, 309). Armstrong mentions 
sensations of warmth, pressure, motion, and distension as transitive; and aches, 
                                                 
86 I borrow this formulation of what transitive sensations are from Richardson (2013). 
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pains, tickles, tingles, and erotic sensations as intransitive (1962, 1; 1968, 308-
9). 
I do not particularly intend to endorse the idea that these two lists of 
bodily sensations actually form natural kinds – nor, specifically, that each of 
these kinds is determined by the feature more or less precisely defined by 
Armstrong. Yet, I do think that his distinction captures intuitive 
phenomenological nuances to be found within bodily experiences. On the one 
hand, in at least some cases of somatosensation we indeed seem to feel that 
objective properties of the body are conveyed. Proprioception arguably is a 
paradigmatic case of this: when ordinary speakers claim to feel that their legs 
are crossed, they seem to mean that their legs, as parts of a particular physical 
object, have a certain property relative to their objective position in space. Let 
me call this intuition about the phenomenology of proprioception the Folk 
Intuition about Proprioception (FI-Proprioception). Contrasting with this case, 
there are other bodily sensations of which we would not want to say so 
categorically that they have this phenomenological structure – namely of which 
we might doubt that they primarily convey an objective property of the body. 
Pain arguably is a paradigmatic case here. We can call this the Folk Intuition 
about Pain (FI-Pain). 
Whether or not particular bodily sensations, such as a given tactile 
experience or a specific interoceptive sensation, are more akin to 
proprioception or to pain in this respect might well be a matter of degree. My 
point in this section does not directly touch upon these taxonomical issues. 
The point I want to make is rather that, assuming that there are paradigmatic 
cases at each end of the spectrum, or within each class if we prefer 
Armstrong’s classification, Explicit Reflexivity offers enough tools to 
accommodate each of them. 
In the foregoing discussion I have appealed to several types of properties, 
among which: PropertiesS, which are properties of the bodily field; 
PropertiesRB, which are representational properties of the experience grounded 
on PropertiesS; bodily properties; and properties of non-bodily objects. Even 
if, according to Explicit Reflexivity, the bodily awareness involved in 
somatosensory experiences is to be spelled out ultimately in terms of the first 
type of properties, within this framework there is room for the possibility that 
the other types of properties be more or less salient in the experience, for 
instance as a result of switches of attention. A clear example of this has already 
been discussed above: in haptic touch, we ordinarily focus on the properties of 
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non-bodily objects. Yet, switches of attention can be performed that result in 
tactile sensations in which bodily properties are specially salient. 
With this in mind, let us focus on FI-Proprioception. For one thing, it is 
important to note that the intuition itself could be further qualified. FI-
Proprioception advocates for a description of proprioceptive experiences as 
transparent. The suggestion seems to be that, when we have them, we are 
directly acquainted with the body itself in a way that makes it impossible to 
attend to anything experiential – such as the bodily field – without thereby 
attending to the external object of the experience. However, this is a very 
strong reading of FI-Proprioception and the transparency thesis. On a weaker 
reading (Kind, 2003), the point would rather be this: in proprioception, it is 
difficult to attend directly to experiential features instead of attending to the 
body itself. 
As far as I can see, there is no clear verdict as for which of the two 
readings is ordinarily at stake when we hold FI-Proprioception. It might well 
be the case that when undergoing proprioceptive experiences one can shift the 
focus of attention from bodily properties themselves to the corresponding 
PropertiesS – for instance, from one’s legs being Crossed to the property of 
being CrossedS as a property of the bodily field. In this sense, there might be 
some cases in which bodily sensations that typically are transparent with 
respect to the body itself cease to be so. This would be the implication of a 
weak understanding of the notion of transparency as involved in 
proprioception – one that would allow for the PropertiesS of the experience to 
be revealed.87 I do not think that there are in principle reasons to reject this 
possibility. 
In any case, both readings of FI-Proprioception allegedly pose a challenge 
to Explicit Reflexivity in the following sense: if the content of all 
somatosensory experiences were to be specified in terms of PropertiesS, and 
PropertiesS are properties of a bodily field, wouldn’t it have to be the case that 
all our somatosensory experiences, including proprioceptive experiences, be 
ordinarily non-transparent with respect to the body itself? That is, wouldn’t our 
awareness of the body in somatosensation always have to feel somehow 
“mediated” by the field? FI-Proprioception indicates that this “mediation” 
either does not belong to proprioception at all – on the strong reading –, or it 
                                                 
87 The attentional exercise suggested here might be akin to what Loar (2017) calls “oblique 
reflection” on visual experiences, a way of “discerning qualia” in vision available to ordinary 
perceivers. 
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does not belong to it in ordinary cases – on the weak reading. Indeed, 
proprioceptive experiences are transparent with respect to the body in normal 
conditions, and ordinarily no question seems to arise regarding the experience-
independency of the properties involved in the experience, such as the Position 
of one’s legs. 
The postulated relation of representation between the bodily field and the 
body allows for a reply to this challenge. Postulating a bodily field and defining 
the content of bodily experiences in terms of properties thereof does not 
necessarily make bodily experiences non-transparent with respect to the body 
itself. Thus, we get the phenomenology right in the relevant cases. 
A simple analogy will do to suggest why this is so. Imagine you see a 
photograph of a jungle in a guidebook. By contemplating the photograph, you 
are having a visual perception whose primary intentional object is the 
photograph, namely a representation of the jungle. In this situation, there is a 
clear sense in which you will be right to predicate of the photograph the 
Greenness involved in your experience. In other words, there is a clear sense in 
which it is the picture itself, with its patches of ink on the guidebook’s page, 
which is Green. Indeed, certain switches of attention with respect to the 
default attitude of the guidebook’s reader can make this sense salient: the 
photograph in the guidebook can, on occasion, veil the jungle it represents 
instead of enable its contemplation, if one pays special attention to the peculiar 
shades of Green of the ink on the page.88 However, there is indeed a sense in 
which, in this situation, what you see when contemplating the picture is the 
jungle and its properties. In fact, in normal conditions – and assuming for the 
sake of the example that the picture in the guidebook has no artistic interest 
whatsoever – you will take the picture to be mainly informative about the 
Greenness of the wilderness. In this sense, the photograph does not veil the 
jungle at all: what you are contemplating are not the properties of the 
representation qua representation, but rather of the represented.89 
More generally speaking, there is no tension between grasping properties 
that are themselves properties of a representation, and these properties 
ultimately indicating, and more importantly, being taken to indicate, properties 
                                                 
88 Note that this change of attitude with respect to the guidebook reader’s default attitude 
parallels the switch of attention within proprioception just described in the previous paragraph. 
89 The description of this example is intended to be neutral with respect to the positions in the 
debate in aesthetics about the transparency of photographs. Walton (1984) has famously 
argued that photographs are transparent, and that we literally see the objects photographed 
when ordinarily looking at them. Critics of his view include Currie (1995), Carroll (1995), and 
Gaut (2010). 
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of a represented object. This is what happens in ordinary cases of 
proprioception. Put in the terms proposed by Explicit Reflexivity, in reports of 
proprioception, the Position of our legs is targeted in virtue of its relation to 
PositionRB, that is, the counterpart of PositionS, by reference to which the latter 
stands for a property of a specific pair of legs. 
If this is the case, then there might be yet another fair concern regarding 
the cases in which FI-Proprioception applies: in what sense are we exactly 
aware of the experience-dependency of the properties in these cases if, in another 
relevant sense, we experience properties as properties of the body itself, 
namely as objective? 
Even at the risk of being repetitive, the answer to this worry involves 
insisting on the specific understanding of the locution “awareness of 
experience-dependency” that has been at stake here. Recall that the notion of 
bodily field emerges if we take bodily experiences to involve non-bodily 
objects as represented within the field, actually or potentially. Under the 
current elaboration of the notion of bodily field, the following has been 
suggested as a relatively straightforward proposal on how the dual content of 
bodily experiences is articulated: their non-bodily content is partly gained as a 
function of the instantiation of token PropertiesS and their relations. This is 
enabled by the feeling of (bodily) boundaries involved in the experience – as 
mentioned before, the sharper the boundaries are felt, the finer grained the 
non-bodily content of the experience. In other words, the awareness of 
experience-dependency crucially has to do with the non-transparency of 
somatosensation generally as a form of perception of the non-bodily. Earlier in this 
chapter (section 3.2.3) I argued that this sort of content, and hence this sort of 
awareness of the bodily field as such, is indeed involved in proprioceptive 
experiences, and in general in experiences to which FI-Proprioception applies. 
The fact that in these cases we typically end up predicating properties of the 
body itself is due to the fact that, maybe peculiarly, the sensory field involved 
in somatosensation latches onto a physical body, together with the just 
discussed typical transparency of the representation with respect to the one 
object it stands for. None of this is in principle incompatible with these 
experiences involving awareness of experience-dependency in the sense in 
which I have been using the expression here. 
As has emerged previously, Armstrong includes pains and aches within 
the class of intransitive bodily sensations: those which, on the face of it, do not 
involve a distinction between the sensation itself and some mind-independent 
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state of affairs. Even though this claim is controversial, I do think that, if any 
type of bodily experience falls under this description at all, then at least some 
cases of pain do.90 More generally speaking, when reporting experiences of 
pain we do seem to be talking about the fact that we have a sensation that feels 
a certain way, instead of referring to some objective bodily property. 
On the assumption that ordinary ways of talking about experiences reflect 
at least the way in which speakers take these experiences to be, and hence that 
it makes sense to use them as a guide to possible phenomenal differences, this 
suggests that the very experience of pain presents its own properties specially 
saliently. As far as I can tell, in debates in the philosophy of mind it has often 
been accepted, and even taken as a guideline, that our ordinary way of speaking 
about pain, and hence arguably our folk concept of pain, pre-eminently 
involves the pain qua phenomenal experience. This articulates the 
abovementioned FI-Pain. 
FI-Pain plays a crucial role in classical discussions about physicalism: for 
instance, Levine’s (1983) discussion of Kripke’s (1972) anti-physicalist 
argument, which famously leads to his detection of an explanatory gap in 
psychophysical identities, exploits this idea, already at stake in Kripke’s 
reasoning. Likewise, the Phenomenal Concept Strategy against anti-physicalist 
arguments reflects on the special character of the concepts we use to refer to 
certain phenomenal states, and on how they differ from, but are co-referential 
with, physical concepts (see e.g. Tye, 2009). Explicit Reflexivity contains the 
resources to spell out FI-Pain: in at least some experiences of pain, PropertiesS, 
and thereby the bodily field, are ordinarily phenomenally salient enough so as 
to be the target of our thought and talk about it. If, in ordinary judgments 
about these experiences, we aim at reporting the character of the experience itself, 
it is because the experience-dependency of the targeted properties in these 
cases is specially salient. This, again, is compatible with making claims about 
objective bodily Damage on the grounds of a given experience of pain. 
 
3.3.3. Introducing the SEO 
 
Clause A of [Explicit Reflexivity] states that for a subject to have a SBO (partly) 
is for her to be aware of the experience-dependency of the properties involved 
                                                 
90 Kind (2008, 291-2) mentions throbbing headaches and toothaches as falling under this 
description, using them to argue against the generality of the thesis of transparency. 
Incidentally, Block (1996, 33-4) seems to agree with Armstrong in mentioning orgasms as 
experiences akin to pain in this regard. 
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in the content of somatosensory experiences. After motivating this claim in the 
first pass, I have articulated it in the second pass by presenting the bodily field. 
The originality of Explicit Reflexivity consists in exploiting the 
implications of the claim that, in somatosensation, the bodily boundaries are 
perceived as allowing the representation of objects and events other than the 
body. According to Explicit Reflexivity, this means that somatosensation 
involves a sensory field phenomenologically apparent as such. By exploiting these 
ideas in this way, Explicit Reflexivity makes Spatial Deflationism meet Property 
Deflationism: it is essential to ordinary somatosensory experiences that the 
qualitatively rich properties involved in them are experience-dependent in the 
specific sense described. 
By the same token, Explicit Reflexivity goes beyond both forms of 
Deflationism. According to Explicit Reflexivity, conscious bodily sensations 
involve a representation of the body that subjects take to be the condition of 
possibility of a certain type of representation of non-bodily objects. That 
subjects take it to be so is just another way of saying that the structure of the 
content of the experiences conveys it thus, and that it thereby becomes 
phenomenally accessible. Accordingly, the idea that we are aware of the 
experience-dependency of PropertiesS makes sense. According to the view here 
defended, bodily experiences are therefore explicitly reflexive. 
It must be stressed that none of the views discussed in Chapter 2 was 
committed to the idea that the primary object of somatosensation is of the 
special type articulated in this chapter. This commitment is essential to Explicit 
Reflexivity: it is what allows for clause B of the proposal to enter into the 
picture. Clause B states the requirement that subjects are aware of their bodily 
experiences as their own. On my view, this is the move that enables the 
elements discussed under clause A of the proposal to finally make for an 
account of the SBO. In the rest of this section I outline how these two parts 
collaborate for such an account. 
 
Take a token somatosensory experience, and suppose that it involves as its 
primary object a (constituent of a) bodily field in relation to which other 
objects are or could be represented. Clause A of the view says that the subject 
of the experience is aware of the special nature of this object. If this is the case, 
then what the subject is aware of is that this object allows the relevant 
experience to acquire its contents beyond this object. Another, rather 
metaphorical way of putting this is the following: the bodily field defines the 
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space of possible experience of objects beyond the body, where “experience” 
must be understood as circumscribed to the relevant type, namely 
somatosensation. Among the several objects we perceive somatosensorily, the 
body is the designated one, in this specific sense. This is articulated as part of 
the content of the relevant experiences. 
Let us now plug in the fact that the subject is aware that the experience the 
contents of which depend on the contribution of the field in this way is her own. In other 
words, let us now plug in the SEO. As established in Chapter 1, the exact way 
in which the SEO should be specified will remain unaddressed in this 
dissertation. Let us assume, generally, that when one tokens the first-person 
pronoun in the subject position in judgments of experience, one manifests 
sensitivity of a certain kind to the experiences one undergoes being one’s own. 
According to Explicit Reflexivity, the subject experiences the object of 
somatosensation as her own in the following sense: she experiences it as the 
correlate of her own somatosensory experience – in particular, as what allows the 
experience to have (part of) the content it (also) has. 
Finally, we know that this space of possible experience is itself taken to 
stand for an object: the body. More specifically, we know that there typically is 
one single physical body suitably wired so as to cause the somatosensory 
experiences of a given subject. The self-attribution of (the relevant part of) the 
content of bodily experiences will typically naturally latch onto this specific 
physical body. To put it more clearly, the foregoing will be straightforwardly 
the case for somatosensory experiences in which the bodily field is fully 
transparent, plausibly ordinary instances of proprioception. In the cases in 
which the bodily field is not fully transparent – such as, maybe, ordinary 
instances of pain –, Explicit Reflexivity leaves room for there to be an owned 
object to the experience, even if the body itself does not clearly figure in its 
content. It also leaves room for the body itself entering into the content 
provided that the relevant attentional switches are performed. 
Under the light of the notion of reflexivity as it figured in Property 
Deflationism, 91  a rather natural reading of the notion of awareness of the 
experience-dependency of properties – if there are natural readings of this sort of 
expressions at all – is one according to which some sort of awareness of a 
counterfactual is at stake: in somatosensation, subjects are aware that the 
                                                 
91 See section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2. In that context, following Dokic, I talked about properties 
being constitutively dependent on the occurrence of token experiences, thereby “entailing the 
experiences themselves”, in the sense that they could not be instantiated if the token 
experience they are a content of were not occurring. 
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relevant properties would not be instantiated if the experiences of which they are a content 
were not occurring. Although the question whether or not the understanding of 
counterfactuals has a perceptual counterpart is by itself controversial, this 
conditional eventually is a plausible description of Explicit Reflexivity. No 
more elements than those already on the table are needed to spell it out. 
PropertiesS are such that, in order for them to be instantiated, an experience 
that bears them as part of their content needs to occur. Indeed, it only makes 
sense to talk about sensory fields, and about the bodily field in particular, if 
experiences are occurring that gain their content in relation to them. Being 
aware of the bodily field as such is being aware of it as the condition of 
possibility of the representation of other objects in the experience. That is, in 
other words, as a type of entity that does not exist unless it is experienced. We 
saw that, when presenting his notion of visual field, Peacocke used a rather 
metaphorical formulation to refer to it, a slight modification of which will be 
useful to resort to again now: insofar as we can make sense of a subjective space 
at all – or, rather, of a subjective object in it –, it is precisely space – or, rather, the 
body – as is involved in bodily sensations. 
 
3.3.4. The Complete Picture 
 
Explicit Reflexivity yields the following schematic description of token 
somatosensory experiences: 
 
[ER1]. ExperienceM (P is instantiated in L) 
 
In ER1, the subscript (M) indicates that the experience is taken to be mine by 
the subject who undergoes it; the brackets encapsulate (the relevant part of) 
the primary content of the experience; P stands for any PropertyS; and L 
indicates a felt location. This is a schematic expression of the idea that we have 
a sensation as of a property instantiated in a location. Thus formulated, ER1 by 
itself is not clear on what distinguishes somatosensory experiences from, for 
instance, exteroceptive experiences. However, ER1 has to be read in the 
context of the foregoing considerations, which establish that the following is a 
proper analysis thereof: 
 
[ER2]. ExperienceM (P is instantiated in L of the bodily field) 
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ER2 specifies that L is to be understood as a given point within the network 
constituted by a set of PropertiesS, namely of the properties belonging to other 
token experiences of the type described. In this sense, L will need to be 
specified in terms of its relation to other locations making up the field. By 
invoking the bodily field, ER2 thereby introduces the reflexivity of the 
experiences at stake – in the sense that they involve experience-dependent 
properties. In particular, it introduces it by mentioning it as part of the content 
of the experience. ER2, and ER1 conveniently specified in terms of the 
former, are thus synonyms of: 
 
[ER3]. ExperienceM (P is instantiated in L, and P is constitutively 
dependent on this particular experience) 
 
[ER3’]. ExperienceM (P is instantiated in L, and P is partly constitutive of 
an entity the existence of which depends on the occurrence of this 
particular experience) 
 
In ER3 and ER3’, the focus is set on the nature of PropertiesS. This in turn 
corresponds to a specification of the nature of the bodily field, given the 
relation between the former and the latter. The point of proposing this twofold 
third formulation of Explicit Reflexivity is to include within the content of the 
experience an explicit reference to it: “this particular experience” refers, in ER3 
and ER3’, to the specific experience of which P is a content. This illustrates 
how bodily experiences are reflexive. Importantly, the reference to the 
experience included in all normal somatosensory experiences is a reference to 
my own experience in each case. When undergoing a bodily experience, subjects 
are therefore aware of the constitutive relation holding between the properties 
of the bodily field and their own experiences. I will further unpack how this 
affords the full form of reflexivity we are after – that is, the reference, within 
the content of bodily experiences, to the subject of the experience us such – 
when revisiting the Judgment Formation Goal in Chapter 4, section 4.2.1. 
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3.4. Conclusion 
 
At the outset of this dissertation92 I stipulated that for one to have a SBO is for 
one to be aware of the body one feels in bodily experience as being one’s own. 
The point of accounts of the SBO, I claimed, is to answer the Constitutive 
Question, which is a question about the nature of this awareness. In this 
chapter I have put forward a reply to this question. In particular, I have 
defended 
 
[Explicit Reflexivity]: for a subject to have a SBO is for her to be aware of: 
 
A. the experience-dependency of the properties involved in the content 
of somatosensory experiences – even when, in reports of these 
experiences, we predicate properties of the body itself; 
B. the relevant experiences (namely somatosensory experiences) as 
being her own. 
 
According to Explicit Reflexivity, the SBO consists of the fact that token 
somatosensory experiences have the kind of content and phenomenology 
described: they involve (constituents of) a bodily field. Explicit Reflexivity is 
thus an Experientialist Account that draws on the minimal set of elements 
included in the content of token somatosensory experiences. 93  It does not 
require to posit, as part of the content of somatosensory experiences, any 
“positive quality over and above the felt quality of the sensation and the 
location” (Martin, 1995: 270). Yet, Explicit Reflexivity does count on the fact 
that, in general, subjects are aware of the phenomenally conscious experiences 
they undergo as being their own, and in particular of the bodily experiences 
they undergo as being their own. 
This picture is in principle compatible with any account of the SEO.94 
Importantly, though, it is a consequence of my view that whatever grounds the 
SEO ultimately also grounds the SBO: that subjects experience a given body as 
                                                 
92 See Chapter 1, section 1.1. 
93 In this sense, Explicit Reflexivity can take in versions of the main theses about the SBO 
defended by deflationists. On the one hand, the Boundedness Thesis, which claimed that the 
SBO consists at least partly of the fact that, when having bodily sensations, the body is felt as 
having certain boundaries. On the other hand, a nuanced version of the Property Thesis, on 
which the SBO consists partly of the fact that the properties involved in bodily sensations are 
experience-dependent. 
94 For a general landscape of views on the SEO, see section 1.4.4. in Chapter 1. 
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their own in somatosensation presupposes that they are aware of the relevant 
experiences as their own. Explicit Reflexivity also has it that the SBO is a 
phenomenally significant aspect of bodily experiences, and holds this via the 
claim that certain properties are marked as dependant on my own experience. 
Under this light, it seems that Explicit Reflexivity would recommend a 
view according to which, for all phenomenally conscious experiences, there is 
something phenomenally significant that grounds the self-attribution thereof. 
In other words, Explicit Reflexivity seems to recommend an Experientialist 
Account on the SEO too. This is so, on the one hand, for the sake of 
simplicity. But on the other hand, because this theoretical option guarantees an 
underpinning of judgments of somatosensation when it comes to their 
warrant. In fact, the following would be a possible line of argumentation on 
the debate about the SEO: Experientialist Accounts on the SEO should be 
favoured because they get us closer to a simple, unified account of self-
consciousness in somatosensation. Developing this line, however, remains a 
task for future research. 
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Figure 195 
  
                                                 
95 The simple arrows of Figure 1 stand for relations of grounding. Double arrows stand for 
relations of representation. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Explicit Reflexivity Defended 
 
 
In the present chapter I aim at further underpinning my proposal in two 
different ways. In the first half of the chapter (section 4.1) I will address three 
worries that, one might think, challenge the proposal, and argue that Explicit 
Reflexivity is able to overcome them. Addressing these challenges will also 
allow me to qualify some points of the view, thereby rounding it up. The first 
objection I will address, the objection from afterimages, concerns the relation 
that this special case of visual perception has with self-attribution. By tackling 
this worry, I consider whether Explicit Reflexivity generalises – or 
overgeneralises – to cases that do not involve bodily awareness, and clarify the 
role of my appeal to afterimages in Chapter 3. Secondly, I will discuss the 
notion of a non-localised sensation, sometimes put forward in the literature, 
and I will assess whether it poses a serious threat to the view. Finally, the third 
challenge will allow me to elaborate on how the notions of factivity and non-
factivity are articulated in my proposal. 
After dealing with these objections, I will bring back the three goals 
presented in Chapter 1. In that first chapter, I pointed out three defining 
features of the SBO: the involvement of the first-person in it, the seeming 
compellingness of this involvement, and its empirical relevance. These three 
features, I argued, dictate three desiderata that any theory on the SBO must 
meet, namely the Judgment Formation Goal, the Intuitive Goal, and the 
Empirical Goal. For a proposal to fully explain the SBO means for it to meet 
each of these goals: they constitute a yardstick to the validity of views on the 
phenomenon. Hence, underpinning Explicit Reflexivity necessarily involves 
showing that it meets the three goals. I will do so in three dedicated sections in 
the second half of this chapter (section 4.2). 
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4.1. Objections and Replies 
 
4.1.1. The Objection from Afterimages 
 
According to Explicit Reflexivity, the SBO consists of the fact that 
somatosensory experiences have (a constituent of) the bodily field as (part of) 
their content. The notion of bodily field is a specification, for somatosensation, 
of a more general notion of sensory field of a given experience type: the frame 
within which the objects represented in experiences of the type appear, and of 
which properties of the experience are predicated that are not properties the 
objects are represented as having. Dialectically, in Chapter 3 this general notion 
was extracted from reflection on the case of afterimages. The alleged 
phenomenology of afterimages was intended to be suggestive of the 
phenomenal features of bodily sensations that ground the awareness of the felt 
body as one’s own expressed in judgments of somatosensation. 
This prompts a potentially damaging objection to Explicit Reflexivity. On 
the account of afterimages exploited in the previous chapter, afterimages 
consist in properties of the visual field experienced as such. Thus, when 
experiencing an afterimage, subjects are aware of the relevant sensory field as 
such. Shall we say, then, that we experience the visual field in these cases as 
something we have a sense of ownership for? Put otherwise, does Explicit Reflexivity 
generalise to these cases of visual perception? 
These questions express an objection if some assumptions are at stake. On 
the one hand, the assumption that, in putting forward my view on the SBO, I 
postulated a strict analogy between the phenomenology of afterimages and the 
phenomenology of bodily sensations as for the involvement of a sensory field 
in them. Let me call this assumption the Strict Analogy assumption. On the 
other hand, the assumption that there is no sense of ownership involved in the 
perception of afterimages. If this were the case, then Explicit Reflexivity 
overgeneralises – the objection goes. Let me call this second assumption the No 
Ownership assumption. There are two possible lines of reply to the challenge 
from afterimages, built around the commitment one takes to each of these two 
assumptions. I will now offer these two lines of reply in turn. 
It is worth pointing out, for a start, that it is in principle not within the 
scope of this dissertation to take a stance on the debate about the contents of 
visual perception, nor on the phenomenon of afterimages in particular. Hence, 
in principle, I am not committed to taking a stance on whether there is a strict 
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analogy between the phenomenology of afterimages and the phenomenology of 
bodily sensations with respect to their involvement of a sensory field. As far as 
I see, if a contender asks me to take a commitment on this front, it will be on 
the grounds of dialectical considerations, such as the following: since I used a 
comparison between afterimages and somatosensory experiences as a central 
part of the motivation of my view on the latter, giving up now on one of the 
terms of the comparison seems argumentatively flawed. 
Let me take this possible contender seriously, and suppose that she is right 
that Explicit Reflexivity can only get off the ground as a result of the 
effectiveness of an argument by analogy. If this were so, I should indeed be 
committed to the view that afterimages consist in a relation with a sensory field 
which, by definition, bears some experience-dependent properties; together 
with an awareness of the (properties of the) sensory field as such. Another way 
of expressing this view about the phenomenology of afterimages is the 
following: the phenomenology of afterimages is such that, when having them, 
we do not take them to be elements of the external, public reality. 
This sort of view about afterimages is commonplace in the philosophy of 
perception. It is typically defended by philosophers who subsequently endorse 
“sensationalist” stances on visual perception: namely the thought that, given 
the nature of afterimages, we cannot characterise visual experience only in 
terms of a subject’s experience as of an external, public reality, but we must 
also appeal to visual sensations – or to sensational properties, as I have been 
calling them. 96  On this assumption about the nature of afterimages, my 
contender’s objection arises if one is also committed to there being no sense of 
ownership involved in the perception of afterimages. For if my view were 
sound, then it should be the case that we indeed experienced the visual field 
involved in afterimages as something we have a sense of ownership for. 
A way out of this quandary is hence to drop the No Ownership 
assumption and accept that the experience of afterimages does involve 
something like a sense of ownership. Admittedly, I have not explicitly offered 
in this dissertation the general definition of “sense of ownership” that I am 
exploiting at this point. Drawing from the more specific [SBO] and [SEO], we 
can straightforwardly put together this definition: for one to have a sense of 
ownership for X is for one to be aware of an X one experiences as being one’s 
                                                 
96 Authors who subscribe specifications of this reasoning include Peacocke (1983, 1984, 2008), 
Block (1996),O’Shaughnessy (2000), Boghossian and Velleman (1989), and Kind (2008). In this 
section, I follow Phillips (2013) closely in the description of the role of afterimages in debates 
about the contents of visual perception. 
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own. Importantly, the awareness of X as being one’s own involves the suitability 
of the self-attribution of X by tokening a first-person pronoun, and a typical 
compellingness of this self-attribution. Besides, if a sense of ownership for X 
can be said to exist, it captures facts about the involvement of the first-person 
in actual reports of experiences of X. Along these lines, for one to have a sense 
of ownership for the visual field is for one to be aware of the visual field as being 
one’s own, with all the mentioned provisos. 
On the face of it, that the experience of afterimages involves a sense of 
ownership in this way doesn’t sound unreasonable at all, at least in the context 
of sensationalist views. As a matter of fact, in this context authors often use 
expressions that stress the privacy or “dependence on oneself” of the region 
revealed by afterimagery, for instance by stressing its mental nature – e.g. Block 
(1996) famously talks about mental latex, and Siegel (2006, 375) mentions mental 
space as “home to apparently mind-dependent entities”. Relatedly, the 
peculiarity of these experiences has been sometimes articulated in terms of the 
sensitivity of afterimages to eye movement, that is, to the sensation of moving 
one’s own eyes (Siegel, 2006, 371, 357; Siegel, 2010, Ch. 7). Closer to the idioms 
used in discussions on the sense of ownership, O’Shaughnessy (2000) 
describes a given sensation as of the blue sky within the sensationalist 
framework thus: “something blue came into existence: something blue, psychological, 
and one’s own” (468, the latter italics are mine). And Peacocke (2008, 10), as we 
have already seen, illustratively writes that “[i]nsofar as we can make sense of a 
subjective space at all, it is precisely such space as is alleged to be involved in the 
visual field” (my emphasis). These descriptions of afterimagery plausibly count 
as evidence that the phenomenology of the visual field, thus understood, is 
taken to trigger, by definition as it were, reports in which one self-attributes it. 
The second way out of the challenge posed by afterimages is to drop the 
Strict Analogy assumption. In other words, a second way out is to accept the 
possibility of there being no strict analogy between the phenomenology of 
afterimages and that of somatosensation as for the involvement of a sensory 
field. Assuming that Explicit Reflexivity holds, the suggestion here is to back 
out of the view that afterimages consist in the experience of the (properties of 
the) visual field as such. This resolves the challenge because, if the accurate 
account of the phenomenology of afterimages does not involve an appeal to a 
sensory field, then Explicit Reflexivity does not prescribe any commitment to 
the involvement of a sense of ownership in these experiences. 
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Again, this way out of the challenge does not seem unreasonable. Phillips 
(2013, 418) has made a good case for an alternative account of afterimages. He 
analyses the sensationalist claim that afterimages appear in ways incompatible 
with their being apparent presentations of public objects, in terms of six alleged 
phenomenal features: (i) afterimages do not appear to be material objects; (ii) 
they remain apparent even when one closes one’s eyes; (iii) they do not appear 
to exhibit size constancy; (iv) they do not appear to exhibit kinetic 
independence; (v) they do not appear to be occludable; and (vi) they do not 
appear to afford multiple perspectives. On his view, afterimages do possess 
traits (i) to (iii), but these three features can be accommodated by an 
alternative, non-sensationalist approach to the phenomenon. His proposed 
alternative is to treat afterimages as illusory presentations of light phenomena 
such as rainbows, shadows, holograms, beams of light, or the vault of the sky. 
Besides, drawing on empirical considerations,97 he argues that traits (iv) to (vi) 
are phenomenologically inaccurate, and hence that they do not constitute 
further reason to support the view that afterimages appear to be private objects. 
The general moral of Phillips’ approach is that afterimagery falls short of a 
motivation for sensationalism about visual perception.98 
As mentioned, it is not my aim to endorse one view of afterimages or 
another. However, these considerations are relevant to show that, if one is 
inclined to favour my contender’s No Ownership assumption, then there are 
ways to not compromise Explicit Reflexivity. In fact, now that we can at least 
suppose that Explicit Reflexivity is correct, one could even pull this thread to 
construct an argument against the sensationalist account of afterimages: if 
afterimages involved a sensory field experienced as such, then they would also 
involve a sense of ownership, as somatosensation does. 
                                                 
97 As for (iv), Phillips appeals to the fact that large-scale afterimages do not appear to move 
with eye movement (Pelz and Hayhoe, 1995; Power, 1983), as well as to various forms of 
kinetic independence of small afterimages as a function of eye movement speed (Grüsser et al., 
1987; Smith, 2002). When it comes to (v), he points out that afterimages can in fact appear to 
be occluded. This happens when they are located in so-called “impossible locations in visual 
space”, namely those parts of the visual field that we generally cannot see without moving our 
head because they are occluded by our nose, brow, or cheeks (Hayhoe and Willians, 1984). 
Finally, as for (vi), Phillips points out a series of experimental results that show that 
afterimages are sensitive to body position and movement, and that their experienced 
modifications are reminiscent of visual-constancies (Gregory et al., 1959; Davies, 1973). 
98 And hence that it also falls short of an argument against “purism”. As Phillips puts it, purism 
is the view that “visual experience can be exhaustively characterised in terms of a subject’s 
apparent perspective on external, public reality” (417). Purists include Tye (1992), Dretske 
(1995), Campbell (2002b), or Brewer (2011). 
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It is important to note that, if one opts for this second way out of the 
challenge from afterimages, then the dialectical worry my contender started 
with arises anew: if afterimages turn out not to have a phenomenology that 
supports the notion of sensory field, what was the point of appealing to them 
to motivate Explicit Reflexivity? If we chose the second solution to the puzzle, 
wouldn’t we be left without an argument for the view?99 
I don’t think so. As a matter of fact, the basic lines of the notion of bodily 
field could have been brought to light on the grounds of reflection about the 
phenomenology of touch alone, together with a generalisation to other bodily 
sensations (sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 in Chapter 3). Then, a more abstract notion 
of sensory field could have been defined on the grounds of the former. In 
other words, my arguments were limited to establishing that these notions 
apply to somatosensation, regardless of what may be the case for other sensory 
modalities. The explanatory project on the SBO, which concerns 
somatosensation specifically, justifies the appeal to these notions in 
independent ways, sufficiently explained in this dissertation.100 Nevertheless, I 
do find the sensationalist picture of afterimages prima facie intuitive as a 
description of what it is like to undergo them. In this sense, I take the 
sensationalist picture to be dialectically useful because it easily evokes the 
relevant phenomenological subtleties – and I have used it to this effect. 
Accepting that the dialectical use of the sensationalist view of afterimages 
in the previous chapter was this limited means accepting the following: the 
actual phenomenology of a given experience might not be what, on some intuitive 
introspective analyses, it seems to be. Experiences have an apparent 
phenomenology to which we can appeal for argumentative purposes, but the 
prima facie intuitive phenomenological description might well have to be 
revised. 
This might be found controversial. This is not the place to go deeply into 
considerations about the nature and methods of phenomenological analysis. 
Still, this worry can be preliminarily approached, and at least provisionally 
dispelled, by appealing to what are in fact common practices in the 
philosophical literature concerned with descriptive analysis of experiences. It is 
worth pointing out that some of these practices actually assume that the 
phenomenology of a given experience might not always be obviously available, 
                                                 
99 This objection was raised to me by Kathrin Glüer-Pagin in written correspondence. 
100 Namely the possibility of involving the SEO in an account of the SBO, as well as the 
plausibility of doing so given the parallelisms between the two and their co-occurrence in 
somatosensory experiences (see Chapter 1). 
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and that actual arguments besides brute introspection might be needed to 
make the correct descriptive claims about what-it-is-likeness. 
A recent example of a specific method by which one brings to light 
phenomenal features of experiences is Siegel’s (2010) phenomenal contrast 
method. This method is primarily conceived as a way of testing hypotheses 
about the contents of conscious experiences. Yet, it starts from the assumption 
that “contents of … experiences are non-arbitrarily related to their 
phenomenal character” (88). Suppose that we want to figure out what kind of 
content experience E has. The phenomenal contrast method suggests to 
consider E vis à vis another token experience E’ with a different phenomenal 
character. We must then test whether a given hypothesis about the kind of 
content of E would explain its phenomenal contrast with E’. The phenomenal 
contrast method has it that, in order to determine the nature of the content of 
E, we need to engage in reflection about its phenomenal peculiarities with 
respect to other experiences. The method hence operates on the assumption 
that comparing the phenomenology of token conscious experience E with that 
of E’ can be more informative about features of E that concern its 
phenomenology than reflection on E alone. 
As a matter of fact, de Vignemont (2018) proposes to set the debate about 
the SBO in terms of an adaptation of the phenomenal contrast method. Her 
idea is that comparing ordinary somatosensory experiences with those elicited 
in experimental paradigms such as the Rubber Hand Illusion, as well as with 
experiences involved in putative disorders of ownership, might help 
determining what their content and phenomenology are. The methodological 
assumption here is, again, that reflection on other experiences, with which one 
can establish a comparison, helps shed light on the phenomenology of 
ordinary somatosensory experiences. 
The strategy of polishing our prima facie phenomenological intuitions by 
comparing them to experiences elicited in experimental setups is actually the 
one we just saw Phillips (2013) follow: on his view, even if afterimages seem to 
exhibit kinetic independence, to be non-occludable, and to not afford multiple 
perspectives, these appearances are phenomenologically inaccurate. All these cases 
are examples of a commonplace assumption in philosophical methodology, 
namely that bringing out the actual phenomenology of experiences is not 
always a matter of brute introspection. Certain methods can be useful to 
illuminate it, and can help put forward arguments that favour some 
descriptions over others. 
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To sum up, the objection from afterimages arose from simultaneously 
holding that there must be a strict analogy between the phenomenology of 
afterimages and the phenomenology of bodily sensations as for the 
involvement of a sensory field in them – the Strict Analogy assumption; and 
that there is no sense of ownership involved in experiencing afterimages – 
namely the No Ownership assumption. I have argued that there are reasonable 
ways, both of holding Strict Analogy and rejecting No Ownership, and of 
ruling out Strict Analogy and hence remaining neutral as for No Ownership. 
Both strategies save Explicit Reflexivity from the objection. 
 
4.1.2. On Non-Localised Sensations 
 
It should be clear at this stage that the notion of bodily field is central to 
Explicit Reflexivity’s account of the SBO: by cashing out the contents of 
somatosensory experiences ultimately in terms of PropertiesS, which are 
properties of the bodily field, the view integrates the SEO into an explanation 
of the SBO. The involvement of the bodily field experienced as such in 
somatosensation is affirmed on the grounds of the dual structure of the 
content of bodily experiences, which convey both the body and non-bodily 
objects or space. This structure is implied by the phenomenal accessibility of 
the boundaries of the felt body, and this in turn results from the 
somatosensory experience as of qualities instantiated in a location. Taking the 
first schematic formulation of Explicit Reflexivity used in the previous chapter, 
 
[ER1]. ExperienceM (P is instantiated in L), 
 
what this means is that both P and L play a central role in the phenomenology 
that finally yields the SBO. The awareness of boundaries is gradable, and the 
fineness of grain with which one can describe non-bodily objects and space on 
the grounds of somatosensation is variable as a function thereof – the most 
detailed case being that of touch. Still, the SBO partly depends on the fact that 
the content of bodily experiences involves an indication of the spatial position 
of P – understood either non-literally, as a point defined in relation to various 
PropertiesS; or literally as a location within the physical body, if we consider the 
representational aspect of bodily sensations. 
This being the case, a legitimate worry emerges if we consider the 
possibility of there being sensations that are not localised. The commitment of 
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Explicit Reflexivity should be that there is no SBO involved in these 
sensations. In what follows I will suggest various ways in which we could 
plausibly interpret the idea of non-localised sensations, and evaluate to what extent 
each of them compromises the view. 
In discussing the local sign theory of bodily sensations,101 Frédérique de 
Vignemont (2018, 70) points out that, if some kind of spatial knowledge is a 
condition of possibility for being able to localise bodily sensations, then there 
might be a stage of development in which infants have not acquired this 
knowledge yet, and hence have free-floating sensations.102 We are thereby invited 
to consider the possibility of there being sensations that convey certain 
qualities to the subject, where these qualities are felt to be instantiated nowhere 
in particular. Regardless of whether there is indeed a stage of development in 
which human infants do have sensations of this sort, it is worth evaluating 
whether this very possibility would involve, on the face of it, a problem for 
Explicit Reflexivity. Put in terms of Explicit Reflexivity, for a subject to have a 
sensation as of a property instantiated nowhere in particular is for her to have a 
sensation (i) the content of which cannot possibly be specified relative to the 
content of other bodily experiences, and (ii) which does not represent any 
physical body or body part. As mentioned, the prediction of the view would be 
that, for all bodily sensations with these features that a subject might have, 
these sensations will not involve a SBO. 
Not only this is not problematic for Explicit Reflexivity, but rather the 
mentioned prediction just seems to follow from a proper understanding of 
what it would actually mean to have a non-localised sensation under this 
reading. An alternative way of expressing what one would be feeling in this 
case is by saying that there would be nothing the relevant property would be 
attributed to in the experience, and hence nothing the property would be 
represented as a property of. Correspondingly, in subsequent judgments aimed 
at reporting the experience, the felt property would not be localised in, or 
predicated from, anything in particular. In this context, it is a matter of 
                                                 
101 Namely the theory, defended by Wundt (1897) or James (1890), that there is no spatiality 
intrinsic to bodily sensations, but rather that we interpret some qualitative features of them, 
such as the texture of the body part involved, as signs of the localisation of the relevant stimuli. 
This sort of view has been extensively objected to (e.g. Vesey, 1961; Margolis, 1966; Holly, 
1986). Here I will not engage with the details of this theory – that is, I will not engage with the 
idea that we end up localising sensations in judgment by means of a signalling process. 
102  Although, as she acknowledges following Bremner (2017), infants can localise their 
sensations very early on, e.g. newborns have a capacity to automatically grasp unseen objects 
that touch their hands, and 6.5 months old infants orient their behaviour towards touched 
hands by looking at them. 
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definition that one would not be aware of the body felt in somatosensation as being 
one’s own: the experience we are talking about is simply not an experience as 
of a body instantiating certain properties, and hence it is not an experience as of 
one’s own body instantiating certain properties. Therefore, an accurate report of 
the experience is thus one in which no thing is self-attributed by the subject. 
Free-floating sensations would not involve a SBO because, strictly speaking, 
they do not convey neither a body nor a bodily field. In this sense, the 
prediction of Explicit Reflexivity fits squarely with the more general idea that 
perceiving a property as spatially localised is a condition for the perception of a 
determinate object as the bearer of the property. 
However, there are subtler, more plausible ways of understanding what is 
at stake in talk about non-localised bodily experiences. For a start, let us 
consider Armstrong’s (1962, 1968) famous distinction between bodily 
sensations and what he called bodily feelings. As he puts it, “bodily sensations are, 
but bodily feelings are not, located in particular parts of the body” (1968, 308). 
On his view, clear-cut cases of bodily feelings are the feeling of tiredness or 
sleepiness, the feeling of freshness, the feeling of faintness, and the feeling of 
sickness.103 Bodily feelings might pose a problem to Explicit Reflexivity in the 
following sense: although described as non-localised, these sort of experiences 
seem to “concern” the body in ways that might make one reluctant to claim 
that there is no SBO involved in undergoing them. 
A way to evaluate the threat that bodily feelings pose to Explicit 
Reflexivity is by inquiring into what is meant exactly with the claim that they are 
not localised. On the face of it, it is not completely obvious that feelings such 
as tiredness or sickness (i) cannot possibly be described in terms of their spatial 
relations to bodily experiences different from them, and (ii) do not convey any 
physical body or body part. To the extent that we can offer plausible 
alternatives to this literal reading of the thesis that bodily feelings are not felt as 
localised, the threat that the phenomenon poses to Explicit Reflexivity is 
minimised. 
                                                 
103 Somewhat ambiguously, Armstrong (1968) also mentions hunger as a bodily feeling (307), 
as well as thirst (320), to immediately say that “it may be best to exclude [them] from the class 
of what we have arbitrarily called ‘bodily feelings’” (ibid.). He then sketches an account of 
hunger and thirst as desires, to eat and to drink respectively. Besides, giddiness and dizziness are 
mentioned as “intermediate cases” between bodily sensations and bodily feelings, since on 
Armstrong’s view it is unclear whether they are felt as localised (1962, 43). In any case, the next 
paragraphs are aimed at discussing what it means for bodily feelings to not be localised. My 
points apply in principle to any bodily experience one might consider to be a bodily feeling, 
including hunger, thirst, giddiness, and dizziness. 
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Here is an alternative, more nuanced reading of this thesis: a bodily feeling 
B is a determinable each determinate of which is a cluster of experiences; and 
every determinate of B includes one or more bodily sensations. I use “cluster” 
instead of “set” to highlight the open-ended nature of each of the determinates 
of B, and thus the fact that we are typically unable to enumerate exhaustively 
the sensations in any of these clusters. 
Let me illustrate this with an example. Consider the feeling of tiredness – 
that is, the property of being Tired. On this view, being Tired is a determinable 
property, of which there exist various determinates. For instance, one might 
feel heaviness on one’s limbs, a mild pain in one’s feet, and a headache. Or, 
alternatively, one might feel pain in one’s limbs, stiffness in the joints, and a 
throbbing sensation in the temples. Or one might feel heaviness on one’s limbs 
and a headache, while being in a very bad mood. Each of the lists just 
mentioned plausibly describes a cluster of experiences that determines the 
determinable being Tired. It might not be possible to decide whether other 
experiences should be mentioned as members of these clusters – as it might 
also be impossible to enumerate all the clusters of experiences that determine 
being Tired. In any case, all these clusters include a sufficient set of localised 
bodily sensations. For instance, they include the sensation as of the limbs being 
heavy, the sensation as of the joints being stiff, the sensation as of the head being 
painful, the sensation as of a throbbing in the temples, or the sensation as of an 
ache in the head. The property of being Tired cannot be instantiated unless one 
of the relevant clusters of experiences is, namely unless one of its determinates 
occur. 
On this characterisation of bodily feelings, the uneasiness in ascribing 
them a location is explained: strictly speaking, it is not possible to zero in on a 
location for the bodily feeling itself. Indeed, each of the bodily sensations 
included in the determinates of the feeling will (i) allow for a description of the 
content of the sensation in terms of its relations to other bodily sensations, 
which might or might not belong to the determinate, and (ii) convey a physical 
body or body part. But precisely on these grounds we might be unable to 
decide on whether tiredness is localised simultaneously in the limbs, the feet, and 
the head; or rather it is neither in the limbs, the feet, nor the head; or some 
other combination along these lines. Crucially, also on these grounds it is 
possible to claim that, when having a bodily feeling, one is having a sufficient 
number of bodily sensations, each of which with the structure 
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ExperienceM (P is instantiated in L). 
 
It is therefore possible to claim that, when having a bodily feeling, one has a 
SBO for each of the parts of the body in which each of the sensations 
determining the feeling are localised. 
This way of cashing out bodily feelings seems independently plausible. It 
is worth adding, though, that it also doesn’t seem to depart much from what 
Armstrong himself had in mind when tracing the distinction between bodily 
feelings and bodily sensations. Right after presenting the distinction, 
Armstrong admits that “bodily feelings may involve having bodily sensations … 
which do have a bodily location” (1962, 43). Besides, in the context of 
characterising bodily feelings as perceptions of bodily states, he endorses the 
view according to which “these perceptions involve an inference from bodily 
sensations” (1968, 321)104 – a framework within which the non-localisation of 
bodily feelings “can be explained as the impossibility of giving a definite 
location to a whole pattern of sensations spread throughout the body” (ibid.). 
Armstrong also highlights the possibility of undergoing sensations one is only 
marginally aware of, which on his view explains the difficulty of giving a 
precise account of the bodily sensations allegedly involved in each bodily 
feeling. Rephrased in the terms I have used above, this possibility arguably 
explains that we are typically unable to exhaustively mention the properties in 
any of the “patterns” or clusters that determine our bodily feelings, and hence 
that, when talking about these feelings, we tend to use determinable concepts. 
Yet another way of understanding what might be at stake in discussions 
about non-localised bodily experiences is constituted by what de Vignemont 
(2018) calls spatially diffuse sensations. The example she uses to illustrate this 
type of sensation is retrieved from Head and Holmes (1911, 139), who 
mention the report of a patient who claims “I feel you touch me, but I can’t 
tell where it is”. The patient thereby verbally manifests an incapacity to pin 
down a sensation which would normally be easily localised, namely a tactile 
sensation. It is important to note, however, that the patient further qualifies his 
claim by saying that “[t]he touch oozes all through my hand”. Judging on the 
full report, it therefore seems prudent to read the patient’s statement that she 
                                                 
104 With this quote I want to stress Armstrong’s contention that bodily feelings involve bodily 
sensations. I want to remain neutral, however, on whether inferences are in any way involved 
in having a bodily feeling. 
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can’t tell where the sensation is metaphorically, as referring to the fact that the 
sensation diffuses into a large area of the body. 
Another case similar to Head and Holmes’ in the relevant respects is 
presented by Ploner, Freund, and Schnitzler (1999). The case is that of a 57-
year-old male who suffered a stroke that affected the hand region of his right 
S1 and S2 cortex. He was exposed to noxious cutaneous stimulation to his left 
hand, where he was in principle unable to feel pain. Yet he “spontaneously 
described a ‘clearly unpleasant’ intensity dependent feeling emerging from an 
ill-localised and extended area ‘somewhere between fingertips and shoulder’, that 
he wanted to avoid” (my emphasis). Ploner, Freund, and Schnitzler point out 
the patient’s complete inability “to further describe quality, location and 
intensity of the perceived stimulus” (213).105 This case differs from Head and 
Holmes’ as for the fineness of grain with which the patient reportedly 
experiences the quality of his sensation. Yet, it is similar – and relevantly so for 
our purposes – in the sense that the patient’s reported difficulty to localise his 
sensation comes with a reference to a relatively large area within which it is 
approximately felt to be. 
These patients’ uncertainty about the exact location of their sensation 
could maybe be read as indicating that no location is involved in their 
experience. However, to my mind this reading would involve a controversial 
leap: taking the sensation to be aspatial on the grounds of reports that reflect, at 
most, their roughly-grained localisation in large parts of the body (de Vignemont, 2018, 
70). As a matter of fact, both patients explicitly refer to specific body parts, 
such as their hand or their full arm, even if they do so by means of expressions 
that convey the encompassing character of their spatial experience: in one case, 
the sensation “oozes” all through the hand; in the other, the arm is indirectly 
referred to as “somewhere between fingertips and shoulder”. Experiences of 
this sort still fall under the schema 
 
ExperienceM (P is instantiated in L), 
 
                                                 
105 In the paper, entitled “Pain affect without pain sensation in a patient with a postcentral 
lesion”, the authors make the case for a dissociation between the sensory-discriminative and 
the motivational-affective components of pain. The patient, whose experience lacks the 
former, anyway reports to feel the latter, the approximate location of which is described in the 
terms quoted. The notion of sensation at stake in this dissertation picks out generally the 
phenomenal character associated to bodily experiences. It is thus encompassing enough to 
include both of the aspects mentioned. Therefore, the case is relevant for the considerations 
about the location of bodily sensations in this section. 
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with the only proviso that L does not stand for a punctual location within the 
bodily field and the body, but rather for an extended area thereof. 
Nothing in Explicit Reflexivity prevents an experience of this kind to be 
considered as properly involving a spatial component: as they are described, 
these experiences plausibly (i) have a content that can be specified relative to 
the content of other bodily sensations; and (ii) represent bodily parts. The 
patients’ straightforward report of the sensation as felt in specific body parts 
suggests that roughly localised sensations can make the boundaries of the 
region where they are localised sufficiently salient. Hence, the description of 
the experience is still compatible with the patients’ having a SBO for their felt 
limbs: as a matter of fact, Head and Holmes’ patient refers to the hand as “my 
hand”. 
Finally, the idea of manifesting an incapacity to pin down the location of a 
sensation brings in one last phenomenon worth mentioning, which I take to be 
relatively ordinary and familiar: the phenomenon by which one feels a punctual 
itch, sometimes even an acute one, but is unable to hit the target when trying 
to scratch it. On the grounds of this failure, one might be tempted to conclude 
that experiences of this sort convey a non-localised itch. 
On the face of it, however, there is at least one plausible way of cashing 
out this sort of case without compromising Explicit Reflexivity either – that is, 
there is one plausible way of cashing out the case which allows for a 
description of this itchiness in terms of the sensation as of an itch at a given 
location. The proposal takes into account the following: a given experience E 
might have the structure 
 
ExperienceM (there is an L such that P is instantiated in L), 
 
while it is not true that 
 
there is an L such that ExperienceM(P is instantiated in L).  
 
On this view, itches one can’t scratch do have a spatial content, which might 
be associated with general features of L such as its size or the region of the 
body where it occurs. Besides, we typically access this content, evidence of 
which is the fact that we act on the experience by attempting to get rid of it via 
a bodily directed action coherent with the relevant general features, namely 
scratching. For instance, attempts at scratching the itch might concentrate on a 
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relatively small area of the body. Yet, the proposal has it, the actual location of 
the itch is not (re)presented in the experience: we just feel that there is such a 
location. Hence our difficulties to actually hit the right spot when scratching, 
and our tendency to mislocate the sensation (de Vignemont, 2018, 70). 
What I am suggesting here is to think of this case along the lines of 
Cohen, Dennet, and Kanwisher’s (2016) approach to the problem of the 
richness of visual experience. Subjects generally naïvely believe that their 
perceptual experience is rich, and that this richness spans their entire field of 
vision. Yet, objective measurements on change blindness and inattentional 
blindness show otherwise. As the authors put it, subjects typically overestimate 
the level of detail at which they actually perceive the environment. 
Cohen, Dennet, and Kanwisher’s proposed explanation of this naïve 
impression is that the content of visual perception be cashed out as including, 
not the details of multiple unattended items, but an ensemble: that is, a summary 
statistics of different types of information about the environment. Leaving 
aside their specific explanatory proposal, the gist of it is that perceptual 
experiences can convey certain information about objects in ways that allow 
for their exploitation in action, despite the fact that the details that would 
typically accompany this information simply do not figure in their content. For 
instance, one can tell whether the members of an approaching crowd walk in a 
threatening manner, on the grounds of visual experiences as of the crowd that do 
not represent the precise facial expressions of the members of the crowd 
(Cohen et al., 2016, 327). In the same spirit, one might be able to tell whether 
the itch is localised in one’s upper left limb – instead of, say, in one’s upper right 
limb –, but yet fail at finding its precise location because the experience does not 
convey it. Importantly, the latter does not imply that the itch is not represented 
as localised in an area with certain general features. Nothing in Explicit 
Reflexivity dictates a level of detail at which one must represent space as a 
yardstick to measure whether experiences themselves involve spatiality. Hence, 
itches one can’t scratch can well involve a SBO for the bodily region actually 
represented as bearing them. 
 In short, in this section I have discussed several specifications of the 
general notion of non-localised sensations. For each of them, I have proposed 
a way for Explicit Reflexivity to plausibly make room for it. Hence, none of 
them constitutes an insurmountable threat to the view. 
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4.1.3. On (Non) Factivity106 
 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I defined the SBO thus: 
 
[SBO]: For one to have a sense of bodily ownership is for one to be aware 
of the body one feels in bodily experience as being one’s own. 
 
I insisted that the awareness involved in this definition is non-factive. With this 
proviso, [SBO] was inclusive enough so as to cover cases in which a subject S 
judges a body B, which she feels somatosensorily, to be her own when it is not, 
as well as phantom limb cases in which the relevant part of B does not exist. 
This notion of awareness is thus non-factive in the sense that it need not track 
facts about the actual existence or condition of the relevant body (part), nor 
about actual ownership thereof. 
Besides, the specification of [SBO] that I defended in Chapter 3 has it that 
for a subject to have a SBO is for her to be aware of: 
 
A. the experience-dependency of the properties involved in the content 
of somatosensory experiences; 
B. the relevant experiences (namely somatosensory experiences) as 
being her own. 
 
A worry might arise at this point concerning the consistency of Explicit 
Reflexivity qua specification of [SBO], in the following sense: as part of the 
specification of a sort of awareness which is non-factive by stipulation, I am 
actually appealing to the capacity of subjects to track actual facts about their 
experiences. 
Preliminarily, note that an appeal to a capacity to track actual facts is 
indeed involved in the two clauses of Explicit Reflexivity. Take clause A first. 
Clause A concerns the subject’s awareness of the experience-dependency of 
the properties involved in the content of somatosensory experiences. I have 
proposed that the properties involved in the content of somatosensation are 
PropertiesS. Hence, according to Explicit Reflexivity, these properties are in 
fact experience-dependent. Thus, the subject’s awareness of them tracks the 
actual nature of the properties. When it comes to clause B, it concerns 
                                                 
106 This worry was pointed out to me by Sven Rosenkranz when I presented part of this 
material at the Logos Seminar in November 2017. 
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awareness of a given experience as being one’s own. Consider a phenomenally 
conscious experience E and a subject S, and suppose that S undergoes E: it is 
plausible to think that, independently of whether S judges E to be her own, E 
is S’s experience by definition, just because it is phenomenally conscious for S. 
Otherwise put, it is plausible that what makes a given experience the 
experience of a given subject is the fact that she undergoes it. If this is the case, 
then S’s awareness that E is her own will necessarily track facts about 
ownership of experiences.107 
Even if both A and B involve actual facts one is aware of, the worry that I 
am now considering emerges specifically with respect to clause A. The inquiry 
into the SBO has to do with how to characterise bodily experiences so as to 
explain that the first-person typically figures in the content position in judgments 
of somatosensation. The awareness involved in B concerns facts about the 
mental states generally, and not specifically about their contents. This is of 
course not completely unproblematic per se: for instance, one might worry 
about how properties of attitudes ultimately can explain aspects of their 
contents. 108  Yet, the challenge now emerges specifically with respect to A, 
because the awareness we are talking about in A concerns facts about the 
contents of the relevant experiences: given A, Explicit Reflexivity says that the 
typically non-factive content of judgments of somatosensation is based on 
experiences which track facts, since they convey their own properties as they 
actually are. My objector spots a tension here. How can this exactly happen, 
according to Explicit Reflexivity? 
I have offered in the previous chapter all the tools needed for an answer 
to this question that involves no tension between [SBO] and my own 
specification thereof. The difference spotted by my objector between the 
general, non-factive definition and my particular, factive specification thereof 
actually corresponds to the distinction between PropertiesRB and PropertiesS. 
The worry can be dispelled by pointing to this distinction. 
As mentioned, that the awareness of the felt body as one’s own is non-
factive means that it need not track the facts about existence and ownership of 
body parts. In other words, it means that it is fallible. This includes the 
possibility that the body parts one has sensations as of exist, and that they are 
                                                 
107 This was already pointed out in section 1.4.2 of Chapter 1, in the context of discussing the 
differences between [SBO] and [SEO]. It only becomes potentially problematic now, since I 
have included the SEO in a definition of the SBO. 
108 I will come back to this point below, when discussing the Judgment Formation Goal 
(section 4.2.1). 
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one’s own: [SBO] is formulated so that it applies, for instance, to phantom limb 
experiences, but it is of course supposed to apply as well to cases in which one 
veridically feels a body (part) of one’s own. Hence, when postulating non-
factivity in [SBO], a representational reading of “awareness of the felt body as 
one’s own” is at stake, both in the sense of an existent body (part) actually 
being in a certain condition, and in the sense of it being one’s own. Otherwise 
stated, when formulating [SBO] I am offering a definition that comprises the 
representational form that the SBO takes, at least, when one judges. This 
means that the definition takes PropertiesRB into account, namely the sort of 
properties in virtue of which the content of bodily experiences stands for 
bodily properties. 
Now, clause A of Explicit Reflexivity belongs to an explanation of how it 
comes about that PropertiesRB are taken to stand for properties of one’s own 
body, and not just for properties of any body whatsoever. According to Explicit 
Reflexivity, this occurs in virtue of the fact that PropertiesRB are grounded on 
PropertiesS experienced as experience-dependent. But PropertiesS are experience-
dependent. Hence, insofar as one is aware of them as such,109 they will enter 
into the content of somatosensory experiences as they in fact are. Only if this 
is the case, the view has it, will one have a SBO. Put otherwise, only if this is 
the case will somatosensation convey a body as one’s own, in a way fallible 
with respect to the existence and condition of the body, as well as with respect 
to ownership. This is how the awareness of certain facts exactly explains the 
non-factive awareness involved in the SBO according to Explicit Reflexivity. 
 
4.2. Meeting the Goals 
 
4.2.1. The Judgment Formation Goal 
 
The first goal for theories on the SBO was the following: 
 
[Judgment Formation Goal]: any account of the SBO must explain the fact 
that we self-attribute the felt body for all judgments of somatosensation in 
which we do so. 
 
                                                 
109 Explicit Reflexivity does not preclude the possibility that this is not the case, namely that 
one does not experience PropertiesS as such. As I will argue in section 4.2.3.2 below, this is 
plausibly the case in somatoparaphrenia. 
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[Judgment Formation Goal] succinctly expresses that, when proposing accounts on 
the SBO, we are after an explanation of the first-personal character of 
judgments aimed at reporting bodily sensations, namely of the fact that they 
involve a first-person pronoun qualifying the felt body. I argued that the 
several views assessed in Chapter 2 had flaws that were variants of a general 
problem: how to make it the case that a given object, conveyed to a subject by 
a conscious mental state of hers, is actually conveyed to her in the experience as a 
designated object – where “designated” has a peculiarly strong sense. The body 
is not a designated object whatsoever: it is not enough that the parameters by 
which it is represented are distinctive of it. The putative first-person 
phenomenology of bodily experiences should be one capturing a specific 
reflexive pattern, I advanced: the content of token somatosensory experiences 
should contain a reference to the subject of the experience qua subject of the experience. The 
body is designated in somatosensation in the sense that it concerns the subject 
herself.110 
I have indicated that, in this context, Deflationist Accounts can at most 
posit a posteriori identities between the SBO and the feature selected to specify 
it. These identities are unsatisfactory, because they leave an explanatory gap 
between the contents of bodily experiences, and the putatively first-personal 
phenomenology of these experiences. It is now time to see how Explicit 
Reflexivity bridges the gap. The last formulation of the view’s characterisation 
of the typical contents of somatosensation proposed in Chapter 3 will be 
useful for these purposes: 
 
[TV3]. ExperienceM (P is instantiated in L, and P is constitutively 
dependent of this particular experience) 
 
On this formulation it is clear that, on Explicit Reflexivity, somatosensory 
experiences are typically token-reflexive. Their content ultimately involves an 
object: a relatively well delimited body, distinguishable from other objects, 
picked out via the perception of its properties. Yet, they convey these 
properties by means of properties suitably described as “constitutively 
dependent of this particular experience”. This description, which specifies the 
                                                 
110  Going a bit further: the body might actually be (part of) the subject herself, so that the 
“ownership” claimed over it is not like the ownership claimed over any other physical object. 
The Intuitive Goal, approached in the immediately following section, intends to capture this 
peculiarity, as much as it is possible to do so without getting into metaphysical considerations. 
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content of the sensation, includes the indexical expression “this particular 
experience”. Admittedly, there is nothing first-personal in this expression. By 
stipulation, though, the indexical picks out the very experience the content of 
which it specifies. This experience, in turn, is marked as mine, in the sense that 
its subject typically is aware of it as her own. The indexical picks out the 
subject via picking out her own experiences. 
Therefore, one way of formulating the reflexivity resulting from this view 
is this: for each normal somatosensory experience of a subject, it conveys to 
the subject a property localised in L, dependent on my own experience – where “L” is to 
be understood non-literally in the first place, as a point in the bodily field. The 
experience of ownership for the bodily field latches onto the relevant body via 
the PropertiesRB grounded on the former. 
One needs to be careful when interpreting the formulation just 
mentioned, though. This formulation might suggest that a primitive mineness 
component belongs to the content of the sensation, inflating it so that it yields 
first-personal judgments as a mere correspondence thereof. The proposal of 
Explicit Reflexivity is subtler. The spatial and qualitative structure of the 
content of sensations is such that it brings in a reference to the subject of the 
experience qua subject of the experience: for a given body to be mine just 
means for it to belong to the one and only conscious subject to which I would 
refer by means of the first-person pronoun “I”. A property of the attitudes 
thereby brings to bear on their contents. In sum, bodily properties are typically 
experienced in bodily sensations as constitutively dependent of experiences I 
would report by using a first-person indexical in the subject position. When 
this is the case, I use the first-person pronoun to qualify the felt body in 
judgments of somatosensation. This is how Explicit Reflexivity meets the 
Judgment Formation Goal. 
To conclude this section, let me emphasise a central part of the proposal 
and a consequence thereof. Consider a somatosensory experience E, and a 
subject S for whom E is phenomenally conscious. For the Judgment 
Formation Goal to be met, it is essential that the indexical included in the 
specification of the content of E picks out an experience that S takes to be her 
own. Otherwise put, it is essential that the indexical picks out an experience S has 
a SEO for. For the sake of accounting for the SBO, I have stipulated that this is 
so: the indexical included in the specification of the content of E will typically 
pick out E itself, and S will typically have a SEO for E. 
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Relevantly, if the indexical picked out an experience that S did not take to 
be her own, then the use of a first-person pronoun in the content position in 
reports of E would be unmotivated. This might raise a worry: how is it the case 
that the indexical involved in the content of somatosensory experiences picks 
out the right experience, namely an experience one has a SEO for? Otherwise 
put, one might worry about the possibility that scenarios like the following 
obtain. Firstly, consider another subject, R, and a somatosensory experience F 
phenomenally conscious for R. Suppose also that there are ways for S to get to 
know that R is undergoing F, although F is not phenomenally conscious for S. 
Finally, suppose that S’s experience E has the following structure: 
 
EM (P is instantiated in L, and P is constitutively dependent of that 
particular experience), 
 
where “that particular experience” refers to F. In other words, suppose that S’s 
experience conveys a property as dependent on the experience of someone 
else, in particular R’s. In this scenario, since S does not have a SEO for F, she 
will not report E by tokening the first person pronoun in the content position. 
Secondly, consider yet another somatosensory experience G of subject S. 
Suppose now that G has the following structure: 
 
G (P is instantiated in L, and P is constitutively dependent of this 
particular experience), 
 
where “this particular experience” refers to G.111 The indexical in the content 
of G picks out G itself, but yet S does not have a SEO for G, as the lack of the 
subscript “M” conveys.  
In none of these scenarios would S have a SBO. The first scenario 
illustrates that, if the properties of the body we perceive somatosensorily were 
presented to us as dependent on someone else’s experience, we would not 
experience the body as our own. In the second scenario, S’s report of G would 
not involve a first-person pronoun qualifying the perceived body because of 
the lack of a SEO for G – although G might otherwise count as S’s experience. 
                                                 
111 This example assumes that we can take experiences to be somatosensory in kind for reasons 
independent of the structure of their content. I will elaborate on this point below, when 
discussing the case of somatoparaphrenia (section 4.2.3.2). 
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It is important to note for one thing that it is not required from Explicit 
Reflexivity to give a full answer to this worry. Explicit Reflexivity aims at 
bridging the mentioned explanatory gap, and stipulating how somatosensory 
experiences are in normal conditions is enough to this effect. The view thereby 
excludes these alternative scenarios from the set of normal conditions, just as 
somatosensory experiences that do not involve a SBO are unusual. Still, a 
preliminary answer to the worry is this: the content of somatosensory 
experiences typically refers to our own experiences, rather than to those of 
other subjects, because the former, but not the latter, are phenomenally conscious 
for us. It picks out experiences that are “present” to us in the sense of there 
being something it is like for us to be in them.112 Of course, this still leaves 
room for the second scenario described, if it is possible at all to not have a SEO 
for the experiences one is phenomenally conscious of. Nothing in Explicit 
Reflexivity precludes this possibility: as will be discussed immediately (section 
4.2.3.1), reports of somatosensation from depersonalised patients might well 
reveal experiences with this structure. 
 
4.2.2. The Intuitive Goal 
 
The second goal set for theories on the SBO said the following: 
 
[Intuitive Goal]: any account of the SBO must specify the SBO in terms that 
explain the seemingly necessary link that bodily experiences, but not 
exteroceptive experiences, have with the awareness of the experienced 
body as one’s own. 
 
[Intuitive Goal] expresses a central feature of the relation between bodily 
sensations and judgments of somatosensation, namely the fact that there seems 
to be a necessary link between the occurrence of the former and the 
involvement of the first-person in the content position in the latter. The basic 
dictate for theories on the SBO contained in [Intuitive Goal] is that, whatever it 
is about bodily experiences that, according to the relevant theory, spells out the 
awareness that they are about me, it needs to be sufficiently distinctive of bodily 
experiences vis à vis external perception. The selected feature, specific of 
                                                 
112 Mutatis mutandis, a similar problem and a similar reply are mentioned in Guillot (2016, 
141). Her discussion concerns how the token-reflexive rule that fixes the reference of “I” – 
namely “the thinker of this very thought” – latches onto the correct thought – that is, the 
present thought. 
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bodily sensations, will then help make sense of the fact that the mentioned link 
seems necessary. 
Let me briefly recall the motivation for this goal before clarifying how 
Explicit Reflexivity deals with it. The relevance of an appeal to external 
perception here came from reflection on the fact that bodily sensations are not 
the only type of sensory state by means of which we ordinarily perceive bodies 
– in particular our own bodies. They are also not the only type of sensory state 
that we might report by self-attributing the body perceived. In particular, we 
also perceive bodies by means of external perception: we see them, for 
instance; and often judge them to be our own on these grounds. This is what 
happens when we see ourselves in a mirror and recognise ourselves as such. 
This being so, there is anyway a contrast between external perception and 
somatosensation as for the type of judgment we ordinarily conceive of them as 
possibly yielding. It does not seem specially problematic to think of the 
occurrence of an exteroceptive experience in which a body is represented and 
yet not taken by the perceiver to be her own: this is the case, for example, 
when we perceive the bodies of other people. In contrast, the situation is 
notably different for bodily sensations. In general, our intuitions point in the 
direction of taking the occurrence of bodily sensations to necessarily come 
with the experiencing subject’s awareness that the body she feels is her own. 
The existence of cases such as somatoparaphrenia forces a limited formulation 
of this intuition – that is, it forces a formulation thereof only as an intuition: the 
link between the occurrence of bodily experiences and the involvement of the 
first-person in their content just seems necessary. This is the formulation 
captured in [Intuitive Goal]. 
Yet, despite the narrow scope of this formulation, I have argued that the 
intuition is by itself significant. The existence of these pathological cases does 
not overrule the fact that philosophical discussions on self-consciousness are 
specifically concerned with bodily sensations in a substantive way, which goes 
beyond the concern about the self-attribution of phenomenally conscious 
mental states in general. This arguably mirrors an ordinary assumption that 
bodily experiences are about ourselves in a specially compelling way. I have also 
speculatively suggested that it might be part of our folk concept of a bodily 
sensation, both that it concerns our own body, and that it involves a SBO, thus 
being difficult to conceive that these two features come apart. In turn, this folk 
concept might be based on how things are in fact: in normal conditions, it is 
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both the case that bodily experiences are indeed about our own bodies, and 
that we take their contents to be our own bodies. 
According to Explicit Reflexivity, the trait of bodily experiences that 
explains that we compellingly form first-personal judgments of 
somatosensation is the structure of their content, which involves a bodily field, 
and in particular the phenomenology associated to experiencing it as such. 
Following the speculative suggestion, then, we form our folk concept of bodily 
sensation as the sort of state that involves a SBO because, in normal 
conditions, bodily sensations have the relevant content and phenomenology. 
Crucially, the Intuitive Goal states the need for the explanatory feature of 
bodily sensations to be distinctive of them. In particular, the relevant feature 
should not figure in exteroceptive experiences. The reasoning that backs up 
this claim is this: if the relevant feature figured in exteroceptive experiences, 
then they would ordinarily involve a sense of ownership for the objects 
perceived113 – and, plausibly, our folk concept of an external perception would 
be such that it would be difficult for us to conceive of an exteroceptive state 
that were not about what we take to be our own bodies. 
Hence, here is a way in which Explicit Reflexivity must be accurate, 
expressed in [Intuitive Goal]: it must be plausible to say that exteroceptive 
experiences do not have, ordinarily, the phenomenology that the view posits 
for bodily experiences as an explanation for the SBO. 
In particular, visual experiences must be a case in point: it must be plausible 
to say that they do not ordinarily have the relevant sort of phenomenology. 
The naïve realism typically attributed to vision, extensively discussed in the 
philosophical literature on perception, is the key piece to an illustration of this 
contrast with somatosensation. The following passage by Boghossian and 
Velleman (1989) is specially suitable for these illustrative purposes, since they 
bring forth the naïve realism of visual experience by contrasting it with a 
putative sensory field involved in bodily sensation: 
 
When one pricks one's finger on a pin, pain appears in one's tactual 'field', but it 
is not perceived as a quality of the pin. ... [T]he difference between pain 
experience and colour experience ... is precisely that pain is never felt as a quality 
of its apparent cause, whereas colour usually is: the pain caused by the pin is felt 
                                                 
113  Note that, on the sensationalist view, afterimages would precisely be exteroceptive 
experiences with the relevant feature. 
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as being in the finger, whereas the pin's silvery colour is seen as being in the pin. 
(95) 
 
In this passage, Boghossian and Velleman discuss the contrast between a visual 
experience of a coloured object and a particular type of pain experience, 
specifically one in which touch is involved: the experience of feeling the 
pressure of a sharp object against one’s skin.114 Their example is analysable as 
involving, at least, the following properties: on the one hand, as for the visual 
perception of a silvery pin, there is the qualitative property associated to the 
visual perception of the colour property, which we can call SilverV.115  This 
property is different from the objective Silver-colour property of the pin itself, 
however the latter needs to be cashed out. On the other hand, as for the 
somatosensory experience in the example, there is a quality associated to it, 
DamageS , to be distinguished from the correlated objective property that the 
finger itself might have, namely Damage. Both the cause of the experience of 
colour and the cause of the experience of pain – as a matter of fact, the same, 
namely the pin – appear to the subject, either visually or tactually, in the 
relevant experiences. 
The quoted passage stresses that, even if one cashes out visual experiences 
and somatosensory experiences as equally involving experience-dependent 
properties as part of their content,116 a difference persists between the two. In 
ordinary language, when we report visual experiences of silver colour, we mean 
of objects that they are silver. Arguably, strictly speaking, when we see something 
silver and we report our experience accordingly, we do not intend to refer to 
SilverV qua experience-dependent property, but to some property that allegedly 
objects themselves are seen as having. Maybe independently, we know that in 
general the object in the world that is seen as silver is partly causally 
responsible for the instantiation of SilverV. It is in this sense that Boghossian 
and Velleman’s full point applies: if we take colour reports at face value, we are 
compelled to say that colour is generally perceived as a property of its cause. 
                                                 
114 Touch is involved in this experience of pain in the sense that it involves an object in contact 
with and pressing against one’s skin. 
115 Just to recall, the experience-dependent nature of the qualitative aspect of colour properties 
was addressed in Chapter 2 as part of an argument to the effect that the very same feature, 
which properties involved in somatosensation have, is not sufficient to account for the SBO 
(section 2.3.2). 
116 As a matter of fact, this is how Boghossian and Velleman characterise visual experiences: as 
involving properties of this sort that are then projected onto perceived objects. 
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In contrast, in the specific somatosensory experience under discussion 
there is a felt object that is arguably causally involved in the occurrence of 
DamageS, namely the pin that presses against the finger’s skin. However, 
DamageS is not attributed to it. In ordinary language, we do not seem to aim at 
referring to objective Damage when reporting bodily experiences of pain. As I 
have discussed in the previous chapter (section 3.3.2), when we say “I feel 
pain” we seem to be talking about the very sensation we are undergoing. One 
of my central statements has been that the claim that PropertiesS are felt as 
being in the body and the claim that they are experienced as experience-dependent go 
hand in hand in normal somatosensory experiences. In the quoted passage, 
Boghossian and Velleman seem to hint in this direction when they say that 
pain is felt “as being in the finger”, but also that it “appears in one's tactual 
'field'” (my emphasis). 
In short, the comparison is useful to highlight that, by taking the silver 
colour to be a property of the pin, we treat it as a property the pin has by itself, 
leaning toward the denial of its experience-dependency.117 In contrast, in cases 
of bodily sensation in which the relevant elements are equal – DamageS, as 
SilverV, is experience-dependent, and there is in this situation an apparent 
object that causes it, namely the pin – the phenomenology is remarkably other. 
The finger enters into the picture as that of which the property is predicated, 
thus evincing the presence of a further dimension in the case of bodily 
sensations vis à vis colour perception. In particular, a further dimension for 
which the notion of a sensory field seems adequate. 
This naively realistic character of visual perception is the straightforward 
negation of the perception of a bodily field as such that, I have argued, 
grounds the SBO: if there is something like a visual field involved in visual 
perception, we ordinarily “look through it”, our visual experiences thereby 
being transparent with respect to their represented objects. On these grounds, 
it makes sense that our folk concept of a visual perception does not involve a 
sense of ownership for visually perceived objects, and therefore that we do not 
                                                 
117 This is part of the criticism that Boghossian and Velleman put forward against Christopher 
Peacocke (1984)’s dispositionalism about colours: by treating the colours that visual experience 
attributes to external objects as dispositions, Peacocke gets the phenomenology of colour 
experience wrong (95). As Boghossian and Velleman indicate in their footnote 16, soundly to 
my mind, it is one thing to be a dispositionalist about the properties of objects that cause colour 
experience, and another to be a dispositionalist about the properties that such experience 
represents objects as having. The latter involves the mentioned phenomenological problem, but its 
denial is compatible with the former. 
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have the intuition that the link between the occurrence of visual experiences 
and the self-attribution of their objects is necessary. 
Before concluding this section, it is in order to acknowledge the following: 
admittedly, the contrast with somatosensation should hold for the other 
exteroceptive modalities as well, namely olfaction, audition, taste, and (the 
exteroceptive dimension of) touch. In all these modalities, the perceived object 
can conceivably be different from our own body, as well as not taken to be our 
own body. 
Getting into the peculiarities of the phenomenology of every sensory 
modality is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, there are 
reasons to take the foregoing considerations about the naïve realism of visual 
perception to be enough for my purposes in relation to the Intuitive Goal. On 
the one hand, it has been argued that olfactory experiences are mere sensations 
or raw feels without representational content – thereby cashing them out in a 
way similar to how sensationalism approaches visual experiences (Peacocke, 
1983; Lycan, 1996, 2000). Yet, as it has also been pointed out, olfaction doesn’t 
seem to reveal particular objects as bearers of olfactory properties, since it does 
not achieve figure-ground segregation (Batty, 2014). Hence, even if there are 
reasons to describe olfactory experiences as involving a sensory field we are 
aware of as such, there are other major phenomenological differences between 
them and somatosensation, namely their lack of object identification. 
Therefore, the lack of involvement of a SBO in olfaction is not an urgent 
problem for Explicit Reflexivity. An analogous argument can be put forward 
to minimise a putative challenge from sensationalism about auditory 
experiences.118 
In contrast, touch and vision do represent particular objects. Therefore, it 
makes sense that the case were made for a different phenomenology thereof 
that did not rely on (the lack of) object identification. The forthcoming 
discussion on the naïve realism of visual perception constitutes this piece of 
argumentation. The phenomenology of touch has been discussed previously in 
this work (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.1; and Chapter 3, section 3.2.2), and the 
relevant points about the naïve realism of visual perception were tacitly 
involved, mutatis mutandis, in that discussion: ordinary haptic experiences are 
primarily object directed, even if mediated by the bodily field. Explicit 
Reflexivity has a resource ready to explain this: a putative grounding relation 
between PropertiesS and PropertiesRW. 
                                                 
118 For instance, by exploiting Strawson (1959)’s take on sound perception. 
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4.2.3. The Empirical Goal 
 
The third and last goal set for theories on the SBO read as follows: 
 
[Empirical Goal]: any account of the SBO must leave room for the specific, 
sometimes abnormal relations between bodily sensations and the 
awareness of the felt body as one’s own we seem to have evidence for in 
some pathological and experimental cases. 
 
Literature on neuropathology, as well as findings in experimental psychology, 
offer a substantive body of empirical cases in which the relations between 
somatosensory experiences and judgments of somatosensation are not 
standard. [Empirical Goal] affirms that any theory on the SBO, including of 
course Explicit Reflexivity, must make justice to the actual facts: that is, to all 
the relevant facts. Although our theories are built around ordinary cases, they 
must not preclude the existence of cases in which the SBO is expressed 
differently from how it normally is. One way for theories on the SBO to 
accommodate these cases is to leave room for the content and phenomenology 
of bodily experiences to be, in the relevant abnormal circumstances, just as 
reports reveal them to be. Otherwise, if our theory on the SBO does preclude 
this possibility, then it must offer an independent explanation of why the 
experiences are reported as they are. 
My aim in this section is to show that for a significant subset of the 
relevant cases there are ways of cashing out bodily experiences that, on the one 
hand, accord with the reports taken at face value, and on the other hand, are 
compatible with Explicit Reflexivity. Explicit Reflexivity has it that the SBO 
depends on the SEO: in order for a subject to have a SBO for the body she 
feels in somatosensation, she needs to have a SEO for the very somatosensory 
experiences that (re)present this body. Subjects cannot have a SBO without 
having a SEO for their bodily sensations. Hence, for Explicit Reflexivity to 
meet the Empirical Goal, it must be the case that the relevant empirical cases 
are compatible with this relation of dependence. 
Given this relation of dependence, a case that would directly challenge the 
proposal would be the following: a subject has a phenomenally conscious 
bodily experience – say, for instance, an experience as of pain in an ankle; she 
does not take this experience of pain to be her own – namely she does not 
have a SEO for the pain; yet, she takes the body belonging to the content of 
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this experience to be her own – that is, she has a SBO for the painful ankle. 
The following judgment, asserted by a subject as an accurate description of a 
sensation she is phenomenally conscious of, would (roughly) express this structure: 
“There is an acute pain in my ankle, which is my neighbour’s pain”. This kind 
of case is difficult to even articulate, but admittedly this is not a reason to 
disregard it as a possible counterexample to Explicit Reflexivity. To my 
knowledge, no empirical cases reported in the literature have this structure.119 
This fact, even if inevitably provisional, partly underpins the proposal on the 
empirical front. 
The cases to follow further contribute to this underpinning. I will address 
them under the following headings, which describe their general structure: to 
start with, “Neither SBO nor SEO”, in which I will address depersonalisation 
(section 4.2.3.1). Secondly, “SEO without SBO”, in which I will mainly discuss 
the case of somatoparaphrenia, as well as add a comment on xenomelia and 
congenital insensitivity to pain (section 4.2.3.2). Finally, “SEO and SBO”, in 
which I will comment on the Rubber Hand Illusion (section 4.2.3.3). The 
qualifications to Explicit Reflexivity needed to not just accommodate the cases, 
but also make full sense of them in the context of the view, will be discussed in 
each dedicated section. 
 
4.2.3.1. Neither SBO nor SEO: Depersonalisation 
 
Depersonalisation is a pathological condition in which patients report to feel 
an all-encompassing alteration of the way in which things appear to them, 
including an alteration of the way in which they appear to themselves. 120 
                                                 
119 It might be said that deafferentation (Cole, 1995) fits this description. Deafferented patients 
have no proprioceptive nor tactile feedback from their bodies beyond their neck, but they can 
regain control over their limbs by visually monitoring them. While they feel alienated from 
their body before acquiring this capacity, afterwards they report to have partly recovered the 
feeling of owning their body. The case is however not a counterexample to Explicit Reflexivity 
because the allegedly problematic notion of a sense of bodily ownership involved in it is not that of 
an awareness the body one feels in somatosensation as being one’s own. Deafferented patients do not self-
attribute their bodies in reports of proprioception or of touch, simply because they do not have these 
experiences – and therefore they do not have a SEO for them. They indeed self-attribute their 
bodies with more conviction after learning how to control them, thereby expressing what we 
could call “SBO*”: the awareness of the body one visually controls as one’s own. Nothing in 
Explicit Reflexivity precludes the possibility that judgments of bodily self-attribution be yielded 
– or even are ordinarily yielded – by experiences different from somatosensation. This route to 
bodily self-attribution is, however, not the route we are concerned with. 
120  The depersonalisation syndrome often includes experiences of derealisation, namely 
“experiences of unreality or detachment with respect to surroundings (e.g. individuals or 
objects are experienced as unreal, dreamlike, foggy, lifeless, or visually distorted)” (American 
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Patients who suffer from depersonalisation report to have experiences of 
detachment, or of being an outside observer, with respect to their thoughts, 
feelings, sensations, body, or actions (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Although momentary episodes of depersonalisation can appear in depression 
or anxiety processes, there are also cases of long-term, persistent 
depersonalisation. One of the defining features of the syndrome is the report 
of anomalous bodily experiences, or desomatisation (Sierra, 2009; Billon, 
forthcoming). In particular, patients consistently express to feel alienated from 
their bodies, or to lack an experience of body ownership. In fact, one of the 
items of the Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale, the current standard scale for 
diagnosing depersonalisation, reads thus: “parts of my body feel as if they 
didn’t belong to me” (Sierra and Berrios, 2000). The following reports of 
patients illustrate this symptom: 
 
“I do not feel I have a body. When I look down I see my legs and body but it 
feels as if it was not there … I am walking up the stairs, I see my legs and hear 
footsteps and feel the muscles but it feels as if I have no body; I am not there … 
I see my hands and my body doing things but it does not feel like me and I am 
not connected to it at all. I don’t feel alive in any way whatsoever … Even if I 
touch my face I feel or sense something but my face is not there. As I sense it I 
have the need to make sure and I rub, touch, and hurt myself to feel something. I 
touch my neck for instance with my hand but it doesn’t feel like my hand 
touching my neck. I can’t feel me touching my own body.” (Sierra, 2009, 29) 
 
“I can sit looking at my foot or my hand and not feel like they are mine. This can 
happen when I am writing, my hand is just writing, but I’m not telling it to. It 
almost feels like I have died, but no one has thought to tell me. So, I’m left living 
in a shell that I don’t recognize any more.” (Sierra, 2009, 27) 
 
Subjects suffering from depersonalisation typically have an intact capacity to 
receive proprioceptive feedback from their bodies. Besides, they are typically 
not delusional, and they take good care of reporting their feelings exactly as 
such: for instance, as seen in the first of the reports just quoted, they often 
express to feel as if things were thus and so. Yet, despite their believe that the 
                                                                                                                            
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Yet, depersonalisation and derealisation do not always appear 
together, and they can be conceptually distinguished: the former refers to altered self-
experience, while the latter concerns the perception of one’s surroundings. For a study of the 
relations between depersonalisation and derealisation, and of their underlying neurobiological 
mechanisms, see Sierra, Lopera et al. (2002). 
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body they receive proprioceptive feedback from is in fact their own, they are 
reluctant to straightforwardly claiming that they properly feel it to be, 
expressing a vivid experience of estrangement with respect to it. 
In the context of Explicit Reflexivity, this distortion of the SBO in 
depersonalisation comes out as a natural consequence of an alteration of self-
consciousness that is much more general. In fact, Explicit Reflexivity offers us 
the tools to carefully dekernel this idea: the explanation of the fact that the SBO 
is somewhat diminished for these patients is that it is a function of their SEO, 
and that the latter appears diminished as well. 
Indeed, subjects who suffer from depersonalisation typically report to feel 
detached from their psychological lives altogether. They are somehow 
“dementalised” (Billon, forthcoming), consistently expressing a feeling of 
alienation from their own experiences. In the most extreme cases, this 
impression is so recalcitrant that it leads patients to claim that they feel as if 
they do not exist, or as if they are dead, as reflected in the reports quoted 
above. It is very illustrative for our purposes to mention that patients are often 
reluctant to referring to themselves by using first person pronouns bluntly 
(Billon, 2016b). Rather, they pick themselves out in discourse by means of 
roundabout constructions that reveal the tension between their description of 
conscious experiences they undergo – they adequately talk about occurrent 
experiences and their types, such as recollections, perceptions of their 
surroundings, or performance of actions –; their uneasy relation with these 
experiences; and their knowledge that they themselves are the subjects who are 
(not) having the experiences.121 
As mentioned, this feeling of detachment, often reported and studied with 
respect to emotions, 122  is all-encompassing. In particular, it affects bodily 
sensations as well. In their seminal study on depersonalisation, Dugas and 
Moutier (1911, 24-25) say that “patients still undergo sensations, but the 
sensations do not move them anymore, they do not touch them anymore; they 
are completely indifferent, ‘neither dead nor alive’” (my translation). In fact, 
item number 22 of the Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale reads as follows: 
                                                 
121 The following reports would be examples of this: “I don’t know who I am – of course I am 
**** but I feel like a robot, like I am listening to someone else talking, like I am looking at 
myself from the outside, but it is not another voice or body –  it is mine, it is me, it just doesn’t 
feel like it” (Baker et al., 2003, 432); “It’s as if a machine was talking to you. Not a person at all, 
just a mechanical thing or object. I would notice my hands and feet moving, but as if they did 
not belong to me and were moving automatically” (Sierra, 2009, 29); “I can remember things, 
but it seems as if what I remember did not really happen to me” (Sierra, 2009, 33). 
122 See e.g. Phillips et al. (2001), Sierra, Senior et al. (2002), and Dewe et al. (2016). 
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“when a part of my body hurts, I feel so detached from the pain that it feels as 
if it were ‘somebody else’s pain’”. Illustrating this point, one patient reports: “I 
feel pains in my chest, but they seem to belong to someone else, not to me” 
(Mayer-Gross, 1935, 114). 
In sum, these patients feel as uncomfortable with the idea that their own 
body is in this or that condition, as they are with the idea of it being themselves 
who feel it to be. Explicit Reflexivity allows to frame this within a more general 
distortion of the awareness of phenomenally conscious experiences as one’s 
own: plausibly, one will have trouble self-attributing a felt body if one is unsure 
of there being a proper experiencing self to whom the body belongs. In other 
words, one cannot have a SBO without having a SEO. 
 
4.2.3.2. SEO without SBO: Somatoparaphrenia 
 
Somatoparaphrenia has been reported mostly in patients with right brain 
damage who have motor and somatosensory deficit, as well as unilateral spatial 
neglect. Gerstmann (1942) coined the term – somatoparaphrenia – to refer to 
“illusions or distortions concerning the perception of and confabulations or 
delusions referring to the affected limbs or side” (895). In particular, 
somatoparaphrenia is characterised by the productive symptom (Vallar, 1998) 
by which patients claim, about the contralesional side of their bodies, that it 
doesn’t belong to them, sometimes attributing it to somebody else. For the 
periods of time in which the delusion occurs, patients hold their disownership 
beliefs recalcitrantly. The following reports of patients in conversation with 
their examiners illustrate the impenetrability of their disownership delusion: 
 
E: Can you name all your left fingers as you touch them, please? (He performs 
the task well). 
P: But they are not mine. 
E: Well, whose fingers can they possibly be? 
P: I don’t really know. 
E: Look at this hand (patient’s left hand ), very carefully: whose hand could it be? 
P: I don’t know… may be it is mine. But no, I’m sure, it isn’t mine, I don’t feel it 
as my hand. 
E: (The examiner put her left hand under the patient’s one) Try to touch your 
left hand with your right one, please. 
P: Here it is! (He caught the examiner’s hand). 
E: Whose hand are you touching? 
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P: It is mine. 
E: And whose is this? (while E is touching the patient’s left hand). 
P: This is yours. 
(Cogliano et al., 2011, 765) 
 
“Mine or yours? It’s a female hand. It could be of the nurse but it wears my 
pyjamas. It’s strange.” … “I woke up last night and called the nurse because 
there was this hand here and I thought that Nadia forgot it. I wanted to give it 
back to her. She cannot work without it. Poor Nadia.” (Gandola et al., 2012, 
1177) 
 
E: Mr. C., look at this. What is this? P: Your hand. E: My hand? Are you sure? P: 
Yes, of course. It couldn’t be mine. E: Why? P: It looks groomer than mine. E: 
From zero to ten, how much are you sure that this is not your hand? P: Ten. E: 
How much are you sure that it is mine? P: Nine and a half. E: (after placing his 
left hand near the patient’s one). Can you choose your own hand among these 
ones? P: They are both of you. E: (after placing both his right and left hands near 
CP’s one). And now? P: They are yours. E: All of them three? P: Yes. E: Don’t 
you think they are too many hands for me? P: (smiling at the examiner). You are 
a polyp! (Invernizzi et al., 2013, 149) 
Importantly, cases have been reported in the literature in which, still endorsing 
their beliefs of disownership, patients report to feel sensations in their 
disowned limbs. I have referred to one of these cases in Chapter 1 (section 
1.3): Moro et al. (2004) describe two right brain-damaged patients with tactile 
extinction in their contralesional hand, whose tactile detection increases when 
stimuli are delivered to their left hand placed in the right hemispace. Spatial 
disposition, however, has no effects in reports of disownership: they keep 
claiming that their left hand does not belong to them, regardless of where it is 
located. Aglioti et al. (1996) describe a case of the same type. Their patient C.B. 
suffered a right hemisphere stroke and presented motor and sensory deficits in 
the left side of her body. Positioning her left hand in the right space brought in 
“dramatic improvement” in the left hand accuracy. Yet, they point out, “[i]t is 
remarkable that when the left hand was in the heteronymous hemispace C.B. 
reported feeling stimuli on a hand that, in her opinion, did not belong to her” 
(295). A relevantly similar case is reported in Bottini et al. (2002), whose 
patient F.B. attributed her impaired left hand to her niece. Examiners explored 
the relation between her tactile deficit and her delusion by briefly touching the 
dorsal surface of her hand and warning her, at each trial, that they were going 
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to touch either her right hand, her left hand, or her niece’s hand. F.B’s tactile 
imperception only recovered, dramatically, when she was required to report 
touches delivered to her niece’s hand – namely those which matched her 
delusion. 
These cases make of somatoparaphrenia the paradigmatic pathological 
condition as for the lack of a SBO. Somatoparaphrenic patients undergo bodily 
sensations that, judging by their reports, are localised – i.e. all reports include 
specific references to hands. However, they simultaneously deny that the hands 
in which they feel touch are their own. 
Relevantly for us, in the reports of these patients there is no indication 
that they do not have a SEO for the sensations they report to feel in their 
disowned limbs – even if they are only mild. Their delusion is restricted to self-
attribution of the relevant body parts: they do not manifest a more 
encompassing uneasiness with their psychological lives that should suggest a 
problem of self-consciousness of a more general nature. In this sense, the 
general schema of their pathology is logically compatible with the relation of 
dependence dictated by Explicit Reflexivity: the SBO requires of the presence 
of the SEO, the view says, but not vice versa. It is in principle possible, then, 
to have a SEO for one’s sensations without having a SBO for the body part 
where they are localised. Admittedly however, cases of this type call for an 
explanatory hypothesis about the specific phenomenology of the bodily 
experiences involved. 123  For, if they have a SEO for their sensations, why 
should these patients not have a SBO for the relevant body parts? 
In what follows I will argue that an explanatory hypothesis is available that 
is compatible with Explicit Reflexivity. The proposal is that somatoparaphrenic 
patients who have sensations in their disowned limbs experience these limbs as 
they experience other worldly objects. Explicit Reflexivity offers a way of 
actually substantiating this claim: the somatosensory experiences by which 
somatoparaphrenic patients pick out their disowned limbs do not convey 
properties as experience-dependent. The proper specification of the content of 
these experiences of theirs is thus the following: 
 
ExperienceM (P is instantiated in L), 
 
                                                 
123  Just as my proposal, and the general line of research pursued in this dissertation, are 
phenomenological, the hypothesis wanted here is about the possible phenomenological 
specificities of somatoparaphrenic experiences, and not about their cognitive underpinnings. 
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where “ExperienceM” stands for a somatosensory experience – e.g. a tactile 
experience – which patients ordinarily self-attribute. Since the content of the 
experience is as described, patients do not self-attribute the body part 
ultimately represented by it. 
For an illustration of this point, consider the contrast between ordinary 
experiences of coloured objects and afterimages – in particular, for the sake of 
the argument, consider the contrast between ordinary experiences of coloured 
objects, and the intuition about afterimages vindicated by sensationalists. 
Suppose now that a red apple stands on the table in front of me. In normal 
circumstances, Redness is such that I experience it as a property of the apple 
itself, namely a property the apple has independently of my perceptual relation 
with it. This is so even if we admit that, for all normal experiences of red, there 
is a qualitative property involved in the experience – which we can call RedV. 
Qua qualitative property, RedV is an experience-dependent property. Ordinary 
perceptual experiences as of red apples, however, are such that we “look 
through” RedV. 
On the other hand, there is such thing as the perception of a red 
afterimage, for instance after directly looking at the sun. The relevant intuition 
dictates that, in this case, the colour perceived is not attributed in the 
experience to anything that the experience represents. Rather, in this case RedV 
stands out as such, so that we predicate it from a putative visual field. 
Experiencing colour in this way is experiencing it as experience-dependent, I have 
claimed: in contrast to red apples, the red visual field is “our own” in a peculiar 
sense. 
The contrast just described between the perception of a red apple and the 
perception of a red afterimage is indeed a phenomenological one. It is 
important to note, though, that there is something, also qualitative, that 
remains constant across the two cases. Both experiences count as instances of 
visual perception, and not only in the sense that both of them involve the 
visual system. It is also the case that I have been able to describe both 
experiences as involving red rather unproblematically. There is something 
essential to RedV that allows us to group experiences as of red objects and 
experiences as of red afterimages – as opposed to, say, blue objects and blue 
afterimages – as members of a type, and which is independent from our 
awareness of the experience-dependency of the property. 
From the point of view of Explicit Reflexivity, somatoparaphrenic 
patients feel tactile sensations in their disowned limbs as they see Redness in 
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red apples. To put it more precisely, let us take DepressedS to be the property 
they feel instantiated in their hand when their examiners touch it. I have argued 
that, in ordinary cases, DepressedS is felt in the hand in a way akin to how 
RednessV is part of the experience in (sensationalist) afterimages. But, I have 
just pointed out, nothing about the quality of colours prevents us from seeing 
them as properties of worldly objects, circumstances allowing. My suggestion is 
that, in parallel, nothing intrinsic to DepressedS precludes the possibility of it 
being experienced as a property of objects perceived as standing beyond the 
bodily field. More generally put, nothing intrinsic to DepressedS makes it the 
case that they must be experienced as experience-dependent. This explains the 
character of the relevant tactile experiences of somatoparaphrenic patients. 
Instantiations of DepressedS are anyway experience-dependent: they would not 
occur if patients were not having the experiences by which they perceive, as 
well, what are in fact the examiner’s fingertips against their flesh. But this is not 
straightforwardly equivalent to subjects being aware of the experience-
dependency of the property. In abnormal circumstances, such as those of 
somatoparaphrenia, subjects may “look through” DepressedS. 
This is in principle compatible with the fact that, even if abnormal, these 
experiences count as somatosensory in type, not just because they are caused 
by the relevant cutaneous receptors, but because of their qualitative properties. 
For instance, these experiences probably are qualitatively akin to other tactile 
experiences the patients have, localised in limbs that they do feel as their own. 
Patient F.B. of Bottini et al. (2002) is useful as a case in point here: the 
examiners’ warning that they are going to touch her hand brings about a 
sensation – arguably not any sensation, but a tactile one. The authors write that 
“[i]mmediately after the experiment we asked F.B. how she could report touches 
on someone else’s hand” (my italics), to which F.B. admitted: “[y]es, I know, it is 
strange” (251). As much as it confirms that she feels what appears to her to be 
someone else’s hand, and that she finds this strange, F.B.’s statement is a 
confirmation that what she feels is what the examiners announce, namely 
touch. 
In order to refine the present discussion on somatoparaphrenia, there is 
yet a further argumentative spin of Explicit Reflexivity to be taken into 
account. On the one hand, the point we are at now concerning 
somatoparaphrenia is this: (a) somatoparaphrenic patients have sensations 
localised in parts of their body; (b) these sensations involve experience-
dependent properties; (c) the patients do not feel as their own the body parts 
 165 
conveyed by these sensations; (d) the reason for (c) is that the sensations do 
not convey their properties as experience-dependent. On the other hand, Explicit 
Reflexivity proposes the notion of bodily field to specify the distinctive way in 
which the body is ordinarily perceived in somatosensation. Among perceived 
objects, and in particular those somatosensorily perceived, the body is the 
designated one in the specific sense that it enables, and is perceived as enabling, the 
somatosensory perception of other objects. This role of the body brings in the 
reflexivity expressed by the first-person in the content position in judgments of 
somatosensation. 
According to Explicit Reflexivity, this line of thought analyses what it means 
to have sensations as of properties instantiated in a location in 
somatosensation, and the role of the subsequent experience of bodily 
boundaries. But item (a) mentioned above is true: patients who suffer from 
somatoparaphrenia have sensations as of properties instantiated in a location. 
Hence, the claim that they do not feel PropertiesS as experience-dependent 
might appear deceitful, unless there is evidence that the claim boils down to, or 
can be reformulated as, a claim about these patients’ perception of bodily 
boundaries, and thereby about the patients’ relation to worldly objects beyond 
them. 
Some facts about somatoparaphrenia can be brought up to this effect. To 
start with, the fact that somatoparaphrenia is systematically associated with 
extrapersonal hemineglect (Vallar, 1998), namely an incapacity to represent or 
engage in exploration of extrapersonal space at their contralesional side – that 
is, the side corresponding to the impaired limb. For instance, in the line 
bisection test, in which subjects are asked to mark the centre of a 20 cm 
horizontal line printed on an A4 sheet placed on the mid-sagittal plane of their 
body, patient F.B. (Bottini et al., 2002) made a massive error, marking the mid-
point on the right extreme of the line. In the Albert’s cancellation test, in 
which subjects are asked to cross out 40 short lines printed on an A4 page, 
F.B. crossed out just the six lines on the extreme right side of the paper. 
More generally speaking, somatoparaphrenic patients systematically 
ignore, and have no sense whatsoever of, the space immediately beyond their 
impaired limbs and the objects in it, and typically are off-target when required 
to reach for objects on this area. In their review of the literature on 
somatoparaphrenia, Vallar and Ronchi (2009) write that “[t]he closer 
association between somatoparaphrenia and extrapersonal neglect may reflect 
the fact that one main feature of somatoparaphrenia is a blurred distinction 
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between corporeal (namely, the patients body parts), and extracorporeal 
objects (namely, body parts of other persons, or other non-corporeal objects)” 
and that “[t]his type of impairment may involve a disordered representation of 
objects in extrapersonal space” (545). In the context of Explicit Reflexivity, 
part of this spatial deficit can be explained by the fact that, in the 
representation of the part of extrapersonal space in their contralesional side, 
the patients cannot benefit from mapping the properties of external objects on 
the properties of their own body, that is, of the body experienced as a sensory 
field. In other words, conditions are not met for PropertiesRW to be grounded 
on PropertiesS. 
Other pieces of data worth mentioning here are, firstly, the difficulties of 
some somatoparaphrenic patients to fully picture the contour of their own 
bodies. For instance, patient A.F. from Moro et al.’s (2004) study, who was 
able to draw from memory a prototype of a human figure, draw her own body 
image with three question marks in the area where her left hand should have 
been. Secondly, some patients, such as A.G. from Cogliano et al.’s (2011) 
study, suffer from tactile allochiria: A.G. could detect light touch stimuli 
delivered to his impaired left hand, but on 30% of the trials he transposed the 
stimuli from left to right. This constitutes a reason to think that yet another 
prediction of Explicit Reflexivity regarding spatial perception in 
somatoparaphrenia is spot-on: since the relevant tactile sensations do not 
belong to their bodily field, somatoparaphrenic patients have problems to 
adequately locate these sensations in their bodies, as well as to situate them in 
relation to other properties that are constituents of the field – that is, 
ultimately, in relation to other bodily parts. 
This brings me to the very last consideration regarding 
somatoparaphrenia. Nothing of what has been said implies that 
somatoparaphrenic patients do not have a bodily field. For all ordinary bodily 
sensations that these patients have, these sensations unproblematically involve 
properties experienced as experience-dependent. These properties will 
therefore be properly related to one another, and will represent the body that 
the patients will normally self-attribute. The substantive point about this 
condition is that, for all the sensations that concern their disowned limbs, the 
properties conveyed by these sensations are not constituents of the bodily 
field. 
The range of pathologies involving some sort of bodily estrangement is 
vast and diverse, and it is not always obvious at which point in the spectrum 
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each specific case should be placed: there are indeed cases in which the presence 
of a SBO is less clear than it is in clear-cut cases of non-pathology; and there 
are also cases in which the lack of a SBO is less clear than it is in clear-cut cases 
of lack of SBO such as somatoparaphrenia. The difficulty of properly 
describing each of these cases is partly due to the difficulty that patients 
themselves have to make meaningful reports that capture their experiences, as 
well as to a corresponding difficulty to interpret these reports. Since there is a 
plethora of such cases, it would be unrealistic to make the case here that my 
account can offer an interpretation of all of them. 
Nevertheless, one can already see how the kind of material I have 
deployed in the treatment of depersonalisation and somatoparaphrenia would 
help me deal with all this range of cases. My view is compatible with the SBO 
being somehow flexible and gradable, since it is a product of various factors: 
the amount of PropertiesS making up the bodily field, as well as their quality 
and relative phenomenal saliency – all of them diachronically variable, and 
directly bearing on the phenomenal richness and presence of the bodily field. 
All of those, in turn, are a function of the type and amount of somatosensory 
experiences subjects have, and whether or not they have a SEO for these 
experiences. 
With this in mind, I will close this section by briefly mentioning two more 
pathologies that concern specifically the SBO, without in principle involving 
general SEO impairments. In this sense, as I mentioned, they are at least 
logically compatible with Explicit Reflexivity. The first pathology plausibly 
illustrates the fact that membership of a group of bodily sensations, and their 
corresponding PropertiesS, to a subject’s bodily field is graded, and hence more 
or less clear-cut felt. Xenomelia – also called apotemnophilia or Body Identity 
Integrity Disorder (BIID) – is a condition in which subjects have a desire for 
amputation of a healthy limb (Sedda and Bottini, 2014). This desire is 
reportedly related to an oppressive feeling that the limb in question does not 
belong to oneself and that, if the limb were amputated, one’s identity would be 
restored. Patients often report the feeling that they would be “complete”, 
instead of “overcomplete”, if they had the relevant body part removed (First, 
2005; Hilti et al., 2013; Romano et al., 2015). Patients with xenomelia do not 
have motor or sensory deficits, and their disorder is not better explained by 
other medical or psychiatric syndromes (Ryan, 2009). The following is a report 
from one patient: 
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“I don’t understand where it comes from or what it is. I just don’t want legs. 
Inside I feel that my legs don’t belong to me, they shouldn’t be there. At best my 
legs seem extraneous. I would almost say as if they’re not part of me although I 
feel them, I see them, I know they are . . .”. (BBC Documentary Complete 
Obsession, 3rd April, 2019)124 
 
As this report illustrates, xenomelic patients are perfectly aware that the limb 
they reject is actually their own (“my legs don’t belong to me”). They are not 
delusional, and they in fact acknowledge the awkwardness of their desire. In 
this sense, their condition is similar to depersonalisation, although concerning 
bodily awareness exclusively. Despite this acknowledgment, however, their 
desire for amputation is so compelling that it might result into clinically 
significant distress, sometimes leading patients to attempting self-amputation. 
Xenomelia is often read as revealing a mismatch between the biological 
body of the patients and their representation of it (e.g. First, 2005; 
Ramachandran and McGeoch, 2007). From the point of view of Explicit 
Reflexivity, this can be made more precise by saying that, for those bodily 
sensations by which xenomelic patients feel the “disowned” limb, at least some 
of these sensations do not convey properties experienced as experience-
dependent. A consequence of this is that they urgently want to get rid of the 
“object” attached to their body. Maybe because not all the sensations by which 
they feel the limb have this sort of content, or because of their sensitivity to 
other beliefs they hold, according to which their rejected limb is their own, 
these patients are not as resolute in their denial of ownership as 
somatoparaphrenic patients are. In line with this softening of the condition, 
they are generally functional. However, they do report feeling relieved when 
they engage in pretence behaviour, such as tying their leg so that it fits their 
desired body shape. In other words, they feel relieved when they can engage 
with the environment dealing with their own body only. 
The last pathology worth mentioning here is congenital insensitivity to 
pain (Nagasako et al., 2003). Patients with this condition suffer from an 
impairment to feel pain sensations since birth, showing no reaction to 
pinpricks, pressure, tissue pinching, or harmful thermal stimuli – which they 
can feel and locate, but to which they have no affective response. These 
patients often describe feeling as if their body were an external object or tool 
                                                 
124  At the time of completing this dissertation, this documentary was available at 
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0605138/?ref_=ttep_ep9 . 
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(Frances and Gale, 1975). Again, Explicit Reflexivity would accommodate 
these cases in terms of unawareness of the experience-dependency of felt 
properties, incorporating for instance the moral that de Vignemont (2018, 188) 
draws from these cases: “[t]ouch and vision contribute to the delineation of the 
boundaries of one’s own body, but they do not contribute to the sense of 
bodily ownership in the way that pain does”. In other words, some sets of 
sensations might be more central than others in the configuration of the bodily 
field, at least when it comes to the vividness and, as it were, the “presence to 
consciousness” of the PropertiesS they involve. It might well be the case that a 
subject that has never had the sort of experiences that, I have argued, are 
comparatively more phenomenally salient as such, have a less vivid experience 
of their body as a bodily field.125 
 
4.2.3.3. SEO and SBO: the Rubber Hand Illusion 
The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI; Botvinik and Cohen, 1998) is the central 
experimental paradigm for philosophers working on the SBO. Just to recall, in 
its original setup experimenters have a subject seat with her left arm on a table 
and place a screen beside it in order to hide it from the subject’s view. A 
rubber model of a left arm and hand is then placed on the table in front of the 
subject. The experimenter strokes the rubber hand and the subject’s hand, 
making either synchronous or asynchronous movements, while the subjects’ 
eyes are fixated on the rubber hand. The illusion occurs only in the 
synchronous condition. In this condition, after the stroking subjects report to 
“agree strongly” with the claims that “it seemed as if I were feeling the touch 
of the paintbrush in the location where I saw the rubber hand touched”; “it 
seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching the 
rubber hand”; and “I felt as if the rubber hand were my hand”. Whereas in 
somatoparaphrenia we find patients who deny ownership of their own limbs, 
the last of the claims mentioned suggests that subjects under the RHI have a 
SBO for a limb that is in fact not their own. 
                                                 
125  We could plausibly analyse the case of tool use by following this model too, as de 
Vignemont (2018) suggests. We can have referred sensations in tools, such as tactile 
sensations, but yet we do not generally have a sense of ownership for them – or at least there is 
a sense in which it would seem odd to claim that the spoon with which we stir the soup is 
“ours”. Relevantly, the range of sensations we feel in tools is very limited: for instance, we do 
not feel pain in them. 
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The fact that the illusion only works in the synchronous condition reveals 
the effect of visual capture of touch. When there is spatiotemporal congruence 
of the visual, tactile, and proprioceptive inputs, somatosensation adopts a 
secondary role as for the determination of the location of the felt body, 
shifting its perceived location in the direction of the hand that the subject sees. 
The first two claims endorsed by subjects under the illusion illustrate this 
phenomenon: “it seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the paintbrush in the 
location where I saw the rubber hand touched”; and  “it seemed as though the 
touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching the rubber hand”. Besides, subjects 
typically point to a location closer to the rubber hand than to their own left 
hand when asked where their left hand is after the stroking. Still, this of course 
doesn’t mean that there is no somatosensory experience involved in the RHI: 
subjects indeed locate tactile properties in the rubber hand. 
The illusion created in this experimental paradigm does not concern the 
SEO. Subjects involved in the experiment do not report to feel alienated from 
their tactile sensations in any sense. That is, they have a SEO for their tactile 
experiences, revealed by the relevant first-person pronoun: “it seemed as if I 
were feeling…”, “it seemed as though the touch I felt was…”, or “I felt as if 
the rubber hand were my hand”. Besides, it is clear that the intuition captured 
in the Intuitive Goal, according to which bodily sensations “come with” a 
SBO, is also respected. 
Things being thus, the RHI poses no challenge to Explicit Reflexivity, and 
can be unproblematically accommodated by it. In the RHI, subjects undergo a 
tactile experience the content of which is the rubber hand – namely a tactile 
experience that borrows, as it were, the content of their visual experience. 
Hence, their tactile experience is illusory in two senses: firstly, in that it 
represents the rubber hand as the hand in which touch is occurring, and 
secondly, in that it represents the rubber hand as their own hand. Yet, that 
their tactile experience represents the rubber hand as their own hand shouldn’t 
come as a surprise, insofar as it is a somatosensory experience of the rubber hand. 
In the context of Explicit Reflexivity, somatosensory experiences such as 
tactile experiences typically involve awareness of the relevant properties as 
dependent on experiences themselves, and hence subjects under the RHI have 
a SBO for the object (mistakenly) represented as bearing these properties. 
Following in with Explicit Reflexivity’s main tenets, the felt location of the 
sensation demarcates the extension of the bodily field. One consequence of 
this fact is that when they see the rubber hand being threatened, subjects 
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display increased affective response and withdrawal behaviour – which, of 
course, does not succeed in putting the rubber hand under cover, since they 
can only withdraw their own real hand. Put in terms of Explicit Reflexivity, by 
locating tactile properties in the rubber hand subjects represent it as the hand 
by which they would somatosensorily perceive the threatening instrument, for 
instance by feeling pain.126 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
The considerations presented in this chapter conclude the abductive reasoning 
in favour of Explicit Reflexivity that I have deployed throughout the 
dissertation. The demand for an illumination of the explanatory knitting 
between the SBO and that which specifies it has been addressed by putting 
forward Explicit Reflexivity in Chapter 3: that chapter explores the possibility 
of embedding the specific kind of reflexivity of canonical expressions of 
judgments of somatosensation into the very content of somatosensation. To 
this effect, I argued, including the SEO in the explanans becomes urgent – 
besides the independent plausibility of the move. 
As a result, Explicit Reflexivity fares better than its alternatives in meeting 
the goals defined, as I have argued in the present chapter. Embedding a 
reference to the subject of the experience in the content and phenomenology 
of bodily experiences is the straightforward way to meet the Judgment 
Formation Goal. Besides, philosophical tools are at our disposal to show that 
exteroceptive experiences do not generally have a content or a phenomenology 
akin to those attributed here to somatosensation. The Intuitive Goal is thereby 
met.127 Finally, the abductive defence of my proposal includes the fact that 
some central empirical cases which concern the SBO can be accommodated by 
it. Indications on how further cases could be treated are also provided. This, I 
have argued, amounts to meeting the Empirical Goal. 
                                                 
126 This line of reasoning could in principle be deployed in relation to all the bodily illusions 
obtained by visual capture of touch, such as the Tool Ownership Illusion (Cardinali et al., 
under revision. Cited in de Vignemont, 2018), the Invisible Hand Illusion (Guterstam et al., 
2013), the Supernumerary Hand Illusion (Guterstam et al., 2011), the Full-Body Illusion 
(Lenggenhager et al., 2007), or the Out-of-Body Illusion (Ehrsson, 2007). 
127 I have also argued, however, that cases of exteroception that might have akin contents and 
phenomenology are, in any case, not an unsurmountable challenge to Explicit Reflexivity 
(section 4.1.1, “The objection from afterimages”). 
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Conclusions 
 
 
What I have done 
 
This thesis has been an investigation into the feasibility of a fully experientialist 
account on the SBO. An original Experientialist Account, Explicit Reflexivity, 
has been proposed and defended. On the way to proposing and defending the 
account, I have put forward several claims, significant for the debate on the 
SBO as well as for philosophical discussions on self-consciousness more 
generally. 
In Chapter 1 I have proposed a non question-begging notion of sense of 
bodily ownership (SBO), taking judgments of somatosensation in which the body 
is qualified with a first-person indexical as a datum and an explanandum. I 
have identified three core features of the SBO thus defined: the involvement 
of the first-person in it; the seeming compellingness of this involvement; and 
its empirical relevance. With this non question-begging notion and its analysis, 
I have helped settle the debate on the SBO. I have articulated it as the attempt 
to answer the Constitutive Question, and I have put forward three desiderata 
that views on the SBO must satisfy. Each of these desiderata flow from one 
characteristic feature of the SBO. I have labelled these desiderata the Judgment 
Formation Goal, the Intuitive Goal, and the Empirical Goal. 
Still in Chapter 1, I have pointed out the parallel between the SBO and 
another phenomenon, the sense of experience ownership (SEO). I have put forward 
an also non question-begging definition of the SEO, and I have proposed 
three basic features of it, analogous to those of the SBO. I have thereby 
contributed to settling the debate on the SEO, articulating it as the attempt to 
answer the Constitutive Question – E. I have proposed three desiderata for 
views within this debate, which flow from the central features of the SEO. I 
have called these desiderata Judgment Formation Goal – E, Intuitive Goal – E, and 
Empirical Goal – E. 
By presenting these two notions and debates, I have stressed the 
philosophical significance of their similarities. This significance has been 
emphasised by pointing out the remarkable metaphysical differences between 
experiences and bodies qua owned phenomena. This has been taken as part of 
the motivation for the type of approach to the SBO defended in this 
dissertation, according to which there are explanatory relations between it and 
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the SEO. I have further underpinned this sort of project by pointing out that 
the SEO and the SBO co-occur in bodily experiences, and that this co-
occurrence is not anecdotal or accidental. Rather, it manifests that several of 
the senses in which we say of subjects that they are self-conscious converge in 
somatosensation. The specific explanatory relation that I hold – namely that 
the SEO is part of an explanation of the SBO – has been initially motivated 
with the observation that the SEO is more pervasive a phenomenon than the 
SBO. 
I have opened Chapter 2 by going into detail about what it means for a 
fully Experientialist Account on the SBO to meet the Judgment Formation Goal. 
I have analysed canonical expressions of judgments of somatosensation as 
containing, as part of their (first-personal) content, a reference to the subject of 
the experience qua subject of the experience. I have established that this is the 
sort of reflexivity that views on the SBO need to explain. In particular, 
Experientialism about the SBO is committed to embedding this sort of 
reflexivity in the content of bodily experiences. I have also justified the value 
of a minimal form of Experientialism. 
Chapter 2 has had a mainly critical aim. I have shown that Spatial 
Deflationism and Property Deflationism fall short of accounting for the SBO. The 
general line of my arguments has been the following: if we reduce the 
experience of the body as our own to an aspect of somatosensation that 
exteroception also has, then it is not clear why only in the former the body 
stands out in the way it does. The farthest a proposal of this sort can go is to 
establish a brute a posteriori identity between the SBO and that which specifies 
it. This leaves an explanatory gap between the content of somatosensory 
experiences and the reflexive expression thereof. For these reasons, I have 
argued, Spatial Deflationism and Property Deflationism fail at meeting the 
Judgment Formation Goal and the Intuitive Goal. 
Chapter 2 has a more positive outcome as well. On the one hand, I have 
presented the various types of Deflationism as having shortages of the same 
sort. On the other hand, I have clearly stated the central tenets of Spatial 
Deflationism and Property Deflationism as for their description of bodily 
experiences, respectively the sense of boundedness and the experience-dependency of 
the properties involved in somatosensation. I have also presented the theses on 
the SBO associated to these tenets, namely the Boundedness Thesis and the 
Property Thesis. These considerations shed light on the debate on the SBO by 
defining the scope and limitations of a given set of views within it. 
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In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I have put forward my original proposal on 
the SBO and I have defended it against several objections. Explicit Reflexivity 
takes in the basic aspects of bodily experiences put forward by Spatial 
Deflationism and Property Deflationism: the sense of boundedness and the 
experience-dependency of properties. These two aspects converge, I have 
argued, in the notion of a bodily field. The view hence explains the SBO by 
spelling out the basic idea of having sensations as of properties in a location. 
Besides, Explicit Reflexivity includes the SEO as part of the specification of 
the SBO. This fulfils the independently motivated idea of there being 
explanatory relations between the SEO and the SBO. 
The inclusion of the SEO in the specification of the SBO follows from 
the very notion of bodily field, I have argued. This inclusion confers bodily 
experiences with the desired sort of reflexivity: by being token reflexive, 
ordinary bodily experiences include a reference to the experience itself as part 
of their content. But experiences are typically marked as one’s own. The content 
of bodily experiences therefore typically includes a reference to the subject of 
the experience. Explicit Reflexivity thus captures the actual philosophical 
significance of the fact that the SEO and the SBO co-occur in bodily 
experiences. 
I have argued that, by cashing out things in this way, Explicit Reflexivity 
meets the Judgment Formation Goal. Furthermore, the type of content and 
phenomenology of somatosensory experiences that this view exploits is 
exclusive of them, vis à vis exteroception. Hence, the view satisfies the 
Intuitive Goal. Finally, I have shown that Explicit Reflexivity is extensionally 
adequate, at least for a significant set of empirical and pathological cases. Since 
it meets the three desiderata, Explicit Reflexivity has been shown to stand in a 
better position than the deflationist positions available in the literature. 
In sum, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I believe to have shown that a fully 
experientialist view on the SBO that demands as parsimonious a content to 
bodily experiences as authors generally agree on is possible. I have done so 
mainly on the grounds of phenomenological reflection about bodily sensations. 
My proposed view, furthermore, settles general worries about the significance 
of discussions on bodily awareness within discussions on self-consciousness 
more generally. 
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What to do next 
 
The work here presented opens up further lines of research that I think are 
worthwhile pursuing. To wrap things up, I will mention two of them. 
A natural step to take after this dissertation is to engage in the debate on 
the SEO. Simply acknowledging the existence of the SEO was enough for the 
purposes of this thesis. Nevertheless, a full-fledged development of Explicit 
Reflexivity requires a positive account of this phenomenon. Just to recall, a 
fully explanatory proposal on the SEO will account for the self-attribution of 
experiences typically yielded by one’s undergoing them; for the seeming 
compellingness of this self-attribution; and for the empirical cases relevant to 
the discussion. 
It is worth noticing that, as a matter of fact, the project on the SEO is 
intimately connected with the extremely well explored topic of what it is, 
generally, for a mental state to be phenomenally conscious. I will not go into 
the details of this discussion here. 128  For the purposes of illustrating this 
connection, it is useful enough to mention the classical Nagelian (1974) phrase: 
if a state is phenomenally conscious, then there is something it is like for a 
subject to undergo this state. In Chapter 1 (section 1.4.3) I warned about the 
leap involved in claiming that I undergo a certain phenomenally conscious 
experience on the grounds of there being a phenomenally conscious experience. 
But, as should be clear by now, this is not to deny the intuition of a necessary 
connection between the latter and the former. As I see it, the more effective a 
theory of phenomenal consciousness is in yielding an explanation of the 
subjectivity typically involved in phenomenally conscious states, the better 
theory of phenomenal consciousness it is. Of course, there are independent 
arguments that favour some views about phenomenal consciousness over 
others in this specific respect. But Explicit Reflexivity might constitute a 
further element to take into account: subjectivity, in the sense of the SEO, 
plays a role in accounting for our experience of the body as our own in 
somatosensation. Hence, accounts of phenomenal consciousness that ease the 
explanatory involvement of the SEO into the SBO are to be preferred. I 
contend that the accounts of phenomenal consciousness that ease this 
involvement are those compatible with Experientialism about the SEO. 
Another research avenue that this dissertation opens up concerns the 
notion of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). IEM has been 
                                                 
128 For a useful discussion of the connection between these two debates, see Guillot (2017). 
 177 
central in studies on self-consciousness in the intersection of philosophy of 
mind and epistemology in the last few decades.129 IEM is a special type of 
epistemic security arguably displayed, on the one hand, by judgments of 
experience, and on the other hand, by judgments of somatosensation in 
normal conditions. In this thesis I haven’t dealt with epistemological matters. 
However, the transition from the discussion on the senses of ownership to the 
debate on IEM seems to me straightforward, and very illuminating. I think that 
there are substantive things to say about the relation between SEO and the 
psychological self-ascriptions that are IEM, as well as about the relation 
between SBO and the bodily self-ascriptions that are IEM. 
In order to clarify this, I need to briefly introduce the notion of IEM. It 
was Shoemaker (1968) who famously coined the idea that some judgments in 
which subjects report mental states in the first person are immune to the error 
through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. A judgment “I 
am P”, where P is a psychological property, is IEM relative to “I” if it cannot 
be the case that the judgment is mistaken because the thinker is wrongly taking 
the individual she knows to have P to be herself.130 In other words, it cannot 
be the case that she knows of somebody that she has P, but yet she is wrong that 
it is herself who has P. 
The interest of defining this feature of judgments very much concerns 
which judgments actually have the feature. Judgments are only analysable in 
terms of their IEM, or their lack thereof, relative to certain grounds. In 
particular, Shoemaker’s point is that psychological self-ascriptions are IEM 
when made on the grounds of accessing the relevant property introspectively – 
or, to put it in the terms resorted to in this thesis, when made on the grounds 
of the subject’s phenomenal awareness of the psychological property. For instance, 
if “I am thinking of you” is a judgment of experience – that is, if I get to it on 
the grounds of my experience of thinking of you – 131  then the following 
mistake is precluded: it cannot be the case that I know of some particular 
individual that she entertains the relevant thought, but I mistakenly think that it 
is me who does. 
                                                 
129 For a fairly recent monograph on the topic, see Prosser and Recanati (2012). 
130 Fort the sake of this brief exposition, I am sticking to Shoemaker’s formulation of the error 
through misidentification, and of the immunity thereof, in terms of knowledge of properties and 
their bearers. 
131 Instead of getting to it on the grounds of, say, my therapist’s opinions about what I tend to 
inadvertently think of. If so, then the judgment would not be IEM: it could be the case that my 
therapist had mislaid her files, and hence that I knew of some person or other that she thinks 
of you, but mistakenly took this person to be myself. 
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The moral of this analysis is that there is a special type of epistemic 
security in the use of “I” that psychological self-ascriptions have in virtue of 
being judgments of experience. Now, in discussion with Shoemaker, Evans 
(1982) famously noticed that this sort of epistemic security does not hold only 
for psychological self-ascriptions. Rather, he pointed out, in normal conditions 
a similar sort of security obtains for self-ascriptions of bodily properties, if they 
are made on the grounds of somatosensation. For instance, if I claim that “My legs 
are crossed” because I somatosensorily feel them to be crossed, 132  then in 
principle it will not be the case that I know of somebody’s legs that they are 
crossed, but yet I am wrong about them being my legs. If made on 
somatosensory grounds, this judgment will in principle be IEM relative to the 
first-person pronoun “my”. Again, the moral of the analysis is that there is a 
special type of epistemic security in the use of the first-person that bodily self-
ascriptions typically have in virtue of being judgments of somatosensation. 
As far as I see, the fact that, when it comes to the involvement of the first-
person in judgments, both judgments of experience and judgments of 
somatosensation are analysable in terms of IEM is yet another expression of a 
certain unity between the two. In particular, it is the expression of a structural 
similarity in the relation between these judgments and their grounds. 
Shoemaker and Evans’ own approach to the phenomenon of IEM will help 
me articulate my point here. On their view, judgments that are IEM relative to 
the first-person pronoun are made on grounds that do not involve an identification 
component. Hence the possibility of misidentification is precluded. As Evans 
puts it, when it comes to these grounds, 
 
[t]here does not appear to be a gap between the subject’s having information (or 
appearing to have information), in the appropriate way, that the property … is 
instantiated, and his having information (or appearing to have information) that 
he is F; for him to have, or appear to have, the information that the property is 
instantiated just is for it to appear to him that he is F. (221)133 
 
When it comes to judgments of experience, the proposed explanation for their 
IEM relative to the first-person pronoun in the subject position has to do with 
the following putative fact: whenever the subject is phenomenally aware of the 
                                                 
132 Instead of claiming so because I see a pair of crossed legs, in which case the judgment will 
not be IEM. 
133 Where, for the sake of this brief exposition, F can be read either as a psychological or a 
physical property. 
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occurrence of a mental state, she will eo ipso be aware that she herself has the 
mental state – or, in other words, she will eo ipso be aware of that mental state 
as her own. In turn, as for judgments of somatosensation, the proposed 
explanation for their IEM relative to the first-person pronoun in the content 
position has to do with another putative fact: whenever the subject is 
somatosensorily aware of a certain bodily property, she will eo ipso be aware that 
she herself has the bodily property – or, in other words, she will eo ipso be 
aware of the body instantiating the property as her own.134 
Importantly, the Shoemaker-Evans line of explanation of IEM is built 
around the endorsement of an intuition central to this thesis: that there is a 
necessary link between the occurrence of certain mental states and the subject’s 
awareness of the relevant mental states as involving herself. Discussions on the 
SEO and the SBO, I have claimed, must focus partly on specifying, either 
phenomenally conscious states generally or somatosensory experiences in 
particular, in a way that clarifies why they typically involve the subject herself. I 
captured this idea under the Intuitive Goal and the Intuitive Goal – E. It is 
thus not news that the descriptive picture of experiences that we offer when 
engaging in the SEO and the SBO debates, while meeting the Intuitive goals, 
explains not only why the relevant experiences yield first-person judgments, 
but also some of the epistemic features of these judgments. These 
considerations invite a reformulation of our Judgment Formation goals, as 
follows: 
 
[Judgment Formation Goal]*: any account of the SBO must explain the fact 
that we self-attribute the felt body for all judgments of somatosensation in 
which we do so, as well as offer an account of the epistemic features of 
                                                 
134 Besides these feature of the grounds, the full explanation of the phenomenon of IEM – that 
is, of the possibility of a mistake in the judgments – needs to bring in the metaphysics. 
Furthermore, taking the metaphysics into account arguably gives us a clue about the distinction 
between logical immunity, usually assumed to be at stake for psychological self-ascriptions, and 
de facto immunity, assumed to be in place in bodily self-ascriptions. As previously suggested, it 
might well be the case that, given a subject S and an experience E, what it means for E to 
belong to S is just that S is phenomenally aware of E. Hence, part of the reason why, if S 
judges E to be her own on phenomenal grounds, she cannot possibly be mistaken, might well be 
the fact that the experiences judged to be her own on these grounds will necessarily be her 
own. By contrast, we have criteria for assigning a body B to S, other than the fact that S feels B 
somatosensorily. It is thus conceivable that S feels someone else’s body somatosensorily, 
despite this not being the case in normal conditions. Arguably, part of the reason why, if S 
judges B to be her own on the grounds of somatosensation, S will (only) typically not fail, has to 
do with the fact that the body that S feels somatosensorily is S’s own (only) typically. 
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these judgments, such as the IEM relative to the first-person pronoun by 
which we express the bodily self-attribution. 
 
[Judgment Formation Goal – E]*: any account of the SEO must explain the 
fact that we self-attribute phenomenally conscious experiences for all 
judgments of experience in which we do so, as well as offer an account of 
the epistemic features of these judgments, such as the IEM relative to the 
first-person pronoun by which we express the psychological self-
attribution. 
 
The limited scope of this dissertation didn’t recommend this starred 
formulation of the Judgment Formation goals. Yet, it seems clear to me that 
these formulations just make explicit an assumption implicit in the very 
definition of IEM: debates on the SEO and the SBO are explanatorily more 
fundamental than the debate on psychological and bodily IEM respectively. 
Indeed, authors trying to explain why, for some psychological and bodily self-
ascriptions, the use of the first-person in them is epistemically secure in this 
respect need to focus on what is special about phenomenal awareness of 
mental states vis à vis knowing them by testimony; and on what is special 
about somatosensory awareness of the body vis à vis, for instance, perceiving it 
exteroceptively. 
Relatedly, we know that some empirical cases challenge the mentioned 
intuition of necessity both for the SEO and the SBO. These cases include 
thought insertion and somatoparaphrenia respectively. It is worth recalling that 
both thought insertion and somatoparaphrenia have been treated in the 
literature as putative challenges to the IEM thesis.135 We are now in a position 
to see why: these cases reopen the question whether the grounds for the self-
ascriptions involve an identification component or not. Given the explanatory 
relations indicated, the following appears reasonable: how serious a challenge 
the empirical cases pose to the IEM of the relevant self-ascriptions will be a 
function of how we establish, via theories on the SEO and the SBO, that the 
grounds work, and thus of the capacity of these theories to accommodate the 
cases. 
                                                 
135 For psychological IEM and thought insertion, see e.g. Campbell (1999, 2002a), Coliva 
(2002), Hu (2017), and Palmira (ms). For bodily IEM and somatoparaphrenia, see e.g. Lane 
and Liang (2009, 2011), Rosenthal (2010), and Kang (2016). 
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Things being thus, in this dissertation I have discussed and set an agenda 
for theories that ultimately shed light on core matters about the epistemology 
of self-consciousness. A bit more ambitiously, I would also like to venture that 
this thesis hints at a positive explanation of the (de facto) IEM of bodily self-
ascriptions. Explicit Reflexivity has it that the grounds for judgments of 
somatosensation typically involve experience-dependent properties 
experienced as such. In turn, this relies on the fact that the grounds on which 
we make judgments of experience yield an awareness of these experiences as 
our own. On this view, then, the nature of the grounds that ultimately account 
for bodily IEM is partly determined by the grounds that would ultimately 
account for psychological IEM. The suggestion is therefore that bodily IEM 
might have to be explained as a product of psychological IEM. That the 
judgment of somatosensation “I can feel that my legs are crossed” is (de facto) 
IEM relative to “my” might have to be explained, at least partly, by the fact 
that it is a judgment of experience, and therefore IEM relative to “I”. 
An account of bodily IEM along these lines would fall squarely into my 
general project, sufficiently motivated in the previous pages: offering a unified 
account of self-consciousness (in somatosensation). This project takes 
seriously the idea that, for each of us, the various ways in which we can be self-
conscious at a time are just ways of being conscious of various aspects of a 
single self at that time. With this thesis I have hopefully made this project 
progress.
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